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The Vision Thing, Continued

A Conservative Research Agenda for the '90s

ADAM MEYERSON

Conservatives are planning to devote more attention to ideas, scholarship, and culture in the 1990s than they did in the 1980s, when the focus was mostly on politics and policy battles in Washington. This is partly out of a perception that, as Communism collapses, the greatest ideological threat to western civilization now comes from within the West's own cultural institutions—the universities, the churches, the professions such as law and medicine, and above all the disintegrating family. There is also a growing sense that with all the compromises necessary in politics, conservatives close to power in the '80s may have wandered from their historical principles, and need to drink again from the wellsprings of philosophy to restore their strength.

It would be a terrible mistake, however, if the renewed emphasis on the battle of ideas came at the expense of engagement in political and policy debates. None of the policy victories of the conservative movement in the 1980s can be taken for granted. As indicated by President Bush's willingness to discuss a peacetime tax increase, principles of the Reagan Revolution that should have been institutionalized still have to be fought for. For all the euphoria over glasnost and the liberation of Eastern Europe, the terms of a post-Cold War world have not yet been negotiated. Conservatives must therefore keep constant pressure on the Bush administration—for example, over its arms control strategies and its rhetoric on China and Lithuania—to make sure that the West maintains its military and ideological strength.

Meanwhile, conservative weakness in cultural institutions should not be exaggerated. The situation on many campuses is very disturbing: freedom of inquiry is under siege, the great works of western civilization are trivialized according to affirmative action categories, the Marxism discredited in Prague and Kiev flourishes in English and psychology departments. However, liberal-left dominance of college faculties has not prevented a majority of young people from voting for Reagan and Bush, nor has it produced any best-selling books in the past decade rivaling Robert Bork's or Allan Bloom's or George Gilder's in influence. Even many professors who would hardly think of themselves as conservatives have been profoundly influenced by ideas of the Right: one thinks of the brilliant critical history of the French Revolution, *Citizens*, by the Harvard historian Simon Schama. The movies of the '80s were much less radical than those of the '60s and '70s, not because of any change in Hollywood politics—actors and directors still held fund-raisers for the Sandinistas—but because movies glorifying radical causes usually proved to be box-office duds.

It would therefore be inappropriate for conservatives to shift gear abruptly in moving from politics to culture. Instead, the cultural strategy of the conservative movement will be most effective if it is closely linked to the political and policy strategy. Intellectual resources might be best expended by supporting scholarship and centers of learning that would advance the overall cultural and political objectives of conservatism. I see six major strategic goals of the conservative movement that require major scholarly work:

1) Maintaining the military and economic strength of the U.S. and the (hopefully expanding) free world.

Military and economic strength will remain as important in the '90s as in the '80s. They are still the paramount issues for conservatives at the ballot box. Moreover, none of the cultural objectives of the conservative movement can be achieved unless America and the West remain economically strong and capable of defending our freedom.

The conservative movement has tremendous intellectual firepower in the national security/foreign policy area, and its ideas here are effectively marketed both to public policymakers and to the national media. Threats to our security will not disappear in the post-Cold War world, nor will ideological conflict in foreign policy, so the generation and marketing of foreign policy ideas will have to remain a top priority for conservatives. The need for SDI, for a credible nuclear deterrent, for long-range power projection, and for capable special forces is as great as ever, and all face powerful opposition, not least from bureaucratic interests within the military. Well-

ADAM MEYERSON *is editor of* Policy Review.

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focused conservative thought on when it is moral to use force will be more important in a world where the United States may face a larger number of small conflicts. Conservative expertise in constitutionalism and human rights also remains critical; democracy involves much more than elections, and democratic institutions have yet to be consolidated in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asian countries like South Korea and the Philippines.

Conservative intellectual strength remains extraordinary in economics. Four leading conservative economists—Friedman, Stigler, Hayek, and Buchanan—have won Nobel Prizes. Monetarism, public choice theory, and supply-side economics continue to have a major impact on public policy both in the United States and in other leading market economies. The bad news is that the younger generation of conservative economists seems to be having less influence on public discourse than did its predecessors. One reason is that economics (including the conservative schools) is becoming more a branch of applied mathematics than a study of human nature and behavior, and is becoming so abstract that it no longer contributes much to policy discussion. A second weakness is that most young conservative economists are too dogmatically libertarian; they have very little sensitivity to legitimate popular concerns for safety, environmental protection, cultural preservation, and other non-economic issues, and are therefore unable to communicate effectively with broader audiences. This may explain in part why the deregulation movement ran out of steam in the '80s, and also why conservatives are in such desperate shape on environmental issues. Politically appealing arguments for the marketplace simply are not being made.

It is worth noting that the economic and military strength of the West during the past 10 years was achieved in spite of overwhelming opposition to conservative economic and defense policies from the media (especially television) and the universities. The reason is that on issues of military strength and tax cuts conservatives had substantial political support among the American people. Thus, although it is important to research bias in the media and in universities, winning the battle of foreign policy and economic ideas in these institutions is not essential to a successful conservative strategy. It is more important to convert the ideas into politically salable rhetoric.

2) Building a conservative political majority—based not only on military and economic strength but on the idea of freedom and the idea of family.

The conservative movement is weak, both intellectually and organizationally, in exploiting its two most powerful ideas, the idea of freedom and the idea of family. The incredible potency of the idea of freedom can be seen in Eastern Europe and in Tiananmen Square, and in America it can be seen, however wrongly applied, in the pro-choice movement. But conservatives have so far failed to translate the worldwide enthusiasm for political liberty into enthusiasm for economic liberty, at home or abroad. This is because the right kind of intellectual groundwork has not yet been laid.

Serious inquiry must be devoted by the conservative movement to a definition of freedom that is philosophically consistent and will have political resonance in the 21st century. Hopefully, libertarians will play a major role in this inquiry, because they are the most intellectually rigorous wing of the conservative movement. At the same time, libertarian absolutism will not suffice: the common sense of the American people will insist that some limits be placed on use of self-destructive drugs, on private racial or sexual discrimination, on ownership of weapons

The conservative movement is weak, both intellectually and organizationally, in exploiting its two most powerful ideas, the idea of freedom and the idea of family.

of mass violence, and on private actions that seriously degrade the environment. The protection of children—an issue virtually never considered in libertarian theory about consenting adults—must be factored into the new definition. The philosophy of freedom must include a moral obligation to help the needy. The reflexive hostility to government of so many conservatives must also be abandoned. The core idea of liberty is that ordinary people are capable of making, and should be free to make, most of the important decisions in their lives; it is perfectly consistent with this idea for people to gather together and make decisions through governments of their own choosing.

Just as freedom is too important to be left exclusively to the libertarians, the family is too important to be left exclusively to the pro-family groups. Existing pro-family groups have been highly effective in mobilizing public outrage over abominations such as state-funded pornography. They have been much less effective building grass-roots support for the family in inner-city and other communities where the family is in the biggest trouble.

America is culturally ready to embrace the message that the breakdown of the family is the country's most serious problem, at the root of our crises in drug abuse, crime, and education. But many Americans who might otherwise support strong pro-family positions shy away from organizations whose views of career women, sex education, or homosexuals are perceived as extreme. There is a large unfilled market for institutions that see the family as the basic building block of a kinder and gentler society, adoption as the best answer to unwanted pregnancy, and marriage as one of the most important routes out of poverty, and that take tough stands against deliberate single motherhood, the abandonment of children by both mothers and fathers, and the breaking

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

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There is a large unfilled market for institutions that see the family as the basic building block of a kinder and gentler society.

of marital obligations—without necessarily dismissing the whole concept of feminism or day-care or sex education in the schools.

Such organizations could greatly benefit from scholarship about the family, about how children are hurt by the absence of a father, and particularly about how successful marriages form and stay together. The Rockford Institute has made a valuable start, but there is otherwise precious little. I recently tried to commission an article for *Policy Review* about marriage as the leading way of getting off welfare; more welfare recipients go off welfare by marrying than for any other reason. To my amazement, I couldn't find a single scholar in the country who had deeply explored the question.

3) Finding solutions for America's terrible problems in education, drugs, and inner-city despair by: a) clearly shifting responsibility for such questions from the federal to state and local governments; b) shaking up state and local bureaucracies so they focus less on providing cushy jobs and more on serving the people they are supposed to help; and c) developing and promoting non-governmental solutions to these problems.

Conservatives talk a great deal about federalism, but really haven't put many intellectual or institutional resources into state and local government. Both conservative political candidates at the state and local level and the recently established conservative state think tanks have been greatly hampered by an insufficient scholarship and information base.

One of the most important research priorities for the conservative movement should be to develop high-quality information about the comparative performance of different state and local governments. If Wisconsin treats the homeless mentally ill more effectively at less cost than does New York, that information should be collected and Mario Cuomo held to account. If South Dakota has better education test scores with lower teacher salaries than Colorado, parents in Denver and Colorado Springs should demand to know why. If the police in Charleston, South Carolina, control street crime more effectively than Atlanta's Finest, then Andy Young should have to do some explaining. Mayor Marion Barry should not be allowed to get away with the District of Columbia's appalling infant mortality rates. Comparative performance information helps spread successful innovations from the different policy laboratories across the country. It will put conservative institutions and candidates at the cutting edge of state and local government reform.

The same can be said of conservative emphasis on private-sector and community-based solutions to social problems. Conservatives talk about them a great deal, but do very little studying of what actually works and can be replicated elsewhere. Most social-welfare programs of leading foundations and most school-improvement programs sponsored by business corporations are as badly designed as—or worse than—similar efforts by government; conservatives need a rich data base and a conceptual framework to explain what's wrong. The Reason Foundation has done a good job studying the privatization of services such as garbage disposal, firefighting, and public utilities. Similar no-nonsense conservative research into private-sector social programs would be highly valuable to community leaders, and is a prerequisite for future transfer of certain public-welfare responsibilities to the private sector. The conservative movement might even consider leading by example—taking the lead ourselves in devising and implementing private community-based approaches to some great national problem such as illiteracy.

4) Sharply reducing long-term dependency in America while preserving government help for those in temporary emergencies.

Not too long ago, it was a social embarrassment to take charity, public or private, on anything but an emergency basis. It is fundamental to a conservative vision of America that this cultural attitude be restored.

A potentially useful distinction, appealing to both the generosity of the American people and its traditional emphasis on self-reliance and community self-help, is that government should provide temporary help for people caught in an emergency, but should not permanently subsidize the able-bodied. Examples of justifiable temporary help might include disaster relief, unemployment insurance, AFDC payments of three or four years to single mothers, temporary import protection for industries suddenly clobbered by foreign competition, and temporary aid to farmers during an unforeseen crisis in the agricultural economy. Examples of permanent, unjustifiable subsidy might include any protectionism or farm aid lasting more than a few years,

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permanent residence in public housing, and AFDC payments to single mothers until their children reach age 18. This distinction could be greatly strengthened by systematic research into the varying time periods during which aid to different kinds of people might be considered justified.

Incidentally, this line of inquiry might prove a way to disentangle the divisive question of racial and sexual preferences. Proponents of affirmative action agree that any form of discrimination is wrong, but they see racial and sexual preferences as necessary correctives for past discrimination against blacks and women. Inquiry into the question of when this temporary corrective should end might clarify the debate, and hasten the emergence of the color-blind policies that all parties in the dispute say they want.

5) Restoring conservative principles and values to the professions, particularly law, medicine, and business and finance.

America's great professions have lost their moorings in recent decades. Neither lawyers nor doctors nor businessmen are sure any more what they stand for. Helping these professions rediscover their own traditional values may well be a more feasible objective for the conservative movement than trying to turn around Hollywood or the universities. It also has more immediate public policy implications.

Conservatives have already made an important start in revitalizing the legal profession. Robert Bork and others are returning the principle of constitutionalism to law. Peter Huber and the Manhattan Institute, among others, are trying to return traditional conceptions of moral responsibility and negligence to tort litigation. The recently founded Federalist Society has quickly become the most important organization examining the first principles of jurisprudence at major law schools.

There is nothing like the Federalist Society at American medical schools, and conservatives have barely begun the intellectual work on medicine that is needed. The paramount questions are whether doctors should ever kill (the medical profession has completely reversed its historic opposition to abortion); what responsibility patients have to improve their own health and safety habits; and how to streamline inefficiencies in health financing and provide care for those not receiving it, while preserving the choice and accountability of a free society. Medicine represents 12 percent of GNP, and, apart from Social Security, health programs account for the largest domestic expenditures of the federal government. Yet, conservatives have put few resources into a field where they could make an important contribution.

Conservative connections to the business world have also weakened in the past decade. Probably the greatest contribution conservatives could make here is to restore the idea that competition, including foreign competition, is one of the greatest virtues of the market economy. Japan's most important comparative advantage, as Michael Porter has recently pointed out, is that its consumer and industrial products markets are the most competitive in the world. This is a lesson that seems to be lost on many American business leaders, who through their own merger activity and embrace of anti-competitive government regulations, seem intent on eliminating competition wherever possible.

6) Developing a conservative environmentalism based on principles of stewardship and rigorous examination of costs and benefits of different policies, while holding the line against environmental extremism.

Of all major areas of public policy, environmental policy is the place where conservatives are intellectually and organizationally the weakest. The number of influential conservative environmentalists can be counted on the fingers of one hand, and except for the concept of emissions permit trading, it is probably fair to say that conservatives had no impact on this year's Clean Air legislation, or on any major recent environmental policy-making. Some highly interesting work has been done on public lands and natural resources in the American West, but it has not yet been converted into a political strategy for incremental reform.

Necessary intellectual groundwork here will include the training of at least four or five dozen environmental specialists, and the formation of a high-quality environmental information center with close ties both to the media and to top scientists across the country. Leading scientists have done major work disputing the current henny-pennyism about global warming, acid rain, and other purported environmental catastrophes; but, despite some fledgling efforts in this direction, no organization is effectively bringing their arguments to public policy discourse.

Political support can be mobilized for the proposition that environmental policy should focus on the greatest risks to health and environmental beauty. For this strategy to work, however, the science of risk assessment needs substantial refinement, and the idea of cost-benefit analysis has to be popularized and made politically palatable.

Perhaps most important, it is essential for conservatives to recognize that environmental questions are above all moral questions. There are deep affinities between efforts to conserve nature and efforts to conserve the best values of civilization. The biblical principle of stewardship, according to which man has the responsibility both to use and develop the earth and to take care of other species, has great potential to become the dominant environmental philosophy in America and other countries. The conservative who develops the stewardship principle most fully is guaranteed one of the best-sellers of the '90s. ☎

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After the Cold War

A Symposium on New Defense Priorities

Angelo M. Codevilla, Frank J. Gaffney Jr., John G. Kester, Christopher Layne, Hans Mark, Keith B. Payne, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Robin Ranger, James Roche, William Schneider Jr., Walter B. Slocombe, Jed C. Snyder, Charles Wolf, Dov Zakheim

In April 1990, *Policy Review* invited several leading defense strategists to respond briefly to three questions:

1) Are any changes in defense strategy necessary for the '90s?

2) What missions must U.S. armed forces be prepared to carry out in the coming decade, and what kind of weapons, forces, and deployments will be required?

3) (Optional) What current military expenditures should be reduced in order to guarantee funding for these priorities?

Angelo M. Codevilla

Senior research fellow at the Hoover Institute; author of While Others Build.

Our search for a strategy for the '90s must begin with the humble realization that if we had to fight a major war in the '80s, we probably would have lost. We haven't had a defense strategy, good or bad, since the '60s. Instead, the U.S. military effort—the Cheney build-down like the Weinberger buildup—is the sum of programs, each driven by its own bureaucratic imperative, and all thinly clothed by "declaratory policies" that are primarily fund-raising devices. The United States lacked the equipment for "forward defense" at the Elbe, or to "hold at risk" the Soviet leadership and its strategic forces in an age of mobile missiles and "deep undergrounds." It is past time that the U.S. armed forces take their business seriously.

Unfortunately, the '90s will not start with a clean slate. The political collapse of Communism is not about to destroy the fruits of a generation of Soviet arms builders. It *is* setting the stage for a lively and probably violent contest for control of the Soviet military establishment. But sooner or later someone will take secure control of that overarmed, underfed, underscrupled country. Hence it would be pure escapism for the U.S. armed forces not to face all those SS-26s, those tanks, those *Akula*-class submarines on their own terms. Also, we must keep up with changes in the military art.

The primary mission of the U.S. armed forces must be to protect the American people. There was never an excuse for failing to use whatever technologies lay at hand to protect against the "queens" of the modern battlefield, ballistic missiles. Iraq and perhaps Libya may soon be able to veto U.S. actions by threatening mass destruction. As for the Soviet arsenal, why tempt whoever might control it by guaranteeing its effectiveness?

Hence, the United States should combine the roughly $4 billion now spent yearly under the label SDI with the budgets now devoted to continental air defense, missile warning, and Space Command, to found a new military service to protect against aerospace threats. Those accounts contain quite enough money to procure reasonable amounts of defensive hardware: ERIS ground-based, high-altitude interceptors, Aegis radars combined with HEDI interceptors, flying optical discrimination devices, space-based lasers, and interceptors of various kinds. We are already spending the money. We might as well get something for it.

Second, we must control the seas. Supporting permanent commitments overseas is less important than making sure that if ever there were a fight for possession of the middle of the ocean, we would win it. This means the end of permanent deployments in the Mediterranean, Western Pacific, and Indian Ocean. The sea-control mission will require only some eight active carriers, with the addition of new B-1 bombers, stripped of their "penetration package" and equipped with air-launched cruise missiles. The Navy also needs the Seawolf to keep up with the state of the art in submarines. The Navy should pay for modernization by radically lowering the tempo of operations and shifting to the reserves. It would be far better to close out operations in Subic Bay in the Philippines, and Yokosuka, Japan, than to demilitarize San Francisco Bay.

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Third, the United States must be prepared to intervene to tip the scales against a major bid to control the Eurasian continent. It is by no means sure that we have seen the last of the Soviet attempt at hegemony. Nevertheless, since any Soviet ruler bent on aggression would require months, if not years, to rediscipline his home front, this is the right time to transfer full responsibility for the defense of Europe to the Europeans. This means reducing our military presence in Europe to little more than liaison and emergency preparedness. It also means turning the U.S. Army primarily into a force of well-equipped reserves.

Our tactical air forces, too, should trade activity and forward deployment for numbers of reserves. Since the mission of the Tactical Air Command is to support the U.S. Army, this is the time to reunite these organizations.

Our strategic offensive forces—missiles and aircraft—logically belong in their own service. Changing technology dictates that we phase out all fixed land-based missiles. The B-2's only mission is to sustain the delusion that something like the "strategic bombing" of World War II could be repeated. The future of strategic offense lies in the development of full-coverage, multi-spectral intelligence systems, plus on-line retargeting for missiles.

Fourth, the United States should be able to do the sort of thing that President Jefferson did to the Barbary pirates, Jimmy Carter tried to do in Iran, and George Bush did in Panama. It is silly to do this sort of thing with *ad hoc* combinations of three services. The Marine Corps should be equipped to do it alone.

Nothing fosters the health of a tree—or an organization—like pruning weaker branches. We should reduce the ratio of general and field-grade officers on active duty to what it was during World War II. The savings through added efficiency would dwarf the savings in salaries. Just getting back to the overhead levels of the '70s would be progress! The operating forces themselves should have the responsibility of procuring their own equipment within the budget allotted to their mission. Almost the entire organization for procurement (the Systems Commands) should be lopped off. Ever since Robert McNamara entangled the U.S. military in ever-more byzantine levels of bureaucracy, Republican Secretaries of Defense have only perfected the house he built. It's time to rebuild.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr.

Director of the Center for Security Policy; former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (1987).

The most important change needed in our strategy is to restore proper perspective on the continuing Soviet challenge to our interests around the world. From that will flow a series of changes from our current posture—in the military capabilities that we develop and field, the quality and direction of our diplomacy, the rigor with which we exercise a prudent technology security policy, and our willingness to embark on an array of ill-considered and unverifiable arms control agreements.

The Soviets have six long-standing foreign policy goals: becoming the preeminent politico-military power on the Eurasian landmass; fracturing alliances they perceive as hostile; obtaining unencumbered access to western economic and technological resources; using arms control and other devices to restrain our technological edge; maintaining a buffer zone on their borders that is at the very least neutral if not militarily aligned with Moscow; and supporting a worldwide array of overseas clients as instruments of Soviet foreign policy.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, disturbing progress is being made toward each of these objectives. This progress may not be altogether of the Soviets' making; what is more, they might not be in any position at present to exploit the opportunities such progress affords. It is likely, though, that—absent a radical transformation of the Soviet political and economic system—Moscow will remain better positioned to exploit this progress than the United States and its allies will be to prevent it from doing so.

We will likely master the technology to build a working ballistic missile defense in the coming decade. Such a defense system would be a potent force for stability in a dangerous world.

—Hans Mark

The overarching mission for U.S. security policy must be to promote individual freedom, genuine democracy, and market economic opportunities worldwide, and, in so doing, to encourage the urgently needed radical transformation of the USSR. Toward this end, western economic, financial, and technological resources—if applied in a disciplined and concerted fashion—can be enormously effective.

Implementation of such a policy would also require the United States to maintain a wide range of technologically sophisticated, flexible systems, particularly those that lend themselves to long-range power projection. Systems such as the B-2, carrier battle groups, and the V-22 Osprey exemplify the sort of multi-purpose weapons that should receive high priority at whatever level of defense funding is ultimately decided.

Some diminution in the readiness of selected U.S. forces would be acceptable if that would enable sustained investment in research and development and production of advanced systems. It is especially important that the nation's industrial and technological bases be protected. Similarly, if, as appears likely, the United States is obliged

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to withdraw forces from overseas, it is imperative to increase airlift and sealift capabilities and thus ensure the timely reinsertion of our forces and materiel when needed.

JOHN G. KESTER

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Army and Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown; now an attorney in Washington, D.C.

Our national security policy toward the Soviet Union, sustained for nearly half a century, has been a staggering success. Its core assumptions about how peace is preserved must not be abandoned.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and centrifugal turmoil within the Soviet Union lessen the threat of a come-as-you-are war on the central front in Europe. We should not leave the continent, but the U.S. Army in Europe now can be reduced to about one corps, the smallest unit able to subsist and maneuver as a significant force. The Soviets, however, although a Third World economy, remain a First World nuclear superpower. We must maintain a nuclear force sufficient to deter anyone who may someday control the Soviet arsenal, or any warhead in it. Or any nuclear warhead somewhere else. The lids have slipped from some still-simmering kettles. The inhibitions on leaders of irresponsible governments will weaken, and their capability for mischief will grow. Old animosities may break out in nationality conflicts, as already is beginning in Eastern Europe.

U.S. strategy should expect more threats from the Qadhafis of the world; some may be ignored, but others will have to be squelched. Nuclear proliferation will have to be monitored and inhibited as much as possible. Ballistic missiles with nuclear capability, chemical and perhaps biological weapons, and powerful conventional explosives will be increasingly attainable by the rogue governments of the world. Penalties must be attached to acquisition and use of such armaments—something the western democracies have notably failed to apply so far.

Our Army still needs armored divisions (now more likely to fight in the desert than in Central Europe). The nuclear triad, ultimate preserver of our security, must remain first priority, including the technologies flourishing under the umbrella of the Strategic Defense Initiative. However, we will no longer size and shape conventional forces to meet a clash in Germany. Traditionally neglected, strategic mobility—airlift and sealift—will be more important than ever. Army units must be versatile, for use in this hemisphere or odd parts of the world where the United States may need to take an unplanned stand—as did the British in the Falklands. This does not mean that the entire Army can be light divisions, which are substantially limited in their tactical mobility, sustainability, and firepower. But, small threats call for a quick and overwhelming response, as in Panama, not the incremental bog of a Vietnam.

The Navy's power projection will have an even greater relative role, and carrier forces can be reduced only slightly. The Marines should not be reduced at all. The tactical close air support mission should be transferred from the Air Force to the Army, along with the Air Force's fixed-wing aircraft.

Now is a good time at last to cut central staffs in the Pentagon from a redundant nine to at most five, and to enhance even further the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, perhaps making the service chiefs simply the chairman's deputies for land, sea, and air. Pork-barrel military bases of course have to go. Civilian employment in the Defense Department should be reduced by at least one-third across the board. Military procurement regulations should be simplified (instead of, as now, made more complicated), and defense contract disputes taken out of the clumsy hands of federal criminal prosecutors. Research and development—the one advantage this country preeminently enjoys—should be funded generously, but actual procurements held to a minimum. Overall, there may be some savings in personnel, and from cutting marginal programs of the kind Senator Nunn highlighted in his brilliant speeches this spring. Still, vast savings ought not to be expected in a world where the variety of military threats will grow, not diminish.

The years ahead will confirm that national security resides not in military forces alone, but depends on the economic strength, political cohesion, will, and talent of our people. The public education system of the United States, key to much of our past success, has collapsed under the weight of bureaucracy, endless demands on the schools for non-educational social programs, ignorant court interventions, and a mass democracy uncomfortable with excellence. We are becoming more a collection of interest groups and less of a nation than we were a generation ago. The shapers of public debate and national decisions too often now are neither academics nor business leaders nor politicians, but 30-year-old television producers. In spite of the amazing

The collapse of Communism is setting the stage for a lively and probably violent contest for control of the Soviet military. But sooner or later someone will take secure control of that overarmed, underfed, underscrupled country.

—Angelo M. Codevilla

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buoyancy of our economy and the blessed political freedom we take for granted, the greatest security threat lies within.

Christopher Layne

Adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute; attorney with Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler in Los Angeles.

The bipolarity of the postwar era is giving way to a multipolar system of four or five great powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, China, and perhaps Western Europe). For the United States, multipolarity is particularly attractive because it means that other great powers are (or will be) available to act as the primary counterweights to the Soviet Union, or any other future potential hegemon. Multipolarity also means that many of America's burdensome strategic obligations can be shifted to other nations. As long as the United States is careful to play the regulating role of balancer, it can rely primarily on the emerging multipolar balance to safeguard its vital overseas interests. The objective of strategic independence and America's geopolitical position should dictate defense priorities.

American nuclear strategy should switch from extended deterrence to residual deterrence. The present forward deployment of U.S. tactical and intermediate-range nuclear weapons to "couple" America to other nations' security is unacceptably dangerous. If deterrence fails, the automaticity of escalation, on which extended deterrence rests, would almost certainly lead to the American homeland's destruction. Moreover, the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on foreign territory fuels tensions between Washington and the host country.

A new residual deterrence strategy would give the United States the option of selectively using nuclear weapons in Europe's defense but would not irrevocably commit the United States to doing so. Deterrence can be effective even without the explicit understandings and formal symbols of an alliance, as was demonstrated in the late 1960s when the United States used its deterrent threat to dissuade Moscow from launching a preemptive war on China—a nation with which the United States did not even have formal diplomatic relations. Residual deterrence would rest on adequate counterforce/first-strike capabilities, refined selective and limited targeting options, accelerated research on (and, if feasible, deployment of) strategic defenses, and highly accurate U.S.-based air- and sea-launched cruise missiles that could be used in a theater support role.

Strategic independence would require the United States to maintain strong naval and air forces and the airlift capability to move ground units quickly to threatened regions. Because of their mobility, naval and air forces could be deployed rapidly to overseas trouble spots in the event U.S. intervention were necessary. Naval and air forces also could be used for diplomatic and crisis management purposes. However, strategic independence would result in U.S. ground forces being reduced to approximately one-third of their current strength. American troops should be withdrawn from Western Europe and South Korea by the mid-1990s, and the bulk of these forces should be demobilized. For crisis management purposes, the United States should retain a limited capability to reinsert its forces by leaving prepositioned equipment for three armored divisions in Europe and for one heavy infantry division in South Korea. These four divisions, and their airlift, would be based in the United States. At the same time, the United States has few concrete interests in the Third World (with the clear exception of Central America). By cutting U.S. reliance on Third World markets and raw materials, strategic independence would enable the United States to reduce its Third World contingency forces to four light divisions.

In a multipolar world, the United States would no longer be on the front lines of every international flash point. However, the United States would be prepared, if necessary, to backstop the efforts of other great powers by entering into temporary and informal defensive commitments. Like Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries, America would be the "holder" of the global balance, a role it is uniquely suited to play. As the leading great power (assuming it acts wisely to arrest its relative economic decline), America's weight would be decisive when added to the power of any antihegemonic nation or coalition. Because the United States' paramount geopolitical objective is the negative one of preventing another state from achieving hegemonic preponderance, the United States would have the diplomatic flexibility to assume the balancer's role.

Hans Mark

Secretary of the Air Force (1979–1981); deputy administrator of NASA (1981–1984); now chancellor of the University of Texas system.

Victory in the Cold War does not mean that we can relax and stop worrying about what happens next in the rest of the world. Two trends in world politics will require active engagement of the United States in many areas of the world. One is the creation of large economic units such as the European Community, the recent customs agreement between the United States and Canada, and the continuing growth of large multinational corporations. The trend toward what has been called the "global village" is generally positive and reflects the best in world civilization. It will lead not only to more efficient production of goods and services, but also to greater cooperation among nations and peoples.

A trend characteristic of the darker side of human nature seems to be occurring simultaneously. In many parts of the world, people are slipping into what might best be called "tribal warfare." Ancient religious, ethnic, racial, and class hatreds have escalated to bloody conflicts in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, Peru, Colombia, and Kashmir, to mention a few. The collapse of Communism has revived conflicts among the peoples on the periphery of the disintegrating Soviet empire. This trend is dangerous and cannot be permitted to accelerate.

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The American interest is to welcome and encourage the movement toward a "global village." Among other things, this means that we should work with the nations of Europe to make the European Community a reality. We have the opportunity to use the existing NATO alliance to develop the economic and political relationships that will make the European Community work. While there is still a military threat posed by the conventional and nuclear capabilities of Soviet Russia, the nations of the European Community will be able to deal with it. Therefore, American military forces can be withdrawn from Europe in the coming years.

Instead of emphasizing large-scale production of a small number of weapons systems, we should emphasize smaller volume production of a larger number of systems—with the option to speed up production in response to different contingencies.

—James Roche

In addition to encouraging cooperative organizations, the second element of our responsibility as a world power will be to prevent "tribal wars" from escalating into major world conflicts or from threatening our vital interests around the world. A model was our response to the war between Iraq and Iran a few years ago. A vital interest—the flow of oil to the world's industrial nations—was threatened. Units of the U.S. Navy were deployed in the Persian Gulf to keep the tankers moving and, at first, the deployment was made unilaterally because the European allies did not participate. We probably will be called upon to execute similar deployments in the future. Thus, a strong Navy with a worldwide reach remains the essential element of our military posture.

Three other priorities in military matters must be pushed to maintain our interests and to fulfill our responsibilities as a world power. First is intelligence. In a more complex world the collection and analysis of information from all corners of the globe takes on much greater importance. In addition to satellites, manned and unmanned aircraft should be deployed for this purpose. The B-2, with its enormous range, payload capability, and stealth characteristics, could be an excellent replacement for the retired SR-71 Blackbird.

Second is airlift at all levels. The recent operation in Panama in which 10,000 fully armed troops were moved from the United States to Panama by airlift alone illustrates what I mean. Both the C-17 transport and the V-22 "Osprey" vertical-take-off-and-landing transport should be built.

Finally, there is defense against ballistic missiles. Weapons of all kinds, nuclear and conventional, have proliferated around the world. A number of smaller nations are likely to acquire nuclear ballistic missiles, increasing the danger of destructive attacks. There is now good reason to believe that we will master the technology to build a working ballistic missile defense in the coming decade. Such a defense system, which we should eventually share with others who have fundamentally peaceful interests, would be a potent force for stability in a dangerous world.

KEITH B. PAYNE

President of the National Institute for Public Policy.

It would be optimistic in the extreme to assume that a Soviet Union in turmoil, the reemergence of ethnic conflicts and animosities in Europe, a regenerate Germany, and a reduction in locally deployed American forces is a benign combination. Crises in Europe are probable, and for the foreseeable future the Soviet Union will remain the premier military power in Europe, able to exploit crises and power vacuums. The balancing of that power will remain essential for U.S. security.

Anti-nuclear sentiments in Central Europe and democratization in Eastern Europe mean that the United States should begin planning for nuclear forces committed to Europe that are long-range and largely sea-based. The United States should continue to pursue the tactical air-to-surface missile. Its promotion, however, should be done gently, lest it unleash lethal public opposition in Germany. Even so, eventual German opposition to air-based nuclear systems should be expected. Consequently, submarine-launched cruise missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and other strategic forces appear to be likely candidates for extending deterrence. If these forces are to become a primary means for extended deterrence, START and any future naval arms control must take these likely new responsibilities into account.

Concern over a Soviet standing-start attack has vanished. However, with a likely reduction or elimination of both superpowers' forces in Eastern and Central Europe, a major U.S. priority must be the ability to mobilize and reconstitute U.S. forces for Europe. Air and sea transport must be strengthened. Those U.S. forces remaining in Europe will serve primarily to support the infrastructure for reconstitution.

This focus on reconstitution will exist whether or not NATO remains the primary collective security vehicle for the West. It is not too early for the United States to begin identifying additional security structures (for example, building on the European Community or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and formulating the U.S. role in such organizations.

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Outside Europe, the greatest danger is the proliferation of advanced weaponry. The U.S. will to defend interests abroad could easily be paralyzed if Americans fear that U.S. forces, and eventually U.S. territory, are subject to attack by Third World ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

A reliable response to this emerging threat must include ballistic missile defense, involving both space- and ground-based interceptors. Relying on offensive deterrence or arms control for security has always been a risky proposition. To continue doing so in a strategic environment that includes widely divergent countries armed with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction would be excessively and needlessly dangerous.

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr.

President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

American strategic interests remain basically unchanged: to deter and, if necessary, repel military action against the United States, our allies, and other states vital to our security. U.S. nuclear strategy must deter Soviet strategic forces, which will continue to modernize whatever the plausible outcome of arms control negotiations, including a START treaty. Political instability in the Soviet Union and China will increase the potential for accidental launch of nuclear weapons, and even for nuclear civil war. In addition, the proliferation of nuclear, conventional, and chemical weapons with great accuracy and range will reinforce the need for deterrence based on defense as well as offense. We must be able to protect our power projection forces from attack by highly accurate delivery systems, which will be more widely available than ever.

Because of the higher intensity conflict capabilities of regional protagonists, U.S. military forces must be rapidly deployable in sufficient strength to trouble spots around the world. They must be neither too heavy to lift nor too light to fight. We can rely more on sealift for Europe, where we are likely to gain added warning time for a conflict. But we will need airlift for contingencies outside Europe and this hemisphere.

Also, because targets that can be identified can be destroyed, we will need active and passive measures of protection at all levels—from intercontinental strategic forces to the battlefield. As a priority item, therefore, the United States should press ahead with technology development and deployment of a strategic defense system. Simultaneously, we will need to develop defense technologies for theater and extended air defense.

As we reduce troop levels abroad, especially in Europe, the United States will be able to increase the ratio of reserve to active forces. A premium should be placed on reserve training and mobilization capabilities. Technology programs designed to prepare the United States for the battlefields of the 21st century will be essential. Personnel levels can be reduced, but this task must be accomplished in a way that does not inflict undue hardship or create major morale problems for those who have chosen a military career.



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U.S. and South Korean troops on joint maneuvers. "Our national strategy of deterrence and coalition warfare remains as viable in a multipolar as in a bipolar world."—William Schneider Jr.

Robin Ranger

Former Jennings Randolph fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace; now vice president of Ranger Associates.

Having won the Cold War, the U.S. defense position is disturbingly similar to that of France after the First World War. The defense strategies and forces that won the war must be adapted to the new international security system created by victory, as well as to reduced budgets.

A combination of political pressures from Capitol Hill and the interests of the entrenched military bureaucracies could easily push the United States into repeating the French mistakes of the 1920s. France suffered from what Eliot Cohen and John Gooch describe in their brilliant new book *Military Misfortunes* as a catastrophic failure to adapt to a new security system, and as a result was defeated in 1940.

The core American strategic objectives in the 1990s are to deter or defeat a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. and any Soviet attack on the European democracies, including the emerging democracies of Central Europe and the three Baltic republics; to protect a few key U.S. allies, such as Israel; and to preserve U.S., European, and Japanese access to Middle Eastern oil. The United States will also want to secure a Soviet transition from a totalitarian to a democratic government.

There will also be an increasingly important negative objective: preventing the loss of American lives and interests to Third World governments (and possibly terrorists) armed with weapons of mass destruction.

To achieve these objectives, U.S. defense strategies and forces will have to adapt to three main features of the new security system: an unpredictable international system with many more nations involved, including the U.K., France, and China (plus possibly Germany and Japan) as major nuclear players; continued real Soviet threats to U.S. interests, including threats from an angry

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Russia within a collapsing Soviet Union; and the widespread, rapid proliferation of First World weapons to major Third World regional powers willing to use them, including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, satellites, and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems.

The basic U.S. strategies of deterrence and denial using nuclear and conventional forces, which worked against successive Soviet regimes, may not work so well against some of the Third World governments (and groups) with weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. may thus have to develop strategies combining effective defenses—including preemptive counterforce strikes—with selective retaliation.

The Soviets, although a Third World economy, remain a First World nuclear superpower. We must maintain a nuclear force sufficient to deter anyone who may someday control the Soviet arsenal, or any warhead in it.

—John G. Kester

Accordingly, the U.S. will have to stress mobile, long-range power projection forces. These will include Special Forces, the Marine Corps, Army Airborne and Light Divisions, naval and air forces. Because the greatest budget savings can be made in readiness expenditures, most of these forces will become dependent on reserves to deal with serious contingencies. The U.S. will have to develop an effective reserve system that has different levels of mobilization against different threats, and is politically usable. (The French lack of such a system enabled Hitler to win major victories in the 1930s.)

Other major budget savings could best come from personnel cuts, especially in the Army (from 750,000 to about 500,000 military personnel), cuts in congressional pork-barrel bases and projects, and cutbacks in congressional micromanagement.

Programs that should be protected are those that provide the best hedges against adverse developments in the international security environment, including breakouts and holdouts from arms control agreements. Some of these programs need special protection because they lack support in the service bureaucracies or in Congress, or both. These programs include those for military space and ASAT systems, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and Special Forces budgets.

Strategic force modernization programs also need special protection because they are now extremely vulnerable to a potentially destabilizing combination of technical changes (perfect accuracy) and cuts imposed by Congress and by prospective START I and II treaties. To preserve a triad of strategic forces, the Midgetman ICBM program should be continued. To hedge against Soviet defenses will require development of the Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MARV) and the Advanced Cruise Missile.

Major funding and protection will also be required to restore and maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons manufacturing infrastructure, which has seriously deteriorated, leaving the U.S. potentially unable to maintain the forces needed for deterrence in the 1990s.

James Roche

Vice president and special assistant to the president and CEO of the Northrop Corporation.

While all-out nuclear war is less likely in the '90s, defense planning will become much more difficult for four reasons:

1) Potential turmoil within the USSR, such as a civil war, could get out of control—resulting in major conflict between different regions of the Soviet Union; or, some remnant of the USSR might lash out against Western Europe to divert attention from internal conditions.

2)While deterrence against Bolsheviks was somewhat calculable, the notion of "sufficient deterrence" against Russian nationalists or countries such as Iraq is extremely difficult to calculate.

3) The range of contingencies will become much wider because there will be a general loosening of the mortar that has held the United States and USSR in two distinct military alliances.

4) The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons among Third World countries, when combined with the West's refusal to act against the recent use of chemical weapons, means that contingencies involving weapons of mass destruction will become far more likely. These contingencies could affect U.S. allies such as Israel, and will certainly threaten any U.S. ground forces projected into regions such as the Middle East.

Strategic nuclear forces should remain flexible so that they can be retargeted quickly. They should be capable of responding to new technologies and new contingencies. Where possible, they should be conventional as well as nuclear capable so as to get a greater return from the investment in them. And their numbers should be large enough to deter new and as yet unforeseen threats.

The United States can reduce significantly our ground forces in Europe, although we still have a major stabilizing role to play. We should emphasize our comparative advantage in modern air power. The U.S. also has a historic role in the Pacific. Little has occurred to suggest drawing down forces deployed or projected for Asia.

Because of the range of contingencies expected around the world, the United States needs long-range projection, bombardment, and mobile forces. Increased

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emphasis will have to be placed on such small but important issues as language capabilities, the ability to adjust to varying climates and terrains, and the ability to rapidly operate out of U.S. bases.

The goal is to reduce standing forces but make them the best, moving what forces we can to the reserves. We also need to devise more imaginative procurement arrangements. Instead of emphasizing large-scale production of a small number of weapons systems, we should emphasize smaller volume production of a larger number of systems—with the option to speed up production in response to different contingencies.

William Schneider Jr.

Former Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (1982-86); currently chairman of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament.

Our national strategy of deterrence and coalition warfare remains as viable in a multipolar as in a bipolar world. However, the lessening of Soviet–American tension in Europe should alter some of the tactics by which military strategy is implemented.

The diffusion of modern military technology, and the potential this technology provides to deliver weapons of mass destruction with precision, independent of range, remains a challenge to American security. For this reason, American military strategy may require a greater capability to preempt or intervene in threatening conflicts as an instrument of deterrence. Moreover, strategy will require a greater proportion of military resources devoted to intelligence collection and processing, as well as to active (such as ballistic missile) defense.

While the coalition warfare element of our military strategy is likely to endure, its content will evolve. Traditional alliance partners in Western Europe and the Western Pacific are likely to be reinforced by democratic regimes elsewhere in the world; their performance and ability to contribute to American defense objectives can be enhanced through security assistance and arms transfers from the United States and other friendly nations.

The maintenance of deterrence increasingly should depend on mobile forces, reinforced by a modest number of well-located offshore bases. While this objective requires naval forces and strategic and theater airlift, it will also require technologically sophisticated and tactically innovative ground forces. Reductions in active forces should be offset by a rejuvenated reserve component.

We should continue to pressure Communist regimes to liberalize, so that the gains wrought by the rebuilding of America's defense in the 1980s can be sustained in the 1990s.

Active defense will require early deployment of ballistic missile defense, probably involving a mix of space- and ground-based systems. Transfer of such capabilities to allies, and the ability of the U.S. to offer protection to other nations through ballistic missile defense, will be an important dimension of U.S. foreign policy.

Intervention forces, especially against relatively low-level threats, will be increasingly required as military power—and hence the ability to threaten American and allied interests—is dispersed among two dozen nations in the 1990s. The forces should possess the ability to strike targets with great precision from the continental United States, as well as include mobile forces able to go in harm's way. Sophisticated air-delivered weapons systems should be supported by ground and naval forces capable of operating anywhere in the world.

Improvements in intelligence collection and processing will be required by the multipolar character of international politics in the 1990s, and should be augmented by a strengthened capability to conduct covert operations. Security assistance and arms transfers to friendly nations defending democratic institutions can offset the impact of American force structure reductions in the maintenance of peace.

Mobilization and readiness—both defense and industrial—have been neglected when large standing forces have been required. Force structure reductions should lead to a reexamination of this lost art, which was more responsible than any other factor for our ability to emerge victorious in World War II.

The possible withdrawal of Soviet military forces in Europe to districts east of the Ukraine's Bug River would diminish demands for both active force structure and readiness on the part of U.S. tactical air and ground units in Western Europe. If residual U.S. and NATO forces in Western Europe are provided with advanced conventional weapons systems (and the U.S. maintains an effective theater nuclear posture), they can deter a Soviet reoccupation of Eastern Europe, or a thrust into Western Europe. However, the extraordinary rush to disarm by Eastern Europe's new democracies will diminish the benefits of elongated warning time that would otherwise result from a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe.

The U.S. will to defend interests abroad could easily be paralyzed if Americans fear that U.S. territory is subject to attack by Third World ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

—Keith B. Payne

To fund new priorities, savings can be created by force structure reductions, revisions in enlistment and retention policy, the streamlining of operating practice, and modernization of congressionally driven procurement practices that inflict unnecessary costs.

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Walter B. Slocombe

Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning (1979–1981); now an attorney at the Washington firm of Caplin & Drysdale.

The central task for American strategy is to recognize the drastically lowered levels of current confrontation and the greatly extended time dimension of any serious threat, while preserving long-term capacity to recreate the system of militarily effective collective security that we might someday need.

The collapse of the Soviet base in Eastern Europe, and the revolution in the internal politics and foreign policies of the Soviet Union, have virtually eliminated as current problems our chief military worries for over 40 years—a quick, Soviet, armor-led thrust into Western Europe, and Soviet aggression in more remote areas, directly or by proxy. But it would be a mistake to reshape our military exclusively for missions against non-Soviet forces. There will no doubt be future Panamas and Persian Gulfs, but military forces will not often be useful against the international problems that will dominate the future conflicts—over resources, trade, drugs, terrorism, immigration, the environment, and new or revived ethnic and territorial disputes.

Systems such as the B-2, carrier battle groups, and the V-22 Osprey exemplify the sort of multi-purpose weapons that should receive high priority.

—Frank J. Gaffney Jr.

Moreover, for years to come, we will also face potential problems from the USSR, or more accurately from Russia, including a possible relapse to authoritarianism. A "Soviet 1933" following a failure of a "Soviet Weimar" would likely mean remilitarization and international adventurism to reward the new regime's backers, bolster its authority, build up its prestige, and rationalize domestic repression.

For all its internal troubles, such a Russian regime would inherit great military power, a central geographic position, and a nuclear arsenal matched only by the United States. To be sure, it could not restore Brezhnev's position in Eastern Europe simply by gaining control in Moscow. But an Eastern Europe—and a Russian periphery—riven by conflict, struggling with too-slow economic progress and political short-sightedness, and lacking a strong security link to the West, could provide fruitful ground for a Russian regime eager to rebuild its influence.

To negate such a threat, the United States and its allies have to be prepared to rebuild almost every element of a strong military within a few years. In the meantime, we should concentrate on developing resources that cannot be created quickly, such as research and development, a professional officer corps, and international institutions. In concrete terms this means:

- Preserving NATO as a real, although greatly reduced, military alliance. To this end, the United States should keep in Europe both nuclear weapons—on aircraft, not on short-range missiles or artillery—and Army divisions. Such American military forces should stay in Europe so long as the Europeans see a need and maintain adequate forces of their own.
- Maintaining a relatively small, active force of highly professional, highly trained, highly mobile units, founded on a strong Navy. We will need these for quick and powerful military intervention around the world, although the occasions where such action will be both wise and feasible are likely to be fewer than many people now believe. Equally important, we would need such forces as the core on which to build if things go badly with Russia.
- Retaining the capability to rearm against a superpower by maintaining some heavy armored forces, some heavy airlift and sealift, and some other units that are geared chiefly to a revived Soviet threat—and the R&D base for their rapid expansion.
- In nuclear forces, giving priority to survivability and technology, meaning submarine missiles, single-reentry vehicle mobile ICBMs, and air-delivered weapons that use stealth technology. A force of no more than half the START levels would be fully sufficient for flexible deterrence.
- Refocusing any work on missile defenses to protecting against very small attacks, of which proliferators will be increasingly capable. The first priority should be protecting deployed military forces.
- Cutting force levels, procurement, and support structures drastically, since we need no longer be concerned with massive attacks after a few months' mobilization, much less surprise attacks with only a few days' warning.
- Finding the funds and the political will to support political and economic freedom in Eastern Europe, as an investment in long-term security.

Jed C. Snyder

Senior research fellow at the National Strategy Information Center in Washington, D.C., and chairman of the Washington Strategy Seminar.

For the past four decades, American defense policy has been designed primarily for global Soviet containment. However, the principal threat against which U.S. forces have been deployed—a Soviet military campaign directed against the NATO allies in Western Europe—is no longer the most likely conflict scenario for American

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(or Soviet) defense planners. Indeed, it is among the least likely contingencies.

The threat to Western Europe, however, has not evaporated. Soviet forces that will be allowed to remain in the western military districts of the Soviet Union after the anticipated reductions under a Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement will still be considerable—as large, as Sam Nunn has noted, as Hitler's army against the Low Countries in 1940. They would be of sufficient size and capability to threaten a united Germany that behaves in ways regarded by Moscow as antithetical to Soviet objectives in a "New Europe." That scenario is unlikely, but not impossible to envision. A German decision to deploy a national nuclear force would, for example, still be regarded by the Soviet Union as a *casus belli*. As the United States considers removing most of its nuclear weapons from Europe, it would be wise to ponder whether that action might ultimately encourage a German nuclear choice.

Although the removal from Germany of shorter-range U.S. systems (capable of striking only NATO or the territory of emerging democracies in Eastern Europe) is sensible, the absence of *any* longer-range, land-based systems capable of holding Soviet targets at risk is regrettable. An extended-range nuclear missile (such as the successor to Lance, recently canceled by the Bush administration, or the Pershing II, removed by the 1987 INF Treaty) could have great utility as insurance during a very uncertain and potentially unstable period.

Postwar American defense strategy and therefore the U.S. defense budget have always been "Eurocentric" in construction. Between 55 and 70 percent of our defense resources have been committed to Europe's security. With a withering of the Soviet threat to Europe, that investment seems disproportionate at best.

The growing threat of ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World (centered in the most volatile region of the Middle East) greatly complicates regional strategy for the United States and the Soviet Union, each of which supports opposing regional allies. The diffusion of military technologies to the developing world will create potent new military powers in regions where successful rapid U.S. intervention in a crisis could be stalled by well-armed, radical states.

However, developing and equipping forces tailored for intervention in Third World areas will be expensive, because very little of our existing force structure is appropriate for these tasks. The costs would increase further if defense planners must assume that such operations would have to be implemented with little or no assistance from allies. Finally, to fund such programs, an American president would need nearly magical powers to persuade an already reluctant Congress that threats outside Europe could affect vital U.S. interests. Indeed, even before Gorbachev began to transform the East-West environment, the chorus of isolationists could already be heard questioning whether Europe's security remained critical to American interests.

It is pointless to engage in grand exercises of reconfiguring budgets and adjusting strategies at the margin until an executive-legislative consensus is reached on what precisely is vital to U.S. and western interests in the decades ahead. Perhaps that is Gorbachev's genuine objective—challenging the United States to justify its status as a superpower. To date, we have failed to meet that challenge.

Charles Wolf

Dean of the RAND Corporation Graduate School, where he is also the director of International Economic Policy Program.

Two changes in the global security environment warrant a change in global defense strategy. The changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe substantially diminish although they do not totally remove the threat to Western Europe. A more gradual and less conspicuous change is the dispersion of military, technological, and economic strength among middle regional powers—for instance, India, Pakistan, Turkey, both Koreas, Brazil, prospectively Argentina—as well as smaller countries such as Libya and Taiwan. These countries can now advance their own national interests and irredentist feelings with capabilities they did not have before.

The prospect of multiple contingencies arising from this dispersion of power will confront the United States with recurring crises of instability and potential conflict—whether between the two Koreas, or China and Taiwan, or Pakistan and India, or Iraq and Kuwait, or Vietnam and Thailand, or Israel and the Arab states. In many cases we will neither want nor be able to do anything about these conflicts. In others we will want to be involved—to protect friends and associates of the U.S., or to prevent the conflict from spreading. We face a diminished major threat but an increase in small, recurring, multiple conflicts where U.S. interests may or may not be directly involved.

> **Forces for Europe can and should be reduced. We need forces that are lighter, more flexible, more rapidly deployable around the world, and better able to operate in tropical, desert, and frigid environments.**
>
> —Charles Wolf

Forces for Europe can and should be reduced. To prepare for multiple contingencies, we need forces that are lighter, more flexible, more rapidly deployable

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around the world, and better able to operate in tropical, desert, and frigid environments.

Our assurance in maintaining overseas bases will diminish, so our forces should be able to project power from remote bases, with capabilities that can deliver accurate ordnance without being based in the region.

The prospect of multiple contingencies also puts a premium on the ability to operate cooperatively and jointly with the forces of friendly countries, rather than on unilateral action. This requires language capabilities as well as command and control systems that are compatible with friendly forces, so that American forces can communicate with Koreans or Brazilians or Thais or other possible allies in conflicts around the world.

Dov Zakheim

Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources (1981–1987); CEO and president of SPC International; adjunct scholar of The Heritage Foundation.

If the national security bureaucracy were to have its way, American defense strategy would remain unchanged throughout this decade. It would continue to focus on the requirements generated by a worldwide conflict with the Warsaw Pact, with the locus of hostilities in Eastern Europe.

The Warsaw Pact has provided Pentagon program analysts with a convenient and unchanging scenario, against which the cost-effectiveness of weapons systems alternatives can be measured quantitatively. But the Warsaw Pact is no more. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are openly sympathetic to the West. East Germany will soon disappear from the map of Europe. Romania was never a reliable Soviet ally. And the Soviet Union itself, racked by internal fissures, with a demoralized military, is no longer the threat it once was.

If the NATO/Warsaw Pact scenario is now a historical artifact, potential contingencies elsewhere are very much the reality. It is in the Third World that America has fought its battles, time after time, both large-scale and small, in the past four decades. Surely, America will, at some unforeseen time, in some unforeseen locale outside Europe, one day again find itself at war.

Our strategy must therefore explicitly presuppose uncertainty; as such, it must emphasize strategic and tactical flexibility. Certain fundamental underpinnings of our strategy that have endured since World War II need not be jettisoned: We are not an aggressive nation, and our strategy should postulate retaliation, not preemption. We are no longer an isolationist nation, so our strategy should continue to presuppose cooperation with allies, wherever feasible. Finally, because of the vast distances over which our human and economic interests continue to be found worldwide, we should continue to deploy forces overseas, though at lower levels than today.

Our interests are concentrated in four geographic locales: Latin America, Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Should our interests be threatened in any of these regions, including Europe (for example, by a resurgent Soviet Union or Russia, or by the spread of ethnic civil war beyond Yugoslavia's borders), we must be prepared to employ military forces to defend them. Yet we cannot expect, nor justify, a permanent land-based presence in Europe significantly larger than the division and constabulary that we maintained in the early 1950s, when the Cold War was at its height. Nor can we assume that other forward-deployed land-based units will be forever welcome on foreign soil. We must therefore rely on forces that have the capability to arrive rapidly, and in force, at the scene of potential aggression.

These considerations point to the forces we need—and don't need. We need a strategic deterrent, both offensive (the "triad") and defensive (SDI), against: the Soviets, whose own strategic forces can destroy the United States; their constituent republics, who might inherit a portion of those forces; and other states that might acquire such forces. We do not need the B-2 in significant numbers, nor the Midgetman, however; their contribution to our posture does not justify their cost.

We need conventional forces that are sized and structured to confront or deter in timely fashion the wide range of threats they might face. Large numbers of heavy forces, suited primarily to the terrain of Central Europe, clearly are too inflexible for such missions. Our current armed and mechanized active force levels can be halved. Such capabilities are best held primarily in reserve—and in the Reserves—in the unlikely event that a major conflagration in Central Europe were to take place.

Smaller, lighter forces are more apposite to flexibility: sea-based Marines, motorized Army units, long-range tactical aviation, and, of course, naval units. On the other hand, large numbers of submarines, geared to fighting a U-boat war with their Soviet counterparts, strain current credulity and resources. A fleet of aircraft carriers that goes beyond Third World requirements to encompass unrealistic plans for attacking the Soviet land mass likewise is excessive.

Sealift is critical to move large forces over long distances, given warning times that can be expected in any contingency other than a bolt-from-the-blue Soviet attack in Europe. Airlift is an expensive luxury to carry out the same mission. Having expended vast sums on airlift over the past decade, we can target our expenditures elsewhere. Last, the Special Operating Forces, whose budget is small but whose impact would be significant in a variety of unconventional missions, particularly in the Third World, will require special funding emphasis for the foreseeable future.

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HALF-SPEED AHEAD

Budget Strategy for a Strong Navy

JOHN LEHMAN

As the great alliance named for an ocean watches in awe, its adversary alliance, named for the land-locked capital of Poland, completes its final disintegration. Ironically, NATO military commanders seem more alarmed by this stunning victory of NATO deterrence than they were by the decades of Soviet aggression that preceded it. And no wonder—for they are suddenly bereft of comfortable certitudes.

Although every postwar administration has been criticized for having no strategy to guide its defense policies, in fact each one has shared a consistent strategy built upon containment of Soviet Communism through the NATO alliance. The entire Defense Department since Marshall's time has been organized around NATO. The circadian rhythms of the Pentagon are set by the annual calendar of NATO ministerial meetings, high-level groups, and joint exercises. Pentagon and State Department orthodoxy is written in Brussels, and military and civilian career success depends on adherence to the faith. Upon this foundation over the past 40 years has grown the largest peacetime military bureaucratic establishment in history to administer the vast standing armies garrisoned in Europe—whose presence has now been vindicated by history.

Less Certain, More Violent World

But now it is over. The armed services must change their mission and makeup. While the Warsaw Pact is most certainly dead, its component forces are certainly not. The Russian armed forces are not diminished, nor are the Balkans visibly more stable outside the polarity of the Cold War. While the threat of superpower war has gone away, the next decade very likely will see more violence and instability around the world than any in the postwar period. The services must change fundamentally to cope with this less certain, more violent world. Most affected will be the Army and the Air Force. Since 1942 they have been sized, equipped, and trained for massive attrition warfare in Central Europe.

Least affected will be the Navy and Marines. Whether we like it or not, we are a maritime nation. Our Navy is the necessary manifestation of that reality. It existed before the Soviet Union and before the Communist Party and it will remain, whatever form the evolution of the East Bloc may take. We have to be able—and be seen to be able—to insure the security of the seas that link us to our allies, our commercial partners, our energy, and our resources. We have to have the capacity to defeat any combination of adversaries seeking to interfere with our access to the seas; we must insure that no enemy (including terrorists and drug lords) may use the seas as a medium of attack against us, and insure that we have the use of the seas as a medium of applying force to terminate any conflict.

Sailing the Five Seas

The size of the U.S. Navy is set not by what happens in Central Europe, but by the five oceanic regions in which we have vital interests: the Caribbean/North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific, and the Northeast Pacific. We must have naval forces for each theater, and all must be very high-capability forces. Great Britain's war in the Falklands demonstrated that in the age of smart weapons there is no such thing as a low-threat theater. If we must protect tankers, containerships, and shorelines worldwide from submarine, air, and missile threats, 24 hours a day, then we must have the very high-capability ships, aircraft carriers, submarines, and surface combatants to deal with the formidable offensive weapons in the hands of the Irans, Libyas, Cubas, and state-sponsored terrorist groups. There is no cheap low-threat option for us. And while it is currently indelicate to mention it, the Soviets are still producing submarines at the rate of five to nine a year and now are adding real aircraft carriers.

For post-Cold War naval missions, the current planned mix of ships and aircraft requires little change. While the reduced strategic threat may result in much lower levels of strategic weapons, it would be foolish in the extreme to keep large numbers of land-based missiles while reducing the most stable and reliable and lowest-cost strategic missiles, those carried in the Trident submarine. And for defending sea-lanes against hostile subs,

JOHN LEHMAN, *Secretary of the Navy from 1981 to 1987, is a managing director of PaineWebber, Inc.*

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

AP/Wide World Photos

We are evolving an officer caste steadily more separated from society at large. A citizen like George Bush could not become a naval officer today.

small or large, the new Seawolf class is long overdue.

There have always been armchair strategists declaring that the end of surface ships is at hand, that the future belongs to the submarine. Unfortunately, the planners at Exxon, the salty Air Force dogs in Illinois who now command naval transport ships, and Army planners have not yet budgeted for tankers, containerships, and Army transports that travel underwater. Until they do, the Navy is stuck on the surface protecting them and doing tasks that cannot be done from underwater, such as bombarding the shore, landing Marines, and launching aircraft.

Cost-Effective Battleships

With our rapid withdrawal from foreign bases, our 14 aircraft carriers will become more important than ever. Each can deploy 85 aircraft of whatever type needed for a unique crisis—with no diplomatic clearance required. As to their size, the big/small debate has never been intellectually respectable. It is simply foolish to put a multibillion-dollar airwing aboard a ship not big and armored enough to take hard hits from even the smallest naval powers. The *Stark* incident shows just how vulnerable small ships are.

The battleships are certainly one of the most cost-effective military systems in any service. They would be justified solely as hardened mobile launching platforms for Tomahawk cruise missiles. They require one-tenth the manpower per Tomahawk of a land deployment of that missile. Battleships would also be justified solely as mobile gun platforms able to deliver 800 tons of accurate fire in 30 minutes over 72 percent of the globe's surface. But most important, in a period likely to be marked with more, not less, crisis management, they are the ideal instruments to send into risky waters. An Exocet missile would literally bounce off the *Iowa* with its 19,000 tons of armor plate.

Carriers and battleships illustrate the boring reality of surface ships. They are simply moveable pieces of real estate and new designs are really just rearrangements of the furniture. Change in surface ships is quite properly slow. The brand new *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyer would be instantly recognized by a four-stacker destroyerman of 75 years ago. The new destroyer has, in fact, returned to the hull proportions of the battleship *Iowa* designed 50 years ago. Nelson's flagship at Trafalgar, *HMS Victory*, stayed in the front line for 75 years. Our battleships can last at least as long. When it comes time to replace them in the next century, the only design change needed might be more automation for the guns and the propulsion plant.

Peacetime Tempo

How can the Navy adapt to lower budgets in a period of lessened tensions in the world? The Navy must reduce the wartime pace at which it has operated the fleet throughout the '80s. Two fundamental changes are needed: first, the now-sacred six-month deployment should be dropped, and second, a significant part of the fleet should be shifted to the ready reserves.

With the current orthodoxy requiring forward-deployed battlegroups constantly in the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean, the fleet is kept operating at an expensive wartime tempo. That was appropriate for the '80s, but now the Soviets are not about to seize the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean, and the Iran/Iraq war is over. We should go back to three or four ships stationed in the Gulf and cruise an occasional battleship or carrier to the Indian Ocean a

Save the current planned mix of ships and aircraft, but drop the six-month deployment and shift much of the fleet to the ready reserve.

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few months each year. Regular carrier presence in the Mediterranean is still a necessary component of maintaining the presence required as a maritime power, but there can be gaps, and battleships can serve the same purpose. In the Pacific, with one carrier permanently based in Japan, the only additional requirement is for increased occasional visits for exercises with friendly nations on the Pacific Rim. There is no need for back-to-back deployments unless there is a crisis.

With such a major easing of the pace, a significant proportion of the ships and aircraft can be shifted to the ready reserve. Such reserve ships and squadrons would be manned 50 percent by active personnel and 50 percent by weekend warriors. They would be firstline ships with firstline planes and kept fully abreast of fleet upgrades. They would operate on weekends and for longer active duty during fleet exercises. The savings would be enormous—some $10 billion a year.

Admirals Off Course

For such a concept to work, the existing Naval Reserve structure must be expanded significantly. In the Reagan years the Naval Reserve was nearly doubled, and its commander raised to three-star rank. New officer and enlisted programs were started, aimed at bringing college and technically oriented kids to active duty for two years, followed by long reserve commitments.

The admirals, alas, have failed to grasp the wisdom of this course. All these programs have been dropped or strangled in recent years, and the commander of the Naval Reserve has been demoted to two stars. As Congress has cut allowed numbers of officers, the Navy has shifted its Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) to emphasize not reserve but regular commissioning; the output of the Naval Academy, all regular, has been increased, and that of Officer Candidate School (OCS), mostly reserve, reduced to a trickle. Minimum active-duty obligation for aviators has been lengthened to an incredible nine years. We are evolving an officer caste steadily more separated from society at large.

Navy personnel policies—obsessed with career retention only—must be changed. More pay, more assignment flexibility, more local recruiting for each home port, and more importance must be given to reservists. Officers and sailors on active duty seeking to go into the reserves should not be treated as treasonous wimps. All enlistees should be given the option of a two-year active duty obligation followed by six years in the drilling reserves. Graduates of the Naval Academy, Navy ROTC, and OCS should be given the option of three years of active duty followed by seven in the drilling reserves.

If we make the shift to the reserves, sacrificing some peacetime deployment in distant waters and accepting a longer time to mobilize for war, then with lower budgets we can still preserve a fleet sufficient in size and technology to deter the Soviets from straying off their current more peaceable course, and ready enough to deal with the Qadhafis of the world. If we do not shift, the declining budgets will make a hash not only of naval strategy but of the fleet itself.



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Bad Housekeeping

The Case Against Congressional Term Limitations

Charles R. Kesler

Everyone complains about Congress, but nobody does anything about it. Frustration with our national legislature, which is by almost every measure widespread among the American public, is about to be exploited by a national movement to throw the rascals out—the rascals, in this case, being incumbent congressmen and senators who have so mastered the art of reelection as to be thought unremovable by conventional means. The most widely touted solution to the problem is the extreme one of adding an amendment to the Constitution limiting the number of terms that members of the House and Senate can serve.

This notion appears to have been first circulated by the same informal network of radio talk-show hosts who were instrumental in rallying public opposition to last year's congressional pay raise. The idea has found support in public opinion polls and is being pressed by a new organization, Americans to Limit Congressional Terms (ALCT), that operates out of the offices of Republican political consultant Eddie Mahe and whose board includes both prominent Democrats and Republicans.

It is the latter party that stands to benefit most from limiting the years a congressman can serve, inasmuch as it is the Republicans who suffer under the rule of a more or less permanent Democratic majority in the House and Senate. In fact, term limitations were endorsed in the 1988 Republican platform. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that conservatives, too, are seizing the issue. In the symposium on conservatism for the 1990s featured in the Spring 1990 issue of *Policy Review*, almost a third of the contributors called for some sort of limitation on congressional terms.

98-Percent Paradox

This movement builds on the public's mounting dissatisfaction with a Congress that is seen not only as unresponsive but also as incompetent and corrupt. Indeed, in light of the chronically unbalanced federal budget, Congress's reluctance to perform even its minimal duty of passing a budget (balanced or not) without resort to omnibus continuing resolutions and reconciliation acts, the 51 percent salary increase for its members that it tried to brazen through without a rollcall vote, the generous privileges it extends to its members (large staffs, multiple offices, free travel allowances, frequent mailings at public expense, liberal pensions), the corruption-tinged resignations of former House Speaker Jim Wright and former Democratic Whip Tony Coelho, the metastasizing scandal of the Keating Five—in light of all these things, it is a wonder that congressmen get reelected at all.

And yet that is the paradox. Despite a deep dissatisfaction with Congress as an institution, the American people are reelecting their congressmen (that is, members of the House) at the highest rates in history. In the 1986 and 1988 elections, more than 98 percent of incumbent congressmen seeking reelection were returned to office. By now we have all heard the jokes about there being more turnover in the British House of Lords or in the Soviet Politburo than in the U.S. House of Representatives. The interesting question is, Why? What has happened to transform what the Framers of the Constitution envisioned as the most democratic, turbulent, changeable branch of the national government into the least changeable, most stable of the elective branches? And to come around to the question of the moment, will limiting the number of terms a congressman or senator can serve do anything to remedy the problem?

Anti-Federalists: "Virtue Will Slumber"

This is not the first time in American history that a limit on the reeligibility of elected federal officials has been proposed. At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, whether the president ought to be eligible for reelection was extensively debated, although always in close connection with the related questions of his term of office and mode of election. With the invention of the electoral college and with his term fixed at four years, it was thought to be productive of good effects and consistent with his independence from the legislature to

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

Photos from The Bettmann Archive

A two-term limit would have disabled Daniel Webster's Senate career, but not Henry Clay's or John C. Calhoun's.

allow the president to be eligible for reelection indefinitely; and so it remained until the 22nd Amendment was added to the Constitution. But what is less well known is that the Constitutional Convention also considered limitations on the reeligibility of the lower house of the legislature. The so-called Virginia Plan, introduced by Edmund Randolph, would have rendered members of the House ineligible for reelection for an unspecified period after their term's end. The period was never specified because the Convention expunged the limitation less than a month after it had been proposed.

Nevertheless, the question of limiting congressional terms lived on. It was taken up vigorously by the Anti-Federalists, the opponents of the new Constitution, who urged that "rotation in office" be imposed not so much on House members as on senators, whose small numbers, long term of office, and multifaceted powers made them suspiciously undemocratic. The Anti-Federalists built upon the legacy of the Articles of Confederation, which had required that members of Congress rotate out after serving three one-year terms within any five-year period. Quite a few critics of the Constitution attacked the unlimited reeligibility of the president, too, but the brunt of their criticism fell upon the Senate. In their view, it was a fatal mistake to neglect "rotation, that noble prerogative of liberty." As "An Officer of the Late Continental Army" called it in a Philadelphia newspaper, rotation was the "noble prerogative" by which liberty secured itself, even as the Tudor and Stuart kings had ignobly wielded their "prerogative power" in defense of tyranny.

The current appeal for limits on congressional office-holding echoes the major themes of the Anti-Federalists 200 years ago. One of the most rigorous of the Constitution's critics, the writer who styled himself "The Federal Farmer," put it this way: "[I]n a government consisting of but a few members, elected for long periods, and far removed from the observation of the people, but few changes in the ordinary course of elections take place among the members; they become in some measure a fixed body, and often inattentive to the public good, callous, selfish, and the fountain of corruption." After serving several years in office, he continued, it will be expedient for a man "to return home, mix with the people, and reside some time with them; this will tend to reinstate him in the interests, feelings, and views similar to theirs, and thereby confirm in him the essential qualifications of a legislator." Were the people watchful, they could recall him on their own and substitute a new representative at their discretion. But they are not sufficiently vigilant. As Patrick Henry warned at the Virginia ratifying convention, "Virtue will slumber. The wicked will be continually watching: Consequently you will be undone."

Federalists: The People Are Not Fools

The Anti-Federalist arguments were rejected by the advocates of the new Constitution. However, it is only for the presidency that the authors of the most authoritative defense of the Constitution, *The Federalist*, give a detailed refutation of the scheme of rotation in office. In *The Federalist*'s view, there is "an excess of refinement" in the notion of preventing the people from returning to office men who had proved worthy of their confidence. The people are not fools, at least not all of the time, and they can be trusted to keep a reasonably sharp eye on their representatives. So far as history can confirm such a proposition, it seems to pronounce in favor of *The Federalist*. Throughout the 19th and most of the 20th centuries, American politics was not characterized by a professional class of legislators insulated from the fluctuations, much less the deliberate changes, of public opinion. In the 19th century, it was not unusual for a majority of the membership of Congress to serve only one term; congressional turnover consistently averaged 40 to 50 percent every election. Occasionally it reached 60 or 70 percent.

The young Abraham Lincoln, for example, served only one term in the House of Representatives, in keeping with an informal rotation agreement he had

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

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Abraham Lincoln served only one term in the House as part of an informal rotation agreement. Such agreements betokened a vigorous intraparty political life as well as keen competition between the parties.

negotiated with two Whig Party rivals in his district. Such agreements were not uncommon, and betokened a vigorous intraparty political life as well as keen competition between the parties: no party wanted its officeholders to betray an unrepublican ambition. But ambition was controlled informally by rotation within a party's bank of candidates so that the party and the country enjoyed the best of both worlds—a circulation of capable and experienced men through public office, with the possibility of keeping truly exceptional ones in office if circumstances demanded it.

Accordingly, even the most distinguished congressmen and senators of the 19th century pursued what by today's standards would be frenetic and irregular political careers. Henry Clay, famous as "the Great Compromiser," was sent thrice to the Senate to serve out someone else's term (the first time despite his being less than 30 years old); served two years in the Kentucky assembly, the second as its speaker; was elected seven times (not consecutively) to the House and three times was chosen speaker, although he often resigned in midterm to take up a diplomatic post or run (unsuccessfully, three times) for president; and was elected twice to the Senate in his own right. Daniel Webster was elected to five terms in the House (not consecutively) and four terms in the Senate, in addition to running once (fruitlessly) for president and serving more than four nonconsecutive years as Secretary of State under three presidents. John C. Calhoun was elected to four terms in the House, served seven years as Secretary of War, was elected twice to the vice presidency, and then served two years of Robert Hayne's (of the Webster-Hayne debate) Senate term, two Senate terms in his own right, one year as Secretary of State, and four more years in the Senate.

By the way, the ALCT's proposed constitutional amendment, which would limit members of Congress to 12 consecutive years in office (six terms for representatives, two for senators), would have had no impact on Clay's nor Calhoun's career but would have disabled Webster, who was elected three times in a row to the Senate.

The Swing Era Ends

But the larger and more important point is that today's entrenched Congress is a product of the great changes in American politics that have occurred since the late 19th century, particularly the weakening of political parties and the great increase in the size and scope of the federal government. Serving in Congress has become a profession over the past 100 years. The average (continuous) career of congressmen hovered around five years at the turn of the century, already up significantly from its earlier levels; today, the figure has doubled again, with the average member of the House serving about 10 years. In the century after 1860, the proportion of freshmen in the House plummeted from nearly 60 percent to around 10 percent, about where it remains today. This gradual professionalization of Congress owes something to the gradual increase of power in Washington, which made it more attractive to hold office; and still more to the seniority system, introduced in the House after the famous revolt against the power of the Speaker around 1910. With the seniority system in place, districts had great incentives to keep their representatives serving continuously. But the contemporary problems of incumbency are something else again. Since 1971, when House Democrats voted in their caucus to elect committee chairmen by secret ballot

Today's entrenched Congress is a product of the weakening of political parties and the great increase in the size and scope of the federal government.

rather than follow the rule of committee seniority, the perquisites of seniority have declined, in part. Yet congressional reelection rates have risen. If it is not the advantages of seniority that account for today's almost invulnerable incumbents, then what is it?

Since the Second World War, reelection rates have been very high, averaging more than 90 percent; they

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Have These Legislators Been in Office Too Long?



Rep. Henry Hyde
(R - Illinois)
Elected 1974

Senator Sam Nunn
(D - Georgia)
Took office 1972

Senator Bill Bradley
(D - New Jersey)
Elected 1978

Senator Jesse Helms
(R - North Carolina)
Elected 1972

Rep. Newt Gingrich
(R - Georgia)
Elected 1978

Senator Orrin Hatch
(R - Utah)
Elected 1976



Senator Richard Lugar
(R - Indiana)
Elected 1976

Rep. Dan Rostenkowski
(D - Illinois)
Elected 1958



Rep. Tom Foley
(D - Washington)
Elected 1964

have risen even further recently, approaching 100 percent in the last few elections. The political scientist David Mayhew identified the key to the incumbency problem as "the vanishing marginals," that is, the decline over the past 40 years in the number of marginal or competitive House districts. (A victory margin of 50 to 55 percent makes a district marginal, that is, capable of being won by a challenger.) In 1948 most incumbents won narrowly, getting less than 55 percent of their district's vote. Twenty years later, three-fourths of the incumbents received 60 percent or more of their district's vote, making these essentially safe seats for the winning congressmen. So, not only are more incumbents than ever winning, they are winning by bigger margins than ever before.

Explanations for the decline in marginal districts have not been scarce. First, there is the effect of gerrymandered congressional districts, which tend to be drawn in such a fashion as to lock in incumbents of both parties. Researchers have shown, however, that marginal districts declined just as sharply in the 1960s in states that did *not* redistrict as in those that did; so gerrymandering cannot be the principal culprit. Then there is the effect of incumbency itself—the franking privilege, free publicity stemming from benefits delivered to the district, prodigious sums of money contributed by political action committees, all of which make possible the greater name recognition that is supposed to discourage unknown and underfunded challengers. As the rates of incumbent reelection have climbed, therefore, one would expect an increase in incumbents' name recognition. But, as John Ferejohn and other analysts have shown, the data do not bear this out: incumbents are no better known now than they were before the marginal districts started vanishing. For all of the incumbents' advantages in name recognition, this factor cannot be the crucial one in explaining the decline in competitive House districts.

Faceless Bureaucracy's Friendly Face

In his arresting book *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment,* the political scientist Morris Fiorina puts his finger on the nub of the problem. During the 1960s, congressmen began to put an unprecedented emphasis on casework or constituent service and pork-barrel activities as a way to ensure their reelection. The new emphasis was made possible precisely by "big government," the federal government's expansion of authority over state and local affairs that began dramatically with the New Deal and accelerated during the Great Society. As the federal bureaucracy expanded, more and more citizens found themselves dealing directly with federal agencies—the Social Security Administration, the Veterans Administration, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and so on. To penetrate the mysteries of the administrative state, to find a friendly face amid the "faceless" bureaucrats and a helping hand among so many seemingly determined to do injustice in particular cases, citizens began increasingly to turn to their congressman for succor.

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And they were encouraged to do so, particularly by the younger and more vulnerable congressmen who had come into office in the great Democratic waves of 1964 and 1974. Eventually, however, almost all congressmen caught on to the "new deal" made possible and necessary by the increased reach of Washington. The beauty of the new politics was that the same congressmen who were applauded for creating new federal agencies to tackle social problems also got credit for helping their constituents through the labyrinths of these impersonal bureaucracies. In Fiorina's words: "Congressmen take credit coming and going. They are the alpha and the omega." The more ambitious of them exploit the paradox shamelessly: the more bureaucracy they create, the more indispensable they are to their constituents. To which one must add: the longer they've been around

Constituent service is gradually transforming the House of Representatives from the most popular branch of the legislature into the highest branch of the civil service.

Washington, the more plausible is their claim to know precisely how to aid their constituents with the bureaucracy.

It is clear that knowledge of these bureaucratic folkways is more important to voters than ever before. But it requires only a very small number of swing voters, perhaps only 5 percent or so, to transform a district from being marginal or competitive into being safe (thus increasing the incumbent's vote from, say, 53 to 58 percent). To explain the disappearing marginal districts it is therefore necessary only for a very small sector of the electorate to have been won over to the incumbent by the constituent service and pork-barrel opportunities opened up by an activist federal government. To this group of voters in particular, perhaps to most voters to one degree or another, the congressman's job is now thought to be as much administrative as political. The spirit of nonpartisan, expert administration—central to modern liberalism as it was conceived in the Progressive Era—is gradually coloring the public's view of the House of Representatives, transforming it from the most popular branch of the legislature into the highest branch of the civil service.

If this is true, the congressman's expertise is a peculiar sort, involving as it does interceding with civil servants (and appointed officials) in the spirit of personal, particularistic relations, not the spirit of impersonal rule following associated with the civil service. Nonetheless, he is expected to keep benefits and services issuing to the district, just as a nonpartisan city manager is expected to keep the streets clean and the sewers flowing. And to the extent that ombudsmanship is a corollary of bureaucracy (as it seems to be, at least in democratic governments), his casework partakes of the spirit of administration rather than of political representation.

Hamilton's "Sordid Views"

Given the origins and nature of the problem with Congress (really with the House of Representatives, inasmuch as Senate incumbents remain beatable), it is apparent that limiting congressional terms to 12 years will do little or nothing to remedy the situation. Any new faces that are brought to Washington as the result of such an amendment will find themselves up against the same old incentives. They will still be eligible for reelection five times. How will they ensure their continued political prosperity without seeing to constituents' administrative needs? If anything, these new congressmen will find themselves confronting bureaucrats rendered more powerful by the representatives' own ignorance of the bureaucracy; for in the administrative state, knowledge is power. It is likely, therefore, that the new congressmen will initially be at a disadvantage relative to the agencies. To counter this they will seek staff members and advisers who are veterans of the Hill, and perhaps larger and more district-oriented staffs to help ward off challengers who would try to take advantage of their inexperience. Is it wise to increase the already expansive power of bureaucrats and congressional staff for the sake of a new congressman in the district every half-generation or so?

The proposed limitation on congressional terms would also have most of the disadvantages of the old schemes of rotation in office that were criticized by the Federalists. Consider these points made by Alexander Hamilton in *Federalist* No. 72 (concerning rotation in the presidency, but still relevant to rotation in Congress). In the first place, setting a limit on office-holding "would be a diminution of the inducements to good behavior." By allowing indefinite reeligibility, political men will be encouraged to make their interest coincide with their duty, and to undertake "extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit" because they will be around to reap the consequences. Second, term limits would be a temptation to "sordid views" and "peculation." As Gouverneur Morris put it at the Constitutional Convention, term limits say to the official, "make hay while the sun shines." Nor does a long term of eligibility (12 years in this case) remove the difficulty. No one will know better than the present incumbent how difficult it will be to defeat the future incumbent. So the limits of his career will always be visible to him, as will the temptation to "make hay" as early as possible.

A third disadvantage of term limits is that they could deprive the country of the experience and wisdom gained by an incumbent, perhaps just when that experience is needed most. This is particularly true for senators, whose terms would be limited even though Senate races are frequently quite competitive (recall

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1980 and 1986) and that the Senate was precisely the branch of the legislature in which the Framers sought stability, the child of long service.

Distraction for GOP

For conservatives and Republicans, the pursuit of a constitutional amendment to limit congressional terms would act as a colossal distraction from the serious work of politics that needs to be done.

The worst effect of the incumbents' advantage in the House is to have saddled America with divided government since 1968 (excepting Jimmy Carter's administration, which was bad for other reasons). Professor Fiorina estimates that if marginal districts had not declined, the Republicans would have taken control of the House five times in the past quarter-century—in 1966, 1968, 1972, 1980, and 1984 (he did not evaluate the 1988 results). Because the marginals did decline, the Democrats, trading on the power of their incumbent members, retained control of the House throughout this period, despite the succession of Republican presidents who were elected.

It would be unfair, of course, to blame the Democrats' popularity wholly on the decline in marginal districts. The GOP has not done well enough in open-seat elections to rely on the incumbency effect as the all-purpose excuse for its inability to take the House. But it is a fair conjecture that the ethos of administrative politics works to the Republicans' disadvantage even in those districts lacking a Democratic incumbent. Which is not to say that Republican incumbents don't look out for themselves; they do. But the spirit of casework and pork-barrel cuts against the grain of conservative Republican principles, and so it is hard for Republican candidates to sound like Republicans when they are preaching the gospel according to FDR and LBJ. More to the point, it is difficult for the Republican Party to articulate why people ought to consider themselves Republicans and ought to vote a straight GOP ticket under these circumstances.

Is it wise to increase the already expansive power of bureaucrats and congressional staff for the sake of a new congressman in the district every half-generation or so?

The attempt to limit congressional terms would do nothing to relieve Republicans of these tactical disadvantages. What is needed is not a gimmick to stir up political competition, but the prudence and courage to take on the strategic political questions dividing conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats. By (among other things) reconsidering the scope and power of the federal government, by opposing the extension of centralized administration over more and more of American life, Republicans could inaugurate robust political competition. President Reagan and the Republican Party were successful at this in 1980, when the GOP gained 33 seats in the House and took control of the Senate. But they seem to have neglected those lessons in succeeding elections.



Library of Congress

Edmund Randolph's plan to limit congressional terms was rejected by the Constitutional Convention.

By the 1992 election, when reapportionment and redistricting have taken hold (and assuming a generous number of retirements), there could be 100 House districts without an incumbent. To win these the Republicans will require not just the better party organization they have been assiduously building, important as that is, but also a moral and political argument against what, to borrow the 18th-century vocabulary, could be called the corruption of the national legislature and of national politics generally—not corruption in the sense of criminal venality, but in the sense of insulating our legislators from the currents of national political opinion, and encouraging them, and their constituents, to subordinate the public good to their own private welfare.

In this fight, congressional term limitations would be at best a distraction. If the American people want to vote all incumbents out of office, or just those particular incumbents known as liberal Democrats, they can do so with but the flick of a lever. All they need is a good reason.

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Scoop Jackson Democrat

Senator Joseph Lieberman's Case for Economic and Military Strength

An Interview by Adam Meyerson

Joseph Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut, was elected to the United States Senate in 1988 with the endorsement of *National Review* and the support of many conservatives who preferred him to incumbent Republican Lowell Weicker. He has since attracted considerable conservative attention with his support for capital gains tax cuts, his defense of President Reagan's use of force in Grenada and Libya and President Bush's military action in Panama, his deep religious commitments (he is an Orthodox Jew who will not campaign on the Sabbath), and his willingness to try market-based approaches to public policy, among them education vouchers, tradeable emissions permits in environmental regulation, and private insurance solutions for the crisis in long-term health care. While his voting record in the Senate has not differed much from that of his Democratic colleagues, he has also sharply criticized the national Democratic Party for moving from its traditional emphasis on military strength and economic growth.

Lieberman, 48, was previously majority leader of the Connecticut state senate and then state attorney general, each for six years. He frequently argues that national Democrats have a great deal to learn from the performance of state and local Democratic officials.

In May 1990, Senator Lieberman discussed his view of the role of government, the impact his religious values have had on his public policy views, and his criticism of both the national Democratic Party and the Bush administration, in an interview by *Policy Review* editor Adam Meyerson.

Policy Review: **You've argued that the national Democratic Party needs to be more closely identified with economic growth, and you've been something of a maverick in the party in calling for targeted cuts in capital gains taxes. What models for the Democrats today do you see in the economic positions of earlier Democratic leaders?**

Senator Joseph Lieberman: The Democratic Party for most of this century was seen as the party of economic opportunity. We were committed to enterprise, to labor in the classic sense of working hard to make your way. We believed in opening up the system, so that everyone could enjoy the rewards of hard work. Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and John F. Kennedy all offered across-the-board leadership on behalf of economic growth, with the federal government leading the way in supporting and stimulating the economy. JFK said that a rising tide lifts all boats, and he aggressively used federal tax incentives as a stimulant for growth.

Somehow, in the last 15 to 20 years, the national Democratic Party has moved away from this tradition. The national Democratic Party now has a reputation of taking money, through taxes, from those who work and giving it to those who don't work. This is a simplification and a caricature, of course. But I think it's fair to say that Democrats at the national level have focused too exclusively on social policy, and that's not enough. The social commitments of the Democratic Party are important and should not be abandoned, but they are not enough to govern and probably not enough to get elected at the presidential level. It is critically important for us to come back as the party of growth, the party that encourages and rewards entrepreneurship and hard work.

The test of America's greatness in the years ahead is going to be our economic strength. Everyone in Washington talks about this, but I don't see much happening. So there's a real opportunity and a responsibility for the national Democratic Party to lead with an economic growth program. Besides, we will never be able to deal effectively with our social problems unless we have economic growth.

P.R.: **Are you saying then that the Democrats are too strongly identified today with high taxes and high government spending?**

Lieberman: We certainly have been, although I think that is changing. There's no question that part of what brought down national Democratic candidates in the last decade has been their association with high taxes and high spending. I know it's fashionable to consider the American people selfish in not wanting higher taxes, but

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is it unreasonable for a hard-working family to be angry about paying higher taxes when they see how often their money is wasted and how little they see in return that means something to the way they live? I don't think Americans are inherently opposed to paying their fair share. It's just that they want to see that they're getting something in return for what they pay.

The American people are very skeptical of what President Reagan called big government. But they're not skeptical about strong government. People really want leadership, especially on the things that most worry them. And a lot of people in this country are worried about our economic future, about whether we and our children are going to have a decent standard of living. I believe people in this country want leadership from Washington on this issue.

***P.R.:* You've called for greater government funding of civilian research and development, particularly in high-tech industries, and have criticized the "Adam Smith gospel" of those who oppose such industrial policy. Are you confident that centralized and politicized government agencies can do a better job than the marketplace in picking industrial winners and losers?**

Lieberman: Yes, the federal government should play a role in stimulating our economy. There's a pretty broad consensus about the danger signs in our economy—the low rate of investment, the low rate of savings, the short-term perspective in management, the relatively decreasing rate of investment in research and development. There's also much tougher international competition. We still are the greatest economy in the world, certainly the greatest consumer economy, but we're being challenged in a way that we've never been challenged before. We have to meet that challenge. And one of the elements of the challenge is the extent to which governments in Japan and some of the other Asian economies as well as those in Europe cooperate with business in the creation of new products and services. We've got to do more of that ourselves.

To talk 19th-century economic theory when we're trying to compete with 21st-century economies just doesn't make sense anymore. The reality is that government is all over the economy. Two of our strongest export categories happen to be ones where the government has played a major supportive role—aerospace and agriculture. One of the strongest sectors of our economy has been the defense sector, which is so dependent on the government. We have seen a number of commercial applications that have spun off from this governmental involvement.

Through tax incentives and a national policy of support for growth industries we've got to create a sense of partnership between the private and public sectors in this country. I'm not sure the Japanese MITI model is right for us. We've got to find some models that are uniquely American. That's one reason I like DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which has been quite successfully choosing some potential winners in high-tech industry. Its projects aren't all winners. But it has done some interesting things within the American context—low-interest loans, some grants, and taking an equity position in what it often correctly deems to be growth industries. I am sponsoring legislation that would expand DARPA's role, and get it more involved in stimulating development of high-tech products with civilian-sector application.

***P.R.:* Would you agree that perhaps our biggest economic competitiveness problem is our elementary and secondary education system?**

Lieberman: It is in the long run. The numbers are awful. When 98 percent of Japanese kids graduate from high school and only 50 percent of the kids in most of our cities do, we're just not going to be prepared to compete. We need a sense of national purpose to improve our education system the way we did after Sputnik. Part of this is government's responsibility. But our crisis in education is ultimately rooted in changes in family life.

I am looking for fresh models of what government should do. A lot of the old welfare state answers have not worked.

Too many American families no longer play the role that they used to in conveying the value of educational excellence and achievement as the way to make it in America. We have to do everything we can to turn that around.

Money is not the only answer to the crisis in education. It's part of the answer, but we really have to deal with motivation. We also have to shake up the system. The current system is not functioning as well as it should. I'm intrigued by the ideas of vouchers and choice as a way to create competition in the educational marketplace. I bet such competition would be popular, and would excite a lot of families, a lot of parents, a lot of students.

***P.R.:* You've been something of a maverick in your party with your support of American military action in Grenada and Panama. What traditional principles of the Democratic Party justify such use of force?**

Lieberman: Defense is another area, along with economic opportunity and growth, where the Democratic Party has left its traditional foundations over the past couple of decades. The party of Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy understood that one of the most critical responsibilities of our national government is to protect our national security. These presidents all understood that the world is imperfect, and that although civilization has progressed in many ways, we still are imperfect enough to want to cause harm to one another. Unless you have strength, and show that you are willing to use

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

Nick Lacy

"The American people are very skeptical of what President Reagan called big government. But they're not skeptical of strong government."

that strength in international relations, people and governments will take advantage of you and you will suffer for your timidity. The United States should not go looking for fights, but we have to be ready to defend our interests and defend them wisely and courageously.

***P.R.:* Under what circumstances must the United States be prepared to use force?**

Lieberman: Wherever American people or principles are in danger, we have to be open to the use of force. President Reagan's decision to order an air attack on Libya was a totally justifiable use of force because Colonel Qadhafi was a major supporter of international terrorism, which was hurting and killing Americans, and it was important to send him a message that he could no longer operate without fear of reprisal. It is very dangerous to let an international outlaw run loose.

The ouster of Noriega was another justifiable use of force. Again, both principles and people were involved: Panama is close to our border and in our natural sphere of influence. We have important commercial interests through the canal. Noriega violated democratic principles with his flagrant nullification of the election he clearly lost. His role in drug running threatened our security. And, finally, his encouragement of, or at least toleration of, attacks on American soldiers in Panama could not be permitted to escalate.

A military response was also necessary in Grenada. Our conflict with the Soviet Communists seems to be diminishing now in many regions. But when the new government took over in Grenada with Cuban support, the situation was clearly threatening to other democracies in the Caribbean. Was it threatening to our ultimate existence? No, but it was a threat to freedom in our hemisphere. We had the capacity to eliminate the threat without much risk, and I thought it was an important and appropriate use of force.

***P.R.:* You have argued that "the world may become a more dangerous place just when tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union may be easing." What do you see as the major threats to peace and security in the coming decade?**

Lieberman: Well, there's still a major threat from the Soviet Union. The Soviets are focusing on trying to rescue their own economy, and are less likely to be involved in regional conflicts, less likely to create security threats for us or our allies in Western Europe. Even if there's a change of leadership, the factors that drew Gorbachev to bring these extraordinary changes to the Soviet Union are likely to remain whoever comes to power there. But there's some uncertainty about exactly what course this second Russian revolution is going to take. And the Soviets are still tremendously well armed. No other nation compares with the Soviet Union in its potential military threat to us, particularly its nuclear threat.

I hope that the START talks are successful and that we can scale down the level of nuclear arms, which have become a waste of critical resources for both sides. Nonetheless, so long as the Soviets possess the nuclear strength that they do, we have to maintain a deterrent capacity.

The new threats are going to be from unstable Third World countries and from terrorists. The proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, together with the capacity to deliver them via ballistic missiles, is a major threat to peace—especially in the Middle East and Asia. Assuming things continue in a peaceful direction in Eastern Europe, I'm concerned that the Middle East will emerge as the world's tinderbox. I'm also greatly concerned about the link between drugs and terrorism, which poses a direct threat to our nation's interests and our people.

***P.R.:* How do you respond to the argument that this proliferation calls for the rapid development and deployment of missile defense systems such as SDI and Israel's Arrow tactical ABM program?**

Lieberman: I remain opposed to SDI because it is an enormous expenditure of money for a system that no one has convinced me is technologically feasible. There are elements of what is called SDI that we should continue to support, particularly the early warning systems

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that will protect us from surprise attacks not only from major powers like the Soviets, but from runaway Third World enemies. But the greatest defense is deterrence—our capacity to inflict equal and greater punishment on anyone who would attack us, and a clear understanding in the international community that we are prepared to use that capacity. Because of the short warning times they have, countries like Israel may need a missile defense. But I think that their greatest defense—like ours—is the understanding that they have a response capacity that should deter any thoughts of first strike by their enemies.

***P.R.:* Are you disturbed by President Bush's silence on behalf of liberty in Lithuania and China?**

Lieberman: Yes, I am. The most electric moment of my 16 months in Washington came during Lech Walesa's speech to the Congress, when he described how the American ideal of freedom had inspired and sustained him and the rest of the Solidarity movement during their darkest days. We're finding the same response in the rest of Eastern Europe and throughout the world. This is our strength, this powerful 200-year-old democratic idea of our Founding Fathers, and it must be the foundation of our foreign policy. Any time we sacrifice principles for what appears to be short-term international political gains, we lose—if not in the short term, then eventually.

I've been affected a great deal by the failure of western leadership to act in the years that preceded World War II. And I see a shadow of this history in Lithuania today. The specifics are different but we have here a small, relatively powerless nation that has the courage to stand up for freedom against a powerful giant. For us to stand by silently is wrong. It's inconsistent with everything we stand for, and it weakens us. We should be shouting for the Lithuanians and granting them diplomatic recognition immediately. Of course, March 11, when the Lithuanians proclaimed independence, was not a convenient time for Gorbachev. Neither was July 4, 1776, a convenient time for King George.

Incidentally, I don't see that this would jeopardize either our relations with Gorbachev or his own power within the Soviet Union. Everything we know about Gorbachev suggests he is very agile at balancing different forces—the right wing in his country, the nationalist movements, all the grumbling within the military that might call for being tough on the Lithuanians, his desire for good relations with the U.S., his desire to spend less on arms (which depends on our good will and our willingness to enter arms control agreements), his desire to enjoy better trade relations with the United States. By letting him know, through recognition of the government in Lithuania, just how important we think Baltic independence is, we could affect the way he balances these different political forces. But the main point is that we must uphold principles, not political personalities, in our foreign policy.

***P.R.:* You are a deeply religious man, and I wondered if you might say a few words about how the values of Orthodox Judaism affect your approach to public policy.**

Lieberman: Well, my first obligation as a public servant is to the Constitution, the laws, the oath of office that I took, and the people of Connecticut. But many factors such as my religion have played a part in the development of my world view, my view of human nature. I believe that people have enormous potential for good, that we all are touched by the Divine. But we're all also imperfect, and we have the capacity to do great evil. And part of the answer to that evil, according to my religion, is the role of law as an attempt to create order, to establish standards for behavior, in some senses to express our best aspirations for ourselves and to deter our worst instincts. This is one reason I ended up wanting to be a lawmaker, and why I believe in the rule of law and order.

***P.R.:* Judaism requires every individual to set aside a portion of his income for the less fortunate, and it also requires strong moral obligations within the family. How do these principles influence your approach to government help for the needy, and, in particular, to the great conundrum of the modern welfare state—the needy who have abandoned their own family obligations?**

Lieberman: I suppose my feelings about the welfare state were affected as much by experiences in government as by religion. But my religion teaches that you don't stand by while suffering exists, that we have an obligation to those who are genuinely in need. Indeed, one of the highest forms of charity is to create the opportunities for people to better themselves and to take some responsibility for their actions.

A lot of Democrats have left the Democratic Party in national elections because they believe that the Democratic Party has left them.

My religion also teaches that we are accountable to a higher authority, that we have an obligation to develop our unique human potential to the greatest extent possible, and that the family is the central unit through which we act. Very often, when I think about our great national problems of education and drugs, I am impressed by the great limits to what government can do. So many of the answers really have to come from within the family and from within the self. The government can only do so much about drugs. If people don't learn values, if people don't acquire self-discipline, then they're going to be subject to drug abuse. The same is true of education. There's only so much the government can do if the family is not there to create standards of

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excellence and the motivation for success.

At this stage of my life, I am looking for fresh models of what government should do. A lot of the old welfare state answers have not worked. In Eastern Europe, which has had an extreme form of the welfare state—total statism—the result has been more human suffering, less human accomplishment, and ultimately less human welfare. Our goal should be to bring together our compassion for those who are needy with our understanding that ultimately it is family values and individual motivation that make the most difference in bettering the human condition.

***P.R.:* How does Judaism affect your approach to abortion and public policy? Would you favor a legal right to choose abortion, while at the same time arguing that in most circumstances of unwanted pregnancy the mother is morally obligated not to abort?**

Lieberman: I don't personally believe in abortion. To me it's unacceptable. But I have also come to the conclusion that this value of mine is not shared by millions of other Americans and that, while I might personally argue against abortion, as a lawmaker I cannot impose my personal judgment on others. It wouldn't be appropriate, and it wouldn't be feasible. Some women are going to have abortions regardless of what the law says. Sometimes lawmakers have to show some humility and say that no matter how strongly they feel about an issue, this is beyond the appropriate reach of the law.

Money is not the only answer to the crisis in education. Our crisis in education is ultimately rooted in changes in family life.

While respecting the right of women to choose an abortion, particularly in the early stages of pregnancy—pre-viability—government policies can and should be designed to encourage childbirth. This means government support for pregnant women, especially with prenatal and neonatal care, and also encouragement of adoption. I've introduced legislation that would give federal workers the same kind of insurance coverage for adoption costs that we give for childbirth costs. And I've also introduced legislation to devote more research dollars to the development of better birth control methods that would lessen the number of unwanted pregnancies and therefore the disturbingly high number of abortions in America each year.

***P.R.:* Has religion played much of a role in the development of your environmental concerns?**

Lieberman: I think so. If you believe in God as Creator of the world, then the natural environment is part of Creation and should be protected and sustained. The Garden of Eden story and its vision of a natural paradise, and the concept of stewardship in Noah's protection of all the other living creatures from the flood, are important and powerful metaphors, parables, and lessons. Obviously, my environmental concerns expanded in different ways through my own personal political experience, but my religious training played a seminal part.

***P.R.:* Given your concern both for economic growth and for the environment, are there any ways to achieve strict environmental protection at less cost than under current law?**

Lieberman: Well, I hope so. One of the great themes of environmental protection in the next decade is going to be pollution prevention based on economic incentives, not just enforcement and regulation. Enforcement and regulation will continue to be needed, to create an incentive for compliance. But enforcement and regulation cannot do it alone, as I learned in my six years as attorney general in Connecticut. Authorities who rely simply on law cannot do all they should to protect the environment because there is never enough time nor money nor personnel to investigate all the cases and enforce all the laws that are being violated.

It is much more effective to build on the environmental ethic that is becoming so widespread in our society, and to encourage self-initiated pollution prevention by individuals and by businesses. An executive from a large corporation recently explained to me why his company was doing so much to reduce pollution. "Our business," he said, "depends on the good will of the community. If we are identified as a polluter, our customers are not going to want to do business with us." This kind of market-driven pollution prevention is going to be a real driving force in the next decade.

We are also beginning to move away from our exclusive reliance on the old command-and-control techniques for environmental protection, and to experiment with some creative and exciting market incentives. That's hopeful, because market incentives are consistent with human nature and they generally work. They also require less bureaucracy. We're trying market incentives in a big way in the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act. I like the concept and hope we can use it more in the years ahead, because it will certainly be less expensive for government and it is also potentially very effective.

***P.R.:* Do you think the federal government's environmental protection efforts are focused on the most serious threats?**

Lieberman: Not always. About two years ago the staff at EPA did a report called "Unfinished Business" that somebody gave me when I was elected. I was fascinated by it and I go back to it periodically. The EPA ranked environmental threats according to estimates of their danger to human health. Some of the threats where we've committed the most resources, such as toxic wastes, were less

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dangerous according to this assessment than others, such as lead poisoning, which gets very little in the way of government resources. The greatest threat to human health comes from ground-level ozone, which hopefully we've begun to deal with in the Clean Air legislation. But generally we have to do a better job in relating our commitment of resources, time, and legislation to the most serious threats.

P.R.: **You co-sponsored legislation to remove the use of Alar from apples. Does it concern you that many everyday foodstuffs—such as mushrooms, mustard, table pepper, and bread—contain naturally occurring chemicals that are more carcinogenic than Alar? Or should different safety standards apply to substances that occur naturally vs. those introduced by humans?**

Lieberman: I've heard those arguments. They are intriguing. One response is that there's nothing we can do about natural carcinogens. Nature made them. But there is something we can do about pesticides like Alar that we intentionally put in our food supply. There's a difference between intentionally creating a problem, which is what we are doing with the pesticides, and unavoidably living with a naturally occurring problem that you have to be mindful of.

The second response is that intentionally created problems could become truly dangerous if they are not regulated. Long-term exposure is a real problem that we cannot ignore. Theoretically somebody could put much too much of a harmful pesticide on an apple or some other food, whereas the naturally occurring carcinogens tend to occur in predictable and relatively small amounts over time, with the exception of an occasional poison mushroom. Just for the record, by the way, I'm against poison mushrooms.

P.R.: **Over 30 million Americans are without health insurance, and millions of elderly lack the financial wherewithal for long-term health care. You represent a state with some of the leading private insurance expertise in the country. What public policies would better enable private insurance companies to offer affordable medical insurance and insurance for long-term care?**

Lieberman: This is one of the biggest challenges we face. Whenever I go to public meetings in Connecticut, I find that people are angrier about health care than about any other issue. The anger is not mainly about health care for those who are uninsured. That is a real problem and I don't mean to diminish it. But the anger I hear most is from people who have insurance and are concerned about rising costs and diminishing coverage, as well as from businesspeople, who complain that health care costs are the fastest escalating costs of doing business.

We haven't figured out a way to put a cap on these rising health costs. We don't have the governmental resources to pick up the whole system and solve everybody's problems; it's great to talk about that kind of dreaming, but it's not going to happen. Nor would it be fair nor reasonable to put a big additional burden on private businesses to pay for the uninsured. So I think

Lieberman (right) with EPA administrator William Reilly: "If you believe in God as Creator of the world, then the natural environment is part of Creation and should be protected and sustained."

we really have to look again for models of public-private cooperation, and two good ideas have come out of the insurance industry.

One is to use life insurance proceeds for medical care for the terminally ill. Believe it or not, there are $8.4 trillion in life insurance assets in our country. I've co-sponsored legislation that would enable patients whose doctors certify that they are not going to live more than 12 months longer to tap into their life insurance benefits in the months before they die. We're calling it a life with dignity bill, because the patient will be able to pay his expenses without burdening his family, and he will be able to live out his final months comfortably and with dignity.

A second idea is a demonstration project in Connecticut, which would enable people to buy private insurance to cover long-term care for probably a two-year period, with the government picking up the tab after that. An important aspect of the legislation is to protect a patient's assets from government taking to the extent of his or her insurance. The purpose of this provision is to protect middle-class people, who sometimes have to give up their homes and savings to finance long-term care. You know the story: If you have a lot of money you probably can take care of yourself. If you have very little money the government will take care of you. But under the current system, people in the great group in the middle, the group that's worked hard and saved and built, face poverty, loss of their homes and their savings, when they become sick later in life. The goal of the Connecticut program is to give them the opportunity to protect their assets through private insurance. It's consistent with basic American values of hard work and saving, which are so important for economic growth and economic competitiveness.

P.R.: **Republicans have won five straight presidential elections in Connecticut. Yet the governor of Connecticut and both senators are Democrats, three of six congressmen are Democrats, and Democrats control the legislature as well as most local offices. The story is**

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

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"Bush's silence over China is inconsistent with everything we stand for and I fear it will be taken as a sign of weakness by the Chinese."

similar in other states. Why can't Democrats regain the presidency when they are so successful in state, local, and congressional elections? And conversely, why are Republicans so strong at the presidential level and so weak almost everywhere else?

Lieberman: At the national level the Republicans have spoken to the concerns and expressed the values of a great majority of Americans, and the Democrats have not. But at the state and local levels we've been able to express these values more effectively than have the Republicans.

This is a country that cares about basic values. To begin with, most people are religious. I don't mean that everybody goes to church or synagogue, but people believe in God. The national Democratic Party in recent years seems to have felt uncomfortable with the religious impulse, while the Republicans have respected the importance of religion and other values and thereby created a link with many people, including a lot of Democrats. A lot of Democrats have left the Democratic Party in national elections because they believe that the Democratic Party has left them.

Another value most Americans hold is that hard work should be rewarded, that this is a country where if you work hard there's no limit to what you can achieve. Too many Americans have come to the conclusion that the national Democratic Party doesn't share that feeling, that it wants to take their hard-earned money and give it to people who are not working hard.

Americans also believe that government has a responsibility for security, both personal security and international security. This carries over to the drug and crime problem. For various reasons, national Democrats have come to be perceived as belonging to a party that is not prepared to use governmental authority to create order and to punish criminals. Americans are frightened about crime, and the Republicans have responded to this fear. Americans are patriotic, and although they don't want us to go recklessly into war, they want a national defense that can protect our interests, our principles, our people. Again the national Democratic Party has come to be seen as belonging to a party that has moved away from these values.

Why have Democrats been so much more successful at the state and local levels? In part, perhaps, questions of values are not as important in state and local elections. But also, state and local Democrats have clearly understood and spoken to the importance of economic opportunity and growth. In Connecticut and many other states, state and local Democrats crossed this line during the early '70s, just at the time when the national party was veering to the left.

Democrats came to an understanding at the state level that it made no sense to try to build popular support by being anti-business, because that policy had no substance, no meaning to people any more. The abuses by business in the early part of this century were no longer real, and we now had labor laws and labor unions to guard against them. What really mattered to people was having a job, and the best thing government could do was to stimulate economic growth—through tax incentives for business, low-interest loans, a whole range of partnerships with the private sector. Interestingly, state and local Democrats have been in the vanguard of these economic development programs.

The world may become a more dangerous place just when tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union may be easing.

A lot of Democrats at the state level have also been tough on crime. Why that hasn't translated to the national level, I don't understand. Some of it may be the greater influence of special interest groups within the Democratic Party at the national level.

Republicans meanwhile haven't been able to translate the Reagan-Bush mandates into gains at the state, local, or congressional level. I'm not sure why—and of course

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we could be seeing a national political transition in the next four years—but it might have something to do with the relative ineffectiveness of Republican state and local party organizations.

***P.R.:* You haven't explained why the same voters who elect a Republican president vote for Democratic senators and congressmen with different views on foreign and economic policy.**

Lieberman: Part of the reason may be the people's inherent wisdom in enjoying the checks and balances of our system of government. They do not want power concentrated in one party. Part may also be the incumbency factor—in addition to being policymakers, congressmen are advocates for their states and perform important services for their constituents. Even if a congressman may be a bit out of tune with constituents' policy views, he is viewed as a friend because he has fought for the state or district and helped constituents with their problems.

***P.R.:* What are President Bush's greatest strengths and weaknesses?**

Lieberman: President Bush brings extraordinary domestic and international experience to the job. I think this gives people a sense of security that things won't get too bad. He deals more effectively with Congress than others have, and as a result he has a lot of potential to get more done.

His weakness in the domestic area is that he touches on all the problems that the polls say are bothering the people—I'm thinking here of drugs and crime, education, economic competitiveness, the environment—but he doesn't provide the kind of in-depth programmatic leadership that brings about real progress in these areas.

At the end of last year, I would have said that he was doing very well internationally, because he's skilled, he knows people around the world, he's balanced, and he's willing to use force when necessary, as in Panama. But I've been troubled lately by his inclination to take a conflict-avoiding course at the expense of our principles. My sense of human nature and of history tells me that the business-as-usual policies the Bush administration has taken with respect to China, for example, will be taken as a sign of weakness by the Chinese. I fear the same with the Soviets in his response to Lithuania.

***P.R.:* As you look to your career in the Senate, who are the great models of effective senators, past or present, who most inspire you?**

Lieberman: One of my heroes, who was not a senator, is Teddy Roosevelt. He clearly spoke for a strong America in the world, he was a conservationist, in some senses the original environmentalist, and he was willing to fight for economic competitiveness, for the vitality of the free enterprise system.

I have always admired Harry Truman. I like his strong foreign policy as president. And I also admire his Senate career, where he was a great investigator of government waste and corruption. I hope to get involved in some of that myself.

Scoop Jackson is a model because he supported both a strong international presence for the United States and a positive role for the federal government in creating a better economic life at home.

John F. Kennedy inspired me to go into politics. I was 18 years old when he became president.

Finally, Scoop Jackson is a model because he supported both a strong international presence for the United States and a positive role for the federal government in creating a better economic life at home. What that means today is probably different from what it meant in Scoop Jackson's time, but still he brought together policies that I admire. He stands, I think, for a vision of an America that is strong, prosperous, and caring.

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Voices in the Wilderness

The Western Heroes of Eastern Europe

Arch Puddington

Nineteen eighty-nine has rightly been described as a year of revolution, a time of great, irreversible changes in world political affairs. But unlike previous revolutions, which often gave birth to totally new political arrangements and were inspired by ideas untested by practical experience, the upheavals in Eastern Europe signaled the triumph of an already existing system, western democracy, and absolute defeat for democracy's principal 20th-century rival, Soviet-style Communism. On this score there is no ambiguity. Countries formerly under single-party Communist control are currently in the process of adopting western parliamentary models, and those advocating formulas based on "democratic Marxism" have been effectively exiled to the far margins of political life. As for economic affairs, the leaders of the East European democratic movements (and, for that matter, the "restructured" Communist parties) have made clear their rejection of some mythical third way between socialism and capitalism. They have embraced free-market economics, with all its uncertainties and disruptions, as the only viable alternative to Communism's legacy of stagnation, centralization, and mass pauperization.

But if the collapse of Communism represents a clear victory for western ideas and values, it is less obvious precisely how the democracies influenced and inspired events in Eastern Europe.

This is a question of more than historical relevance. For while it is universally acknowledged that western political freedom and the example of capitalist prosperity were powerful forces in subverting Communism's pretense to superiority, there is considerable debate over the impact of the more direct western, and particularly American, initiatives that sought to encourage opposition to Communist rule. Some, in fact, argue that policies that reflected a Cold War mentality either left no impression or even impeded the process of Communist reform. Others counter that the contribution of the United States was crucial, especially during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, when a confrontationist American foreign policy sharpened the social and economic contradictions in the Communist world and hastened the unraveling of Soviet-style socialism.

In fact, if the East European people give Reagan less credit than American conservatives do for stimulating change in their countries, they nonetheless harbor a great deal of admiration for the former president. This was one of the most important findings of a series of interviews I recently conducted with a broad range of East European émigrés and visitors. With few exceptions, those surveyed had participated in democratic opposition movements ranging from the Hungarian revolution to intellectual dissent in Romania to Solidarity in Poland.

"Ash Heap of History"

Almost all those I interviewed had a favorable, sometimes highly favorable, opinion of Reagan's role. Here it should be noted that Reagan seems to have left his greatest impression on Poles. As Tadeusz Zachurski, who emigrated to America in 1981, observes, Reagan was popular not simply among intellectual opposition figures, but among the broad masses of the Polish people, who affectionately dubbed him "Uncle Reagan" and admired his energy, vitality, and sense of humor. One reason for Reagan's popularity was his sharp, anti-Soviet rhetoric. References to the "Evil Empire" and to sweeping Communism into the "ash heap of history"—the kind of talk, in other words, that drew the censure of the foreign-policy establishment in America—was well received by those living within the Evil Empire's borders. Reagan, according to Bartak Kaminski, a Polish émigré who teaches at the University of Maryland, was "the first world leader of the post-détente era who was willing to express ideas about the Soviets which were shared by most Poles."

As for Reagan's specific policies toward East European countries, Kaminski points out that the administration's critical stance toward the martial-law regime was important in undermining the legitimacy of the Jaruzelski regime, and he contrasts this policy with the general attitude of western friendliness toward the Romanian

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dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu, which had the effect of undercutting the Romanian opposition. Jerzy Warman, an activist in Polish student politics before coming to America, thinks that the United States' defense buildup and assistance to anti-Communist forces in the Third World sent a message to the entire Soviet bloc that "the contest between East and West was one that the Communists simply could not hope to win," and notes that this message was not lost on the anti-Communist masses of the East European countries.

Praise for Carter

Jimmy Carter, although not as personally popular as Reagan, also left an imprint on developments in Eastern Europe. True, some judge Carter as harshly as his American critics. Marian Lemke, a Polish lawyer working for Solidarity, recently visited the United States as part of a program sponsored by the National Forum Foundation. He dismisses Carter as a weak president: "His presidency ended with the invasion of Afghanistan; Reagan's ended with revolution in Eastern Europe." Nevertheless, many East Europeans give Carter high marks for his human-rights initiatives. "Carter did not invent human rights as an issue," says Jerzy Warman. "But he put it on the agenda. And this stimulated an atmosphere in which it became much more difficult for the authorities to punish dissidents and, by lowering the threshold of repression, enabled the opposition movements to flourish." Mihaly Csako, a Hungarian sociologist who was dismissed from his academic post for his political views and is currently involved with the independent trade union movement in his native country, agrees with Warman. He believes that it was particularly important that Carter, during a visit to Poland, tied American economic relations to a country's human-rights record, a message that was heard by those East European regimes that valued economic contacts with the United States.

Affection for JFK, Not Nixon

That the figures of Reagan and Carter dominated the discussion of American politicians is at least in part due to the youth of the majority of those I interviewed. East Europeans from an older generation were more inclined to have favorable memories of John F. Kennedy. To Thomas Keri, who participated in the Hungarian revolution and later emigrated to the United States, Kennedy was "the white knight, devoted to freedom, and the clear leader of the Free World." Richard Nixon's identification with détente disqualifies him from consideration among almost all East Europeans, except Romanians, who praise Nixon for having visited their country in 1969, when Nicolae Ceausescu was perceived even within Romania as a potential reformer. Indeed, that one event demonstrates the mystique of the American presidency for East Europeans. A Romanian exile, Vladimir Tismaneanu, recalls that Nixon remained a highly popular figure in Romania after his visit: "He symbolized the idea of democracy and anti-Sovietism, and represented a counter to the threat of Soviet imperial designs."

Among West European political figures, the most popular seem to be Margaret Thatcher and Charles de Gaulle. Thatcher is praised for her leadership qualities, her anti-Communism, and her unapologetic advocacy of the free market. As for de Gaulle, East Europeans remember him for his several triumphant tours of East European countries in the 1960s. De Gaulle's insistence on the European heritage of the satellite nations struck a particularly important chord at a time when western politicians were increasingly perceived as tacitly recognizing permanent Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. As Irena Lasota, a Polish émigré who had been active in student politics in the '60s, notes, de Gaulle's "conception of a 'united Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' found favor among the people."

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One reason for Reagan's popularity was his sharp, anti-Soviet rhetoric. The Polish people affectionately dubbed him "Uncle Reagan."

Orwell, Hayek, and Solzhenitsyn

For some East Europeans, the influence of western writers and political thinkers was as significant as that of western political leaders. The writings of George Orwell, easy to obtain despite official bans, were widely read, as was *Darkness at Noon*, the masterpiece by the Hungarian-born journalist and former Communist Arthur Koestler. For the younger generation, however, French intellectuals—new philosophers such as André Glucksmann and Bernard-Henri Levy along with Jean-François Revel and the Sovietologist Alain Besançon—were an important source of ideas about the nature and evolution of the totalitarian state. Also mentioned with surprising frequency were the great conservative economists of the age, most notably Milton Friedman and Friedrich von

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Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel (right) with his western counterculture hero Frank Zappa.

Hayek. Andras Domany, a correspondent for Hungarian state radio who visited the United States as part of the National Forum Foundation project, explains, "Our economists are so set against the supercentralized socialist planning mechanism that no Keynes or Galbraith would have a chance." Marian Lemke has a similar view: "Those who have lived under a totalitarian system are looking for something completely different; we are not interested in leftist thinking."

It would be remiss not to mention that individuals from the Communist world were frequently cited as important influences on the East European opposition. Rafal Krawczyk, a professor of economics in Lublin, Poland, who was associated with The Heritage Foundation during a recent stay in the United States, observes, "It was the East, and not the West, which offered the examples of personal heroism, of people fighting for moral values." Andrei Sakharov, the Helsinki monitoring groups that functioned briefly in the Soviet Union, Polish intellectuals such as Adam Michnik, even Marshal Tito were all given credit for exhibiting personal and political courage in the face of Soviet or indigenous Communist power. The most frequently mentioned name was that of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. While East Europeans take a dim view (to put it mildly) of Solzhenitsyn's outspoken Russian nationalism, they express nothing but admiration for his conduct prior to his expulsion from the Soviet Union. In discussing Solzhenitsyn's influence on the Polish opposition, Jozef Ruszar, who left Poland after being jailed during the martial law period, observes that the Russian's monumental study of Stalinism, *The Gulag Archipelago*, was taken much less seriously than in the West because Poles already knew the realities of life in the prison camp system. Instead, "Solzhenitsyn's importance stemmed from his insistence that people stop living the Communist lie"—advice, Ruszar adds, that was taken literally by the Polish opposition, which openly published its names and addresses during the '70s.

Another figure of some influence was Pope John Paul II. The Pope, it should be noted, although widely respected throughout Eastern Europe, seems to have made a major impact only in Poland, the other East European countries being less strongly Catholic than John Paul's native land. Within Poland, the Pope's influence is enormous. What those I interviewed recall most vividly were the massive open-air rallies at which the Pope, in carefully coded language, vowed that Poland's future would not be a Communist one. As one Pole remarks, "Those rallies were especially important in that they let the Communists know how many of us they would eventually have to confront."

Boost from Helsinki

What about the great political and strategic debates that divided East and West, and often created turmoil within the western camp as well? Many American observers, for example, were highly critical of the Helsinki accords when they were signed in 1975, seeing the agreement as a clever Soviet scheme to codify in international law the permanent political division of Europe. This perception was shared by many in Eastern Europe. Jozef Ruszar says the Helsinki Agreement "was seen initially as yet another western capitulation to Soviet power, à la Yalta." It was only later, Ruszar notes, that Poles understood the significance of the human-rights provisions, the most important of which obligated signatory governments to adhere to the standards spelled out in the basic United Nations human-rights covenants—including the rights to leave and return to one's country, to freedom of expression, and to peaceful assembly. Likewise, Jerzy Warman was at first opposed to the accords, fearing that the West had made too many concessions. "What we didn't understand at the time was that Helsinki gave legitimacy to the idea of protesting human rights violations in other countries. It couldn't be considered interference in the country's internal affairs when the country had agreed to the standards in an international treaty. Furthermore, the accords by themselves provided a ready-made platform for the opposition, and greatly expanded the possibilities for making relations with western human-rights organizations, an important point since it gave the opposition support and protection."

Only one of those interviewed expressed disappointment with the Helsinki Agreement: Dorin Tudoran, a Romanian poet and human-rights activist who now lives in the United States and edits a journal of Romanian affairs. "When they were adopted, the Helsinki accords were seen as some kind of miracle by the Romanian people," Tudoran says. "We had very high expectations. But then it didn't seem to matter what had been signed. Our opposition movement was crushed by the authorities, and no one in the West said a word."

Did Euromissiles Matter?

For the West, the controversy over the Helsinki accords paled before the ongoing debates over military and geostrategic questions: the window of vulnerability, the neutron bomb, the Euromissile crisis, Star Wars. Yet it appears that even the most fervently anti-Communist East Europeans paid little attention to the intricacies of the strategic contest between East and West. They were concerned with one and only one overriding issue: Did America have the will and the resources to stand up to the Soviet threat?

As Jozef Ruszar recalls, "During the Vietnam era we saw the West and America as generally weak and divided

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and the Soviet Union as strong and on the march. This was why we respected Reagan, because he seemed to have the will to turn this situation around, and why we didn't respect the western Left, which seemed naive about the Soviets. We didn't even regard the result of the Euromissile issue as a triumph, since, for us, it was obvious that the missiles should have been deployed. The fact that it took such a struggle to deploy them was just another example of western division."

On the other hand, another Pole, Jerzy Warman, saw the successful deployment of the Cruise and Pershing missiles in a more positive light. To East Europeans, he said, strategic questions were never perceived as NATO versus the Warsaw Pact, but as America versus the Soviet Union. And the fact that the missiles were deployed in the face of "enormous pressure from a Soviet peace offensive" demonstrated that there was a "limit to the Soviet Union's ability to intimidate western governments in this way."

East-West Trade Okay

East Europeans were even less exercised about the question of commercial contacts between East and West, even though this issue triggered a loud and angry debate in the United States and among the western allies. As Thomas Keri observes, "We always recognized that Hungary would have to move toward capitalism. So the fact that this or that western firm invested in the Hungarian economy didn't make much of an impact." Another Hungarian, Mihaly Csako, believes that the prospect of increased western investment had a direct, positive effect on the Kadar regime's human-rights policies. According to Csako, the regime, confronted with a desperate need for western credits, unofficially agreed that in return for loans, Hungarian dissidents would be allowed to travel to the West to teach and study, and to return to Hungary as they pleased.

For Andras Domany, the expansion of economic ties, and particularly the western policy of granting untied credits to Hungary and other East bloc countries, had a both positive and negative impact: "The good side was that western techniques and know-how were introduced into our economy and that the opportunities for personal contacts with westerners and travel abroad were expanded. The bad side was that these credits were not used properly, and our democratically elected government now has these enormous debts to deal with. Also, during the '70s, when Hungarian living conditions were not bad by East bloc standards, these credits enabled the authorities to make good on certain promises of socialism which socialism could never have achieved on its own."

Ironically, the massive infusion of credits, and the resulting debt, played no small role in triggering the Polish economic crisis that led to the creation of Solidarity in 1980, a fact not lost on Rafal Krawczyk. "The western credits demonstrated that even if you pump billions of dollars into this system, the system still won't work," a realization that played an important role in undermining Polish Communism. At the same time, according to another Pole, Tadeusz Zachurski, increased trade enabled Poles to gain an appreciation for the high

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Lech Walesa with AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland. The U.S. trade union federation defied Carter in giving Solidarity assistance.

quality of western-produced goods. Zachurski also believes that the regime's policy of permitting Poles to work abroad "was important, for it enabled Polish workers to experience the western economic system and gain an understanding of the western work ethic, which had been destroyed by the Communists."

Tourist Trap

One of the great ironies of the Communist experience in Eastern Europe was the premium placed on luring western tourists with hard currency by regimes that had initially dreaded the very idea of contacts between their citizens and those from the Free World. While Americans never went in for mass tourism in Eastern Europe, West Europeans eagerly took advantage of opportunities to visit the historic cities and Black Sea resorts of Communist Eastern Europe. By most accounts, western tourism had important political repercussions, particularly in such isolated countries as Bulgaria and Romania. Konstantin Mishev, a Bulgarian who defected to the United States in the early 1980s, believes that the development of Black Sea tourism was crucial in enabling Bulgarians "to see how westerners lived." For years, Mishev said, Communist propaganda had drummed home the message that westerners were warlike and aggressive due to the nature of life under capitalism. "But with tourism, Bulgarians became acquainted with westerners, mainly Germans and Canadians, mainly blue-collar workers, ordinary people who still lived the good life and were polite and peaceful in their behavior."

Tourism from East to West was also seen as important. Bartak Kaminski says that foreign travel "gave Poles the sense that life in the West was normal, while life under Communism was not." Or as another Pole, Irena Lasota, puts it, tourism taught Poles that "things can be done differently than under Communism." Sometimes, in fact, regime efforts to stimulate tourism as part of a strategy to legitimate the system had the opposite effect. Mihaly Csako recalls that the Kadar regime encouraged tourism as a means of cementing relations with the sizable Hungarian diaspora living in the West, going so far as to establish a special agency to further East-West Hungarian contacts. But a major consequence of this policy was to

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

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Pope John Paul II rekindled democratic hopes in Poland.

expand the number of Hungarians who could compare their own living standards with those of Hungarians living in the West, to the detriment of Communism.

Although the early years of East European Communism were notable for the authorities' generally successful attempts to restrict contacts—except for limited commercial contact and tourism—with the non-Communist world, the past 15 years or so, and especially the past five years, were marked by a sharp upsurge in contacts between the democratic opposition in certain East bloc countries and sympathetic supporters in the United States and Western Europe. The adoption of the Helsinki accords and Jimmy Carter's human-rights initiatives encouraged western human-rights groups, often denied visas in the past, to expand their activities into the Soviet bloc, a development that was highly welcomed by opposition forces. The American organization Helsinki Watch and its director, Jeri Laber, were often cited for, as Thomas Keri puts it, "taking the opposition seriously when no one else would talk to them."

Another American institution that is given high marks is the AFL-CIO, both for its outspoken brand of anti-Communism and its generous material assistance to Solidarity, both in its early, legal phase, and during the martial-law period. First under George Meany and then under Lane Kirkland, the labor federation gained a reputation as the most reliably anti-Communist mass institution in the United States. It was carefully noted by East Europeans that when President Gerald Ford declined to meet the exiled writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the AFL-CIO sponsored a dinner at which Solzhenitsyn was the featured speaker. Similarly, Poles have not forgotten that American labor pressed ahead with plans to assist Solidarity despite the opposition of Carter administration officials, who fretted that open aid would seem "provocative" to the Soviets.

Disdain for Peace Movements

Although Eastern Europe has long posed a political and moral challenge for the democratic world, there has been, until quite recently, minimal interest shown among the politically active segments of the West toward participating in the struggles for change there. This was particularly true on the conservative side of the spectrum. While the 1980s brought a new interest in explicitly conservative ideas, western conservatives and their institutions seem to have exerted little influence on Eastern Europe, mainly for lack of trying.

On the other hand, West European leftists—Greens and peace activists—did attempt to forge ties to the East bloc opposition, with decidedly mixed results. Poles, the most aggressively anti-Communist nation of Eastern Europe, tend to view the western Left with unconcealed disdain. One sore point was the attempt by western peace movements to persuade prominent oppositionists to sign declarations drawing parallels between Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe and American policies toward Chile or Nicaragua—parallels that were perceived by most East Europeans as thoroughly bogus. Furthermore, Jerzy Warman notes that contacts with western leftists were often regarded as "not useful, since the Left had no influence in its own countries."

The Left enjoyed somewhat better success in Hungary and Czechoslovakia; nonetheless, while the Left gained a measure of appreciation for its support for oppressed oppositionists, its conviction that "peace" could be achieved without fundamental political change in the Communist world remained an insurmountable obstacle to closer ties. "It was personal freedom, and not peace, which was the highest priority of the Hungarian opposition," points out Mihaly Csako. Martin Weiss, a Czechoslovakian who participated in the National Forum Foundation exchange program, asserts that the peace movements were more concerned about the Third World than about those persecuted by Communism. He says he resented the Left's "fascination with the personality of Gorbachev."

Air Wave Assault

Among the institutions established in direct response to the Communist seizure of power in Eastern Europe, none has been more enduring, or controversial, than Radio Free Europe (RFE), the American foreign broadcast service founded in 1950. RFE, which broadcasts to all the East European Communist countries except East Germany, Yugoslavia, and Albania, is only one of a number of western radio stations that maintain services in the East European languages—among them the Voice of America, British Broadcasting Corporation, and West Germany's Deutsche Welle.

One measure of the effectiveness of foreign broadcasting was the response of the Communist authorities, which regularly denounced RFE as "criminal" and "subversive," passed laws making it illegal to listen to foreign stations, and interfered with foreign broadcasts through jamming. From the Communist perspective, the charge of subversion was eminently justified. Except in those parts of Eastern Europe that eventually gained access to western television, foreign broadcasting remained until the very end the only reliable source of accurate news, and the more isolated the society, the more important was the role of foreign radio. Thus it was through foreign broadcasters that East Europeans gained access to an alternative news, alternative history, and alternative culture to counter the lies, half-truths, and omissions that characterized the official press.

For most East Europeans, foreign radio's most impor-

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tant feature has been the regular hourly news broadcasts, which developed a following among both the political opposition and the general populace. Certain programs, however, had a direct appeal to the most politically minded elements in the various countries. Thomas Keri stresses the importance of broadcasting the texts of Hungarian *samizdat* (underground publications): "*Samizdat* ordinarily reached no more than a few thousand; through Radio Free Europe, it reached an audience of several million." Jerzy Warman credits foreign broadcasts with the role of "amplifier" of events of a political character: "If something important happened in Krakow which was embarrassing to the authorities, everyone in Poland was sure to know about it within hours because of foreign broadcasts." For example, Poles recall that even Communist Party members listened intently during the 1970 Gdansk shipyard riots, when the official press falsified the death toll, and during the mass strikes in 1980 that led to the establishment of Solidarity.

Foreign radio also helped spread western popular culture eastward. Indeed, during the '60s, when rock music was virtually banned by Communist media, RFE and the Voice of America inaugurated disc jockey programs on which the latest records were played, programs that proved immensely popular with young East European audiences, eventually compelling a loosening of official controls over youth culture.

Janis Joplin, Freedom Fighter

It should be noted that for East Europeans, the phrase western culture very often translated as American culture. True, Hungarians, Czechoslovakians, and Poles look forward to rejoining Europe, and deeply resent having been shunted off into an artificial "Eastern" bloc dominated by an alien political system and a nation, Russia, whose European identity, in their view, is suspect. Nevertheless, the idea of America as beacon of freedom, engineer of a consumer economy, and the one society with the resources and will to meet the Soviet challenge, exerted a powerful influence over East Europeans throughout the Communist period. And this despite the many times America has, in East European eyes, failed to live up to its proclaimed standards as the world's most powerful democracy—at Yalta, in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968, during the era of détente, even during Vietnam, which many East Europeans view as a reflection of American division and not an example of the arrogance of American power.

For Konstantin Mishev, the longing for American success affected practically every aspect of life: "Bulgarians always wanted American sports teams to win, especially against the Soviets. America was the strongest country, and we expected America to beat the Soviets at everything." Vladimir Tismaneanu identifies American power in economic terms, noting that Kent cigarettes became Romania's *de facto* currency as that country's economy continued its slide from European to Third World standards. Another Romanian, Dorin Tudoran, stresses the appeal of the counterculture as a symbol of freedom for young artists and intellectuals, who eagerly taped recordings by Jimi Hendrix, Joe Cocker, and Janis Joplin. Jozef Ruszar, on the other hand, emphasizes American consumer culture, a powerful force that "made everything the Communists said about the West a lie." In its early years of power, Polish Communism singled out jazz, Coca-Cola, and pornography as particularly insidious institutions of American cultural imperialism. Yet, as Ruszar recalls, it was precisely these dangerous fruits of imperialism that were bestowed as concessions after the upheavals that periodically shook Polish Communism: jazz during the '50s, Coke after worker riots in the '70s, and soft-core pornography (identified as a western, and not specifically American, import) after martial law. Ruszar believes that a combination of the power of the American idea and the weakness of Communist propaganda resulted in an overly rosy view of America. "Sometimes the Communists did uncover weaknesses in American society. But because everyone assumed that the party always lied, nobody believed them."

Ruszar also believes that American movies and television undercut a basic premise of Communist propaganda. "Remember, the Communists originally claimed that their system would make Poland a richer and better society than in the West. At some point, people realized that this was simply nonsense, and that Poland under Communism could never catch up with the West. And what we saw in American movies played no small part in this process."

Here it should be stressed that the influence of American movies and television was due to an overall image of American society rather than to any explicit political message. Crucial was not the portrayal of the lives of the rich and famous on programs like "Dynasty" and "Dallas"—both quite popular in Eastern Europe—but the portrayal of ordinary Americans who were well-housed, drove nice cars, ate in restaurants, and dressed fashionably. These were not the exploited victims of capitalism, but average working people who lived much better than all but the most privileged party officials in Eastern Europe.

Pseudo-Realism

At a conference I attended in the early '80s, a prominent American diplomat declared that the wisest policy the West could adopt toward Eastern Europe would be one of absolute non-interference in the region in order to reassure the Soviets that we appreciated their, in his view, very real security concerns. To which a well-known British journalist, with years of experience in Eastern Europe, added that it had been a serious mistake for the democracies to have made such a "big deal" of the imposition of martial law in Poland. It is by now clear that these counsels of what Milovan Djilas calls "pseudo-realism" reflected both an overestimation of Communist stability and a serious undervaluation of the West's enormous strengths. Indeed, the testimony of East Europeans themselves suggests that policies rooted in anti-Communist ideology contributed significantly to the eventual collapse of East European Marxism, both by denying the regimes a normal place in world affairs and encouraging those forces that were subverting Communist rule from within.

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Is the AIDS Virus a Science Fiction?

Immunosuppressive Behavior, Not HIV, May Be the Cause of AIDS

Peter H. Duesberg and Bryan J. Ellison

A report published by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) on June 5, 1981, startled the medical community in the United States. This report described five unusual medical cases that had been observed between October 1980 and May 1981. All five had developed cases of *Pneumocystis carinii* pneumonia. *P. carinii* is a microbe present in the lungs of most healthy people, but can cause sickness when the host immune system has somehow been severely weakened. Immunosuppression in these cases was confirmed by the presence of various other opportunistic infections. Medical authorities were most surprised at the identity of the patients: these cases with severe immune collapse all involved 20-to-40-year-old men, typically considered a healthy age group. Further, all of these men were homosexual.

A subsequent report by the CDC on August 28 listed 21 additional cases showing similar severe immune suppression problems. Along with *P. carinii* pneumonia, esophagal candidiasis (a yeast infection), and other diseases typical of immune deficiencies, a number of these patients displayed a rare condition known as Kaposi's sarcoma. This is a growth in the blood vessel linings, manifesting as reddish lesions on the skin. The CDC referred to these new patients with strange combinations of conditions as "previously healthy homosexual men." Since growing numbers of healthy men should not simultaneously develop severe sickness, the full complement of diseases observed in them was grouped together into a syndrome presumed to have some single underlying cause; first called Gay-Related Immune Deficiency (GRID), the syndrome eventually became known as the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, or AIDS.

Since this syndrome was first defined, over 130,000 Americans have been diagnosed with AIDS, and over 80,000 of these have died. Male homosexuals continue to comprise the major risk group for AIDS, but intravenous drug users, blood transfusion recipients, and hemophiliacs also have been included as AIDS victims. Since 1981, the list of indicator diseases for diagnosing AIDS has been expanded by the CDC to include *P. carinii* pneumonia, tuberculosis, Kaposi's sarcoma, dementia, lymphoma, candidiasis, diarrhea—altogether 25 conventional diseases. The most commonly diagnosed of these is *P. carinii* pneumonia, found in about 53 percent of new AIDS cases last year, followed by wasting syndrome in 19 percent, candidiasis in 13 percent, Kaposi's sarcoma in 11 percent, and dementia in 6 percent.

Federal funding has grown with the syndrome. In the earlier years of the epidemic, spending was at a few million dollars a year. Since 1984, with the announcement by the Secretary of Health and Human Services that an AIDS virus had been discovered and could possibly affect the general public, spending on AIDS research, education, and treatment has grown enormously, and has now reached $2.9 billion for this fiscal year.

Immune Breakdown

As a syndrome defined by several conventional diseases, AIDS was seen as being the result of an underlying deficiency in the immune system. In many of the early patients, the main abnormality appeared to be a depletion of one specific subgroup of cells in the immune system, the T-helper cells; these cells respond to the presence of invading microbes and stimulate other cells to produce the proper antibodies against the new germs. But the actual estimate of "proper" levels of T-helper cells were largely speculative because little research had previously been done on this aspect of the immune system. Because the average number of T-helper cells in AIDS patients was lower than among other people, the notion developed that this syndrome was caused by something depleting these particular cells.

Among the earliest proposed causes of AIDS were the nitrite inhalants used almost exclusively by homosexuals in the bath houses. Some early work connected their use

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Friends of the deceased comfort each other on the AIDS quilt as the death toll mounts to 80,000. Fortunately, the majority of Americans with HIV antibodies will never contract AIDS.

to the incidence of Kaposi's sarcoma, but this hypothesis could neither account for the full spectrum of AIDS diseases nor for AIDS in heterosexuals, and it was soon dropped.

Most of the interest instead focused on the search for an infectious agent causing AIDS. Beginning with the first report of AIDS cases, the CDC noted that all of the early cases had either current or previous infection by cytomegalovirus, a member of the herpes group of viruses. Cytomegalovirus was known to have immunosuppressive ability, and this possibility was pursued for some time. But, because this virus was widespread in the general population, and since not all AIDS patients had been infected, this was ultimately abandoned as well.

The question of the cause of AIDS was officially settled on April 23, 1984, when the Department of Health and Human Services announced the isolation of the AIDS virus. Called Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus (LAV) by its French discoverers, and Human T-cell Leukemia Virus III (HTLV-III) by American scientists, it has since 1986 been officially referred to as the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). The belief that HIV causes the immunosuppression underlying AIDS became the generally accepted view in the scientific community with the 1986 benchmark publication *Confronting AIDS*, published by the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Medicine. The predominant view today holds that this virus causes immune deficiency by depleting the body of T-helper cells, dooming 50 to 100 percent of infected people to develop AIDS and die.

However, since 1987 an increasing number of medical scientists and physicians have been questioning whether HIV actually does cause AIDS. Some of these dissident scientists simply demur that HIV has never been proven to cause AIDS, and therefore its role is unclear. Others believe that the evidence essentially rules out HIV as playing any part in AIDS at all. Many more maintain that HIV cannot cause AIDS alone, but may need additional, unidentified factors. Currently, most of these doubters prefer not to be quoted, out of fear of losing research funding or of disapproval by peers. This challenge is so far a minority view, due largely to inadequate attention provided by media sources. In spite of the well-established credentials of many of the more outspoken opposition scientists, their views have yet to be heard by most Americans.

The Case for HIV

An article by Luc Montagnier, French discoverer of HIV, and Robert Gallo, the leading American HIV researcher, in the October 1988 issue of *Scientific American*, discussed in part the rationale behind searching for an AIDS virus in the first place. Noting the sudden onset of diseases previously considered uncommon in young men, they argued that only the recent introduction of a new microbe could account for this increase.

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

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Africans are dying from malnutrition and traditional infectious diseases. But despite widespread HIV infection, only 41,000 AIDS cases have been reported on the entire continent.

The exact means by which HIV kills T cells is still not known. Gallo and his colleagues have repeatedly pointed out that although the mechanism may be unclear, the evidence that HIV does cause AIDS has been well established. They primarily cite evidence from epidemiology, the study of how diseases spread.

They point out that the people who get AIDS are those who have antibodies to HIV. Studies following HIV-infected people in AIDS risk groups over time observe a progression to sicknesses characteristic of AIDS.

Proponents of the virus-AIDS hypothesis stress the geographic correlation between AIDS and HIV infection. AIDS is most common in Africa and in cities such as New York and San Francisco where HIV is widespread. Neither AIDS nor HIV can be found extensively in Asia or the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Proponents also give special attention to the more than 1,600 infants, over 1,100 hemophiliacs, and roughly 3,000 recipients of blood transfusions in the United States who have developed AIDS years after being infected with HIV. The October 1988 *Scientific American* cited an example of a hemophiliac family, in which the father and son both contracted HIV and developed AIDS. A well-publicized example was Ryan White, the young hemophiliac who contracted HIV, developed AIDS, and recently died at the age of 18. The late California legislator Paul Gann, who led the Proposition 13 anti-tax movement, also received some attention, having received HIV through a blood transfusion and subsequently developing a fatal case of AIDS pneumonia. Since infants, and the majority of hemophiliacs and transfusion recipients, can be presumed to be neither intravenous drug abusers nor active homosexuals, their principal apparent risk factor has been their infection by HIV.

Although most viruses cause disease within weeks of acute infection, HIV purportedly causes AIDS after an average latent period of 10 to 11 years. To support this notion, defenders of the virus-AIDS hypothesis cite models of other viruses that cause disease in animals and humans, often with latent periods of 10 to 50 years between infection by the virus and the development of disease. Such "slow viruses" have been credited in recent years for various leukemias both in humans and animals, as well as for certain other specific cancers. Female cervical cancer is widely thought to be caused by assorted strains of human wart viruses, while the cancer known as Burkitt's lymphoma is often believed to be the result of the virus that also causes mononucleosis.

Further, Simian Immunodeficiency Virus and Feline Immunodeficiency Virus, both viruses in the same class as HIV, often cause sickness or even death when introduced into laboratory monkeys and cats, with conditions referred to as equivalents of human AIDS.

Koch's Postulates Unmet

Scientists dissenting against this widely accepted virus-AIDS hypothesis often raise as their most fundamental point that this theory has simply never been proven. Introduced by Robert Koch in the past century, the classical criteria for showing whether a disease is infectious and caused by a particular microbe are called Koch's Postulates. But as the Harvard molecular biologist Walter Gilbert, a Nobel laureate, points out, these criteria have not been met for HIV:

Postulate 1: *The germ must be found in the affected tissues in all cases of the disease.* However, no HIV at all can be isolated from at least 10 to 20 percent of AIDS patients; until the recent advent of highly sensitive methods, no direct trace of HIV could be found in the majority of AIDS cases. Further, HIV cannot be isolated from the cells in the lesions of Kaposi's sarcoma, nor from the nerve cells of patients with AIDS dementia.

Postulate 2: *The germ must be isolated from other germs and from the host's body.* The amounts of HIV in AIDS patients are typically so low that the virus must be isolated indirectly from a patient, only after first isolating huge numbers of cells from the patient and then reactivating the virus. In classical diseases, enough active virus is present to be isolable directly from the blood or affected tissue; anywhere from one million to one billion units of virus per milliliter of body fluid can be found during the time most viruses cause disease, and viruses of the same class as HIV are found at levels between 100,000 and 10 million units per milliliter. HIV, on the other hand, is usually found in less than five units and never in more than a few thousand units per milliliter of blood plasma.

Postulate 3: *The germ must cause the sickness when injected into healthy hosts.* HIV has not been shown to cause disease when injected experimentally into chimpanzees, nor

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when accidentally injected into human health care workers, even though the virus successfully infects those hosts. If for ethical or other reasons this third postulate cannot be tested for some particular germ, strong alternative evidence has to be provided by specific therapies that neutralize the microbe and thereby prevent the disease; such therapies would include antibiotics or vaccines. However, no therapies or antibodies against HIV have been able to prevent AIDS diseases, although new drugs and vaccines are continually being proposed.

Postulate 4: *The same germ must once again be isolated from the newly diseased host.* Until the third postulate can be met, this one is irrelevant.

The failure to meet Koch's postulates raises questions about whether AIDS is even infectious at all. Koch's postulates are the standard criteria for determining disease agents. When they are not met, strong alternative evidence must be produced to support any infectious agent hypothesis.

The burden of such proof is therefore on those who claim that HIV causes AIDS, as noted by Beverly Griffin, director of the Department of Virology at the Royal Postgraduate Medical School in London. This burden is especially high for HIV hypothesis supporters in view of the special characteristics that had to be attributed to HIV in order to connect it with AIDS. First, the virus had to be credited with a latent period of several years between infection and AIDS. But when diseases are said to occur only years after infection by a virus, it can be difficult to be sure that other risk factors have not instead caused the disease. Second, because HIV is conspicuously absent from lesions, scientists had to hypothesize that the virus caused disease by indirect means in the body, in spite of a troubling lack of evidence for such notions. Inventions such as these can be used to blame virtually any microbe for any disease.

Definitional Paradoxes

A second set of criticisms of the HIV hypothesis concerns the clinical definition of AIDS. This definition involves a list created by the CDC in 1987 of about 25 conventional diseases; if any one of these is diagnosed, and antibodies against HIV can be found in the same patient, a diagnosis of AIDS is made. The disease list includes not only Kaposi's sarcoma and *P. carinii* pneumonia, but also tuberculosis, cytomegalovirus, herpes, diarrhea, candidiasis, lymphoma, dementia, and many other diseases. If any of these very different diseases is found alone, it is likely to be diagnosed under its classical name. If the same condition is found alongside antibodies against HIV, it is called AIDS. The correlation between AIDS and HIV is thus an artifact of the definition itself.

Another definitional concern relates to how a single virus could lead to such a diverse spectrum of diseases. Harry Rubin, biologist at the University of California at Berkeley and recipient of the Lasker Prize for his work on viruses, is one of several dissenting scientists who argue that these diseases should never have been grouped together, and that no new microbe is needed to explain the occurrence of these old conditions among behavioral AIDS-risk groups in recent years.

The rationale for combining these separate diseases into a single syndrome is the assumption that they all have a single underlying cause: immune deficiency purportedly caused by HIV. However, immune system failure cannot account for some of the conditions on the AIDS list, particularly the cancers and dementia. While many scientists still hope to find ways of fighting cancer using the immune system, experimental work has long shown that cancers do not necessarily increase in the presence of immune deficiencies. After all, the immune system can only fight foreign particles, but cancer cells are actually part of the patient's body. Dementia is likewise not directly prevented by the immune system, because antibodies do not normally reach brain tissue. Microbes that reach the central nervous system are free to grow without interference by the antibody defenses, even in a fully healthy individual. HIV must therefore be credited with doing far more than simply depleting the immune system; it would have to destroy neurons and make cancerous certain other cells, while simultaneously killing or preventing the growth of immune cells. Indeed, any AIDS microbe would face the same difficulties.

Little Detectable Virus

A third difficulty with the HIV hypothesis is that there is very little detectable virus in AIDS patients. Fewer than 1 out of every 10,000 of the host's T-helper cells are actively infected by HIV even during AIDS; moreover, the tiny amount of virus produced by these few cells is neutralized by the same antiviral antibodies that are detected by the "AIDS test." Fewer than 1 in 500 of a host's T cells contain even dormant HIV, which can only be found by isolating these cells from the body and stimulating them artificially with compounds that help reactivate these latent viruses from within the cells. The resulting difficulty, and often impossibility, of isolating HIV from AIDS patients make the presence of antibodies against the virus the only practical basis for diagnosis.

Retroviruses are poor candidates to blame serious diseases on, particularly fatal conditions involving the deaths of huge numbers of cells, such as AIDS.

It is very difficult to understand how HIV would be able to devastate the immune system while never infecting more than a tiny fraction of its cells. Even if every infected cell were killed, the number of T cells lost at any time would be roughly equivalent to the number lost through bleeding from shaving. Such losses could be sustained indefinitely without affecting the immune sys-

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tem, because the body constantly produces new T cells at far higher rates. Virtually no reactivation of the virus occurs when AIDS patients develop sickness, leaving unexplained how the virus could possibly cause immune suppression, and then only after years of latency. After the body produces antibodies against HIV, the virus remains at low levels for the rest of that person's life, precisely the same as for all viruses of its class. This would help to explain why transmitting HIV is typically so difficult; antibody-positive people have almost no virus to spread.

A few studies describe rare cases of brief flu-like conditions shortly after infection by HIV, but these patients recover rather quickly once their immune systems have created antibodies against HIV. This emphasizes the paradox: how could an inactive virus cause fatal disease after 10 years, when the same virus caused at most a mild condition when it was first active?

Misleading Animal Models

A fourth paradox of the HIV hypothesis has been noted by several virologists. HIV belongs to a class of viruses known as the retroviruses, which are very simple in structure and contain much less genetic information than most other viruses. Most types of viruses are lytic, meaning that they kill the cells they infect and thereby cause disease. Retroviruses, on the other hand, do not generally kill cells. Upon infecting cells, they copy their genetic information into the DNA of their new host cells. From that point forward, retroviruses depend on allowing their host cells to continue living, while they slowly produce new virus particles that are ejected from the cell. Retroviruses are therefore poor candidates to blame serious diseases on, particularly fatal conditions involving the deaths of huge numbers of cells, such as AIDS. Indeed, some 50 to 100 latent retroviruses have been found to reside in the DNA of all humans, passed along to each successive generation for as long as human beings have existed.

The risk hypothesis suggests that AIDS diseases can be attributed to the explosion in drug use and multiple infections associated with sexual promiscuity among certain sectors of the population.

Past research by Harry Rubin has shown that retroviruses cannot infect any cells that do not divide. Neurons in the human brain do not divide after the first year of life, so HIV cannot possibly infect those cells. This would explain why HIV has not been isolated from these cells, and confirms the difficulty it would also face in causing dementia.

Harvey Bialy, research editor of the professional journal *Bio/Technology*, argues that the simple genetic structure of HIV does not differ sufficiently from other retroviruses to account for its supposedly different behavior. The genetic information carried by HIV is not unusual for retroviruses; it contains no gene different enough from the genes of other retroviruses to be a possible "AIDS gene." In addition, HIV uses all of its genetic information when it first infects, rather than saving some to be used years later. In other words, there is no conceivable reason HIV should cause AIDS 10 years after infection, rather than early on when it is unchecked by the immune system.

Bialy also points out the misinterpretations made of animal models. Simian (monkey) AIDS, for example, does not actually resemble human AIDS. The animals do not develop a wide spectrum of diseases, nor do they suffer any conditions even remotely similar to Kaposi's sarcoma or dementia. There is no long latent period between infection by Simian Immunodeficiency Virus and the development of sickness. The animals become sick within days or weeks after infection, or not at all. The sickness sometimes developed in these animals by such viruses resembles more the flu-like conditions occasionally observed in humans shortly after infection by HIV. Such viruses cause fatal animal disease only when they are present in large amounts, and only in highly susceptible inbred animals kept in laboratory conditions.

Although a widespread belief holds that certain retroviruses cause other fatal conditions after long latent periods in sheep, goats, and horses, these viruses are actually found in the majority of healthy animals. Only a tiny number of animals develop such diseases, throwing into doubt the roles of these viruses.

HIV without AIDS

Arguments used most often in defense of the HIV hypothesis concern the field of epidemiology, the study of how diseases spread.

The most common method used in epidemiology today in searching for the cause of a disease is to find correlations between phenomena and their possible causes. The only scientifically conclusive method is the controlled study, in which two sets of people are matched for every potentially important factor except for the possible cause, and the two sets are then compared to see whether one group is more likely to contract the disease. Only uncontrolled epidemiology has been cited to support the HIV hypothesis. However, the opponents of the virus-AIDS hypothesis point to a number of paradoxes in this uncontrolled epidemiology.

Evidence increasingly indicates that large numbers of people infected with HIV, probably the majority, will never develop AIDS. In 1986, the CDC estimated the extent of HIV infection to range from 1 million to 1.5 million in the United States. The figure was changed within the last few months to an *ex post facto* estimate of

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750,000 HIV-positive Americans by 1986, with about one million today. This revision was based simply on back-calculation models; since fewer AIDS cases had occurred than expected, the CDC decided that fewer people must have been infected with HIV than was first estimated. About 130,000 Americans have been diagnosed with AIDS over the past decade, fewer than 15 percent of the newly estimated number of HIV-positive Americans.

AIDS appears to be levelling off now. Michael Fumento, author of the *The Myth of Heterosexual AIDS*, but not an opponent of the HIV hypothesis, has pointed out a slowing of AIDS diagnoses by late 1987. A study published in the March 16, 1990, issue of the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, based on mathematical modeling of the growth of AIDS, has concluded that this syndrome began to level off in 1988.

These trends create a tremendous gap between the large number of people estimated to be infected with HIV and the relatively few developing sickness. To accommodate this gap, the CDC has steadily increased its estimate of the latent period between HIV infection and the diagnosis of AIDS from three or four years to about 10 years at present. Roughly, for every year that passes, an additional year is added to this latent period.

Africa's Non-Epidemic

The situation in Africa is even more puzzling and casts further doubt on the HIV hypothesis. Most of the media publicity in America on AIDS in Africa is based on the large extent of HIV infection, not on the extent of AIDS cases themselves. Nonetheless, although HIV infection appears to be extremely widespread, present in many areas in 10 to 15 percent of the population, the total number of AIDS cases so far reported in the entire continent of Africa amounts to merely 41,000. Proponents of the HIV hypothesis often try to argue that this low figure is the result of underreporting of AIDS cases. Even in Uganda, however, which has a reputation for conscientious reporting, 800,000 people are HIV positive, but only 10,000 people are reported to have died of AIDS. A paper and accompanying editorial in the July 25, 1987, issue of the British medical journal *The Lancet* argued that AIDS in Africa is actually not a major epidemic; the paper was written by a doctor from Cromwell Hospital in London, Felix Konotey-Ahulu, who had just returned from an extensive investigative tour of the areas of Africa with the most AIDS cases.

Researchers have found no difference in immune deficiencies between hemophiliacs with HIV antibodies and those without them.



Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos

The hysteria over Ryan White's attending school was unnecessary. If the risk hypothesis is correct, his medical complications resulted from his hemophilia, not his HIV infection.

The story in Haiti is similar. Only 2,300 AIDS cases have been reported during the past decade in a country where HIV infection is thought to be rampant. Even if this number is underreported, the prevalence of AIDS is much lower than would be predicted by the HIV hypothesis.

No controlled studies have been conducted to determine whether HIV causes AIDS. However, one reasonably controlled study of 19 hemophiliacs was published in the January 1989 issue of the *Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology*, in which the patients with HIV antibodies were compared to those without them. The researchers found no difference in immune deficiencies between the two groups, though the sample size was too small to draw firm conclusions.

Accidental infection of humans by HIV, by means other than specific risk behavior, is especially revealing. Some 19 health care workers in the United States have been presumed infected with HIV by accidental needlestick or other medical injuries, based on the inability to identify any other modes of transmission in their cases. One of these cases was reported in 1988 as having developed AIDS, but that diagnosis was changed shortly after that patient recovered spontaneously. Now the CDC claims that two of these workers have converted to AIDS, but has failed to publish any data confirming this claim.

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Thus, there are still no confirmed cases of AIDS among health workers after accidental infection with HIV, whereas the HIV hypothesis would predict the conversion to AIDS of most of these infected health care workers by this time.

AIDS Diseases without HIV

A critical question about the role of HIV is how it is associated with the various AIDS diseases. One widespread impression holds that many of the AIDS diseases were extremely rare before 1980, and only began reappearing with the presumed introduction of HIV. In reality, not only have all 25 of these AIDS conditions existed for decades at a low level in the population, but HIV-free instances of the same diseases are still being diagnosed today. These diseases are actually increasing in parallel with their HIV-associated counterparts. A letter by CDC researchers in the January 20 issue of *The Lancet* reports the existence of male homosexuals with Kaposi's sarcoma but without HIV. Robert Root-Bernstein, MacArthur fellow and associate professor of physiology at Michigan State University, also published a paper in *The Lancet*, of April 25, in which he reviewed the existing literature on the incidence of Kaposi's prior to AIDS. Since the first recognition of this condition in 1872, a number of cases have been reported each year

Kaposi's sarcoma is probably connected to the inhalation of aphrodisiac nitrites, known as "poppers," which became popular in bathhouses in the 1970s.

in the United States and Europe. Many of these were in people under 50 years of age, or even in children—not just in older men, as originally thought. A number of these cases were fatal. Some cases were associated with blood transfusions or with pneumonias, although many were apparently not connected with any other conditions. Root-Bernstein concluded that during the 1970s approximately 100 U.S. cases of Kaposi's per year could have been diagnosed as AIDS. However, Kaposi's sarcoma was not a disease reportable to medical officials before AIDS, and these cases were therefore not recognized. Kaposi's was only noticed once it was found clustered in young homosexual men in 1980-81.

A similar situation has existed for *P. carinii* pneumonia. First recognized in 1911, this condition may affect a surprisingly large percentage of the population; a 1973 study of Europeans found that between 1 and 10 percent of the population had postmortem evidence of this pneumonia. Often *P. carinii* pneumonia has been associated with hemophilia, tuberculosis, cytomegalovirus infection, venereal diseases, and malnutrition. Patients receiving transplants, heavy antibiotic therapy, or chemotherapy against cancer have also had high rates of this condition. Most cases have been associated with malnutrition rather than with underlying infectious diseases. Before the 1980s, this disease was usually diagnosed only by autopsy; this, combined with the availability of drugs to treat *P. carinii* pneumonia in the 1970s, caused low reporting of this not uncommon disease. *P. carinii* pneumonia had also probably been previously misdiagnosed as other types of pneumonia. Easier diagnosis, and clustering of the disease among active homosexuals, played a large part in focusing renewed attention on this condition with the beginning of AIDS.

Root-Bernstein has collected similar data on cryptococcosis, cytomegalovirus disease, and progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy prior to the AIDS epidemic.

Strange Distribution of AIDS Diseases

Gordon Stewart, emeritus professor of public health at the University of Glasgow, considers the continued restriction of AIDS to very selective risk groups even 10 years after AIDS was first recognized to be one of the greatest epidemiological weaknesses of the HIV hypothesis. The distributions of AIDS diseases and HIV infection are also inconsistent with each other.

Although AIDS in Africa is evenly distributed between males and females, over 90 percent of AIDS cases in the United States continue to be diagnosed in males. This proportion has not changed since AIDS was first defined. The paradox is emphasized by a study in the April 18 issue of the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, which examined over one million teen-aged applicants to the military between 1985 and 1989. In the most extensive study of its kind yet published, the proportion of males with antibodies against HIV was found to be identical to the proportion of infected females, although AIDS is diagnosed in four times as many males as females for that age bracket. In short, males with HIV are more likely than females to develop AIDS, even though they have the same virus.

The annual rates at which HIV-positive people develop conditions diagnosed as AIDS varies tremendously between different risk groups. The annual rate among HIV-positive Americans engaging in risk behavior or who have hemophilia varies from 2 to 25 percent. Though three-quarters of American hemophiliacs are HIV-positive, only 6 percent have been diagnosed with AIDS over the past decade.

The total number of AIDS diagnoses among American infants receiving blood transfusions continues to increase, with 40 new cases in 1989, even after the drastic reduction in HIV transmission through the blood supply four years ago; this is incompatible with the two-year latent period AIDS is claimed to have in those children.

Health care workers, who might be thought to have a greater than average risk of contracting HIV, present another anomaly: three-quarters are female, yet over 90 percent of these workers diagnosed with AIDS are male. Stranger still, the CDC reports that 95 percent of them fall into the same risk groups that 95 percent of all other

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KILLER VIRUS
NO MORE BUSINESS AS USUAL
YOU ARE NEXT
WAKE UP
TURN FEAR INTO RAGE
NO MORE BUSINESS AS
WHY HAS THE FDA MADE BURROUGHS SO WELLCOME
AZT THE GREAT PACIFIER

UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

A protest against the overemphasis on AZT in AIDS funding. If HIV is not the cause of AIDS, then it may be dangerous to prescribe AZT, which is itself immunosuppressive.

AIDS cases do.

In addition to the inconsistent distributions of AIDS as a syndrome, specific AIDS diseases develop largely within specific risk groups. This occurs in spite of all these groups being infected by the same virus.

For example, Kaposi's sarcoma in the United States is almost exclusively found in male homosexuals. Kaposi's is further distinguished by the fact that it is the only one of the AIDS conditions that has been declining for several years, while the others continue to increase. *P. carinii* pneumonia, on the other hand, has been diagnosed in an increasing proportion of the total number of U.S. AIDS cases. The AIDS diseases seen among infants tend to be the typical pediatric diseases, including tuberculosis, pneumonias, and various bacterial infections. In Africa, the predominant AIDS disease is a wasting syndrome, often called "slim disease." While this condition is seen among some U.S. AIDS patients, it is not nearly as synonymous with AIDS.

Montagnier's Startling Admission

Some recent developments have begun to signal the beginnings of a retreat by proponents of the HIV hypothesis. A startling admission by Luc Montagnier, the French discoverer of HIV, was published in the March 1990 issue of *Research in Virology*. Montagnier demonstrated conclusively that HIV is not able to kill T cells in culture dishes, contrary to previous arguments raised by supporters of the HIV hypothesis.

In that same paper, Montagnier first suggested that HIV alone may not cause disease; he offered the possibility of some unidentified bacterium also being involved. He has since endorsed the suggestion of Shyh-Ching Lo, of the U.S. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, who argued in the May 11, 1990, issue of *Science* that his recently discovered bacterium, *Mycoplasma incognitus*, might play a role in AIDS. Montagnier now holds that HIV and the bacterium together cause the disease. Any mycoplasma, however, would face many of the same difficulties as HIV: it would not cause the full set of AIDS diseases, it would have already spread AIDS into the general population, and most of all, this particular one is not different enough from other mycoplasmas to account for such unusual abilities. Mycoplasmas are reasonably common germs, existing throughout the population, and are responsible for about one-third of the mild pneumonias sometimes developed by humans. HIV and *M. incognitus* may soon be branded as co-factors in causing AIDS, but this would simply be an invention to try to fill the gaps in any theory that blames the AIDS diseases on a microbe.

Perhaps the most spectacular recent study on AIDS

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

David Hockley, Nat'l Institute for Biological Standards & Controls

A lymphocyte infected by HIV. HIV is purported to destroy the immune system by killing T-helper cells. But in AIDS patients, fewer than one in 10,000 of these cells are actively infected by HIV.

was published in *The Lancet* of January 20, 1990. Researchers at the CDC concluded that Kaposi's sarcoma is not caused by HIV after all. The bases for this conclusion were simply that Kaposi's is not observed to be equally distributed among the AIDS risk groups, and that HIV-free Kaposi's cases are diagnosed in U.S. homosexuals, arguments previously raised by the senior author of this article (Peter Duesberg). While the basic data used in that paper are not new, this startling admission by CDC epidemiologists marks the first time HIV has been officially questioned as the cause of any AIDS disease, although the CDC has still not removed Kaposi's from the disease list in the AIDS definition. Nevertheless, the publication of this paper may have opened the door for more inquiry on whether HIV is responsible for other AIDS diseases, and whether those diseases truly belong together as a single syndrome.

The Risk-AIDS Hypothesis

If a number of scientists and medical physicians do not believe HIV is likely to play any significant role in AIDS, what do they consider the true cause to be? For the most part, the alternative views of AIDS can be grouped together as the "risk hypothesis" of AIDS—that the AIDS diseases are entirely separate conditions caused by a variety of factors, most of which have in common only that they involve risk behavior. This view does not see AIDS as being a transmissible condition at all.

Nevertheless, a risk hypothesis must explain the recent increases in the various AIDS diseases, and why these have all been concentrated in particular risk groups. During at least the past decade, the incidence of these 25 conventional diseases has increased dramatically among groups in which they were previously rare.

Kaposi's sarcoma may actually be the most clearly understandable of the AIDS conditions. As noted above, it has existed at low levels in the population for as long as it has been recognized. Undoubtedly, various unidentified factors play roles in bringing on this condition. But the relatively recent clustering of Kaposi's in homosexuals may be due to their group-specific use of nitrite inhalants, or "poppers." These aphrodisiac drugs became popular in the active homosexual community during the 1970s. Use of these inhalants began declining after they were suggested as a possible cause of AIDS, and that behavior change has been followed by a corresponding decline in the incidence of Kaposi's. Early tests on animals also implicated these inhalants in Kaposi's. In fact, this evidence of the dangers of nitrite inhalants prompted Congress to ban the nonprescription use of these drugs in 1988. While these nitrites were officially dropped from consideration as a cause of AIDS because they were not associated with all the AIDS diseases, they should be strongly reconsidered as agents specific to Kaposi's sarcoma.

Certain other diseases on the AIDS list, those not necessarily resulting from immune problems, appear to have better explanations than HIV. Dementia is most likely the result of extensive use of psychoactive recreational drugs, and/or undiagnosed syphilis; increased sexual activity appears to have led to renewed epidemics of venereal diseases, including syphilis, which is difficult to test for. Wasting syndrome, found most heavily in African AIDS patients, is an endemic condition produced by the extremes of malnutrition and the lack of sanitation on most of that continent; the rise in recent years of wars and totalitarian regimes has served only to worsen conditions. African sickness was included in the AIDS epidemic merely because HIV had already been implicated in sickness in the industrial world, and this same virus could be found endemically in Africa.

Most of the AIDS diseases involve some degree of immune suppression. This is a condition produced by many different factors. Drug use, particularly of heroin, is one. Recreational drugs are commonly used by active homosexuals in the bath houses. Alcohol, heroin, cocaine, marijuana, valium, and amphetamines can all be found as part of the life histories of many AIDS patients. When combined with regular and prolonged malnutrition, as is done with many active homosexuals

The combination of prolonged malnutrition with heavy use of alcohol, heroin, cocaine, and antibiotics to guard against venereal diseases can lead to complete immune system collapse.

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and with heroin addicts, this can lead to complete immune collapse. Antibiotics, when used heavily or over long periods, also wear down the immune system. Active homosexuals have been among the heaviest users, often taking large amounts of tetracycline and other antibiotics each evening before entering the bath houses.

Joseph Sonnabend, a New York physician who founded the journal *AIDS Research* in 1983, has pointed out that repeated, constant infections may eventually overload the immune system, causing its failure; still worse are simultaneous infections by two or more diseases. "Fast track" homosexuals have generally experienced repeated bouts not only of a full spectrum of venereal diseases, but also of all forms of hepatitis, cytomegalovirus infection, Epstein-Barr virus infection, and various protozoan infections. They have commonly developed multiple infections, usually repeatedly.

Procedures traumatic to the body can play a major role in weakening the immune system. Almost exclusive to the homosexual community is the practice of fisting, which like anal intercourse is often damaging to the rectum. This damage provides access for many infectious agents into the bloodstream.

Many surgeries are immunosuppressive because of the trauma itself, or due to the anesthesia, or from immunosuppressive chemotherapy, or even from the transfused blood itself. In fact, immune suppression is proportional to the volume of transfused blood. These problems may explain the occurrence of AIDS diseases among blood transfusion recipients; with or without HIV infection, half of all such recipients do not survive their first year after transfusion.

Hemophiliac and Pediatric Cases

The question naturally arises as to why people outside these behavioral health-risk groups, including hemophiliacs and children, would develop some of the AIDS diseases. The answers lie in the risk factors too rarely reported to the public.

Hemophilia has always been a fatal condition. This has only been partly alleviated by recent medical advances. Not only are blood transfusions still frequently needed, but blood clotting factors used by hemophiliacs today are somewhat immunosuppressive themselves. Interestingly, the controlled epidemiological study of hemophiliacs, cited above, found evidence to support the idea that hemophilia may be an inherently immune-deficient condition on its own. In the case of Ryan White, now often cited as an example of an AIDS death, the Hemophilia Foundation of Indiana has confirmed that his death was due to such complications as liver failure and internal bleeding, conditions that typically result from hemophilia itself. Indeed, White already had a severe case of hemophilia, ultimately requiring clotting factor therapy every day. He also underwent daily AZT therapy, the dangers of which are reviewed below.

Infants diagnosed as having AIDS have developed their conditions due to combinations of most of the above risk factors. Published CDC data shows that some 95 percent of these babies are born to mothers who are confirmed drug addicts and/or sexual partners of IV drug users (frequently a code word for prostitutes), or the babies are themselves hemophiliacs or recipients of blood transfusions. The risk behavior of many of their mothers has reached these victims, but their conditions are renamed AIDS when in the presence of antibodies against HIV.

Finally, those few AIDS cases in which no risk factors exist are due to the clinical definition of AIDS. Having contracted, for whatever reason, one or more diseases on the AIDS list in the presence of antibodies against HIV, these people are diagnosed as having this new syndrome. In many instances, this means the patients are not given sufficient conventional therapies for the conventional diseases, but are instead treated with the drug AZT.

There are still no confirmed cases of AIDS among health workers after accidental infection with HIV.

Behavioral Changes in the '70s

Both the AIDS diseases and the risk factors causing them have increased before and during the same period that AIDS has been officially defined. Although homosexuality is older than recorded history, the "gay liberation" movement in 1969 began a wave of increasing activity by many homosexuals. Bath houses were opened in major cities, where both sexual promiscuity and drug use exploded. The number of sexual contacts per individual jumped to hundreds or thousands over only a few years, and the diseases discussed above exploded in frequency at the same time. Chronic disease epidemics actually became the medical hallmark of homosexuals in New York and San Francisco. The practice of fisting appears to have begun in the early 1970s, along with the use of nitrite inhalants.

Drug abuse among other groups also exploded beginning in the 1960s, with the use of such substances as heroin and cocaine having multiplied several times since then; the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee reports that the consumption of cocaine alone increased five-fold from 1978 to 1988. During this same period, continually greater volumes of blood have been used for increasingly complex surgical operations. Given the dramatic increases in these risk factors in precisely the groups developing AIDS, the appearance of young male homosexuals with multiple diseases in 1980 and 1981 should never have been a surprise; indeed, the first five homosexuals diagnosed with this syndrome in 1981 were all heavy users of nitrite inhalants, an indicator of the risk behavior practiced by all of the early AIDS cases.

The risk hypothesis explains the many paradoxes of AIDS and HIV. By considering AIDS not a single infec-

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

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Silence = Death. Education programs that promote condoms and sterile needles without emphasizing the danger of the risk behavior itself—particularly drug-taking—may inadvertently encourage spread of the disease.

tious disease or syndrome, but rather a set of separate conditions with different risk factors contributing to each case, it resolves the difficulties of the HIV hypothesis:

- why Koch's postulates cannot be met for HIV;
- the long and inconsistent latent periods between HIV infection and AIDS;
- why HIV would be able to devastate the immune system while never infecting more than a tiny fraction of its cells;
- the fact that HIV is not different enough from other retroviruses to account for its supposedly different behavior;
- the predominance of males in AIDS cases in the U.S., which is consistent with the predominance of males among heavy drug abusers;
- the presence of AIDS-like diseases without HIV;
- the saturation of the number of AIDS cases at levels far below the number of HIV infections;
- the enormous diversity, and risk-group specificity, of the different AIDS diseases; and
- why controlled studies, though few and incomplete, show no difference in sickness between people with HIV and people without.

Instead the risk hypothesis suggests that AIDS diseases can be attributed to the explosion in drug use and multiple infections associated with sexual promiscuity among certain sectors of the population. Hemophilia is a separate risk factor.

The risk hypothesis also accounts for the rough correlation between HIV infection and the development of various diseases; because HIV is difficult to transmit, it has naturally become a surrogate marker for risk behavior. Those people with the most risks are often the ones most likely to spread such an inactive microbe.

AZT Toxicity

If the virus-AIDS hypothesis is wrong and the risk hypothesis correct, several important conclusions follow. The most urgent of these concerns the current therapy officially approved for AIDS, the drug zidovudine (AZT). The hope is that AZT, by preventing the copying of DNA within cells, will prevent the multiplication of HIV in the host. However, by doing this the drug also kills all actively growing cells in the patient; chief among these are the cells of the immune system. This becomes deadly in light of the risk-AIDS hypothesis: inhibiting HIV would accomplish nothing, while AZT actually produces the very immune suppression it is supposed to prevent. The effectiveness of AZT at this task is demonstrated by the fact that it was first designed in the 1960s for the purpose of fighting immune system cancers, by killing the rapidly multiplying, cancerous immune cells; AZT was finally shelved because treated leukemic mice in laboratory studies died as quickly as those not given AZT. Some symptoms of AZT toxicity, such as muscle disease and anemia, resemble those of full-blown AIDS cases.

Two clinical studies have been published claiming effectiveness of AZT in slowing the progression of AIDS, but the studies were both terminated as soon as different results could be found between the treated and untreated groups. Some medical researchers have become skeptical of these studies, in part because the double-blind protocol had broken down: partly due to the immediate toxicity of AZT, both the patients and the doctors had already found out who was getting AZT and who was receiving the placebo. Despite these invalidating faults, the studies have been published anyway and AZT was quickly approved by the Food and Drug Administration after the first of these. Interestingly, a recent study by the Veterans Administration, cited in the March 23/30, 1990, issue of the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, has found no difference in longer-term death rates between patients treated with AZT and those given a placebo. Some British and French researchers have also expressed doubt about AZT's effectiveness, as mentioned in the same *JAMA* article.

Despite its toxicity, most medical doctors currently using the drug believe it to have some short-term benefits in alleviating symptoms of AIDS diseases. This may be for two reasons. Because AZT is a non-specific killer of dividing cells, it is likely to kill cancer cells and parasitic bacteria at the same time that it kills the immune system cells of the host; however, while AZT may temporarily fight the opportunistic diseases, its depletion of the immune system and other crucial cells makes it more difficult for the patient to fight off disease later. The other reason for an apparent benefit of AZT lies in the observation that many patients on this drug experience short-term increases in their immune system cells. This, however, is a temporary pseudo-benefit; when the body is initially exposed to any toxin that depletes its blood cells, a compensatory reaction begins to produce large quantities of new blood cells to replace the poisoned

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ones. The temporary increase in all blood cells, including immune cells, is likely to be the result of the body's reaction to AZT, which later proves futile in the continued presence of the drug.

Federal agencies are now promoting and even financing the application of this drug not only for patients with full-blown AIDS, but now even for people without symptoms, including pregnant mothers and children; some 50,000 patients worldwide are now undergoing treatment. Many other AIDS therapies now under consideration, such as the new drug ddI (dideoxy-inosine), operate in the same basic way. Even if the HIV hypothesis were correct, this approach would be irrational, since HIV is inactive by the time AZT is administered.

Misguided Programs

The risk-AIDS hypothesis also calls into question the direction of current AIDS education programs. Condoms and sterile needles may limit the transmission of hepatitis and other infectious diseases, but they do not guard against the immunosuppressive effects of heroin, cocaine, and overuse of antibiotics. Therefore education programs that promote condoms and sterile needles without emphasizing the danger of the risk behavior itself—particularly drug-taking—may inadvertently encourage spread of the disease.

With respect to AIDS itself, the risk hypothesis should reduce the fear of HIV infection. Those people not practicing risk behavior nor subject to severe medical problems need not worry about AIDS. There is no need to trace the sexual partners of HIV positives, nor to exclude from the country those who have been infected by the virus. Neither policemen nor health workers nor school classmates need be concerned about contracting HIV from antibody-positive people. Legitimate concerns will still remain about tuberculosis, hepatitis, and other contagious diseases often associated with AIDS. But infection by HIV would not be significant in itself.

For those people who do develop AIDS-like diseases, regardless of infection by HIV, several steps would be advisable. The use of AZT and similar antiviral-specific drugs should be avoided, while conventional therapies directed against the specific diseases might be considered. Such therapies have previously included special drugs for each illness, such as pentamidine for *P. carinii* pneumonia, as well as limited use of antibiotics and vaccinations; but none of these particular approaches is necessarily endorsed by the authors of this article. Doctors should treat each condition separately, and should seek to determine the underlying causes in each individual's case; patients should insist on this approach from their doctors. But perhaps the most useful action for any such patient to take would be the ending of any risk behavior. Unfortunately, no studies have been done, but anecdotal case descriptions exist of AIDS patients who recover after ending drug use, sexual promiscuity, and prophylactic antibiotic use, and who improve their nutritional status.

There is no need to trace the sexual partners of HIV positives, nor to exclude from the country those who have been infected by the virus.

Significantly, a June 10, 1990, *Parade* magazine survey of 13 AIDS survivors who have lived more than five years since their diagnosis showed a majority rejecting AZT. "It's incredible, isn't it," said one survivor, Mike Leonard, "that the drug designed to save you can also kill you."

Public policy questions raised by the risk hypothesis mostly concern federal funding patterns. The HIV hypothesis has not yet saved a single life, despite federal spending of $3 billion per year. In place of the current research funding policy, which exclusively finances HIV-related AIDS research, studies on the causes of the separate AIDS-diseases and their appropriate therapies might be conducted. The rest of the $3 billion that will be spent on the virus-AIDS hypothesis in the next fiscal year might then be saved and returned to the taxpayers, before it can do more harm.

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UNORIGINAL SIN

The Judeo-Christian Roots of Ecotheology

ROBERT H. NELSON

Many participants in environmental decisionmaking have assumed that the goal of environmental policy is to reduce pollution, improve air and water quality, and achieve other environmental objectives in an efficient way. Yet, experience has shown that magnitudes of benefits, levels of costs, and other factors affecting efficiency often play little part in environmental policy-making. Decisions are instead frequently made as an act of symbolic affirmation, to make a statement for or against a particular set of values. Indeed, on close inspection, environmental policy-making often turns out to be a battlefield for religious conflict. Rather than rational policy analysis, the making of natural resource and environmental policy in the United States has become an exercise in theological controversy.

Many environmentalists today have no objection to the characterization of their outlook as a religion. They readily acknowledge a goal to change the values of society and that the values they seek to promote rest on what is fundamentally a religious underpinning. The leading historian—an energetic advocate as well—of American environmentalism, Roderick Nash, recently described environmental views as deriving from a set of "eco-theologians" who propound a new "gospel of ecology." There is in the "recent concern for nature" what Nash describes as a "quasi-religious fervor." Joseph Sax, in making the case for reducing the human presence in the national parks, states candidly that he and other preservationists are in truth "secular prophets, preaching a message of secular salvation."

Environmentalism is, to be sure, a diverse movement. Many people support environmental improvements for practical reasons that have nothing to do with environmental theology. They simply want clean air and water, parks for recreation, and protection of wildlife. Nor are all environmentalists skeptical of science or opposed to economic argument. For many environmentalists, taking care of the environment is simply a matter of doing economics better—factoring in all the benefits (including nonmarket benefits) and taking proper account of private actions that have impacts not accurately reflected in market profits and losses.

Yet, the growing importance of the theological element means that those who would engage environmentalists in constructive dialogue may find that they have no choice but to enter the realm of theological discussion. Increasingly, the environmental policy analyst must address matters not only of physical science, economics, and other conventional policy subjects, but of theology as well.

Greener Pastors

Modern discussions of environmental theology have been strongly influenced by a 1967 article in *Science* in which the historian Lynn White Jr. asserted that contemporary environmentalism required a sharp break from the Judeo-Christian heritage. Because the Bible teaches that the earth and its creatures are created to serve the purposes of mankind, according to White, "Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects." White believed the environmental crisis of the current age required "a new religion," perhaps inspired by the faiths of "ancient paganism and Asia's religions," in which humanity must be understood as part of and not distinct from nature. White also drew inspiration from some Christian teachers, particularly St. Francis of Assisi.

The messages of contemporary environmentalism are widely seen—by environmentalist supporters and critics alike—as a major step toward the fulfillment of White's prescription of the pantheistic veneration of nature. Yet, despite its wide influence, White's argument has served more to confuse than to illuminate the actual tenets of environmental theology. The laws of nature frequently are not the laws of an idyllic or pastoral world; they are the Darwinian laws of the jungle—"Nature, red in tooth and claw," as Tennyson put it. Indeed, rather than becoming a part of nature as White asserted, the actual goal of environmentalism is the opposite: to inculcate a

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

Drawing by Anatol Woolf for *Policy Review*

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new morality with respect to the natural world that is found nowhere else in nature. No other creature is obligated to protect other species—as the Bible says that Noah was once commanded to do, and as the Endangered Species Act of 1973 again seeks to accomplish.

Environmental theology typically says little or nothing about God; it offers no answers concerning the hereafter; it is vague about the route of personal salvation; and in other respects it departs from basic tenets of the Judeo-Christian heritage. Yet, perhaps more remarkable is the extent to which environmentalism actually incorporates elements from the western religious heritage. Indeed, the real source of the appeal of environmentalism may be that it offers traditional religious messages of the West in a new secular form—a form that, in an age of rampant secularism, lends these traditional messages great authority for large numbers of people.

The appeal of environmentalism may be that it offers traditional religious messages in a new secular form—a form that, in an age of rampant secularism, lends these traditional messages great authority.

Devil's Design

One source of modern environmental theology is the long, powerful tradition within Christianity that regards wealth and riches, sophisticated reasoning, the structures of the law—all the formal institutions of society and of the good life—as dangerous and corrupting influences. These instruments all too often serve, not the will of God, but the devious designs of the devil. Since the fall of man from the Garden of Eden, human weakness has rendered the products of human reason unreliable, often deluding man to false optimism and excessive confidence in his powers. The leading American Catholic theologian of the 20th century, John Courtney Murray, once labeled this tradition within Christianity as one of "contempt of the world" and found that it has seen "sin as a permanent human fact that casts a shadow over all human achievements." This tradition encourages asceticism (and had an important influence on a number of monastic orders), spurns the attempt to perfect an earthly existence, and suggests that man "should by right neglect what is called the cultural enterprise—the cultivation of science and the arts, the pursuit of human values by human energies, the work of civilization." This outlook often asserts that the world is about to be overcome by the forces of evil—but there can still be hope that "in that moment [of collapse] the light disperses the darkness."

Contemporary environmentalism shares a closely related outlook: a sense that modern civilization tempts man to evil and represents retrogression rather than progress; an apocalyptic foreboding concerning ecological catastrophe and the near-term future of the earth; an attitude that human reason, as today embodied in science, offers false promises and alienates man from his true self; a view that a widespread sinfulness has infected the world (now seen in the "assaults" on and the "raping" of nature that meet popular indifference); a condemnation of the pervasive greed that motivates current evils (found especially in corporate "profiteers" who abuse nature); a view that urban and industrial civilization cuts men off from deeper and truer natural instincts; and a desire for a return to an earlier and more natural existence—the existence of the earth long ago—in which the products of modern science and economics would be banished. The deliverers of such environmental messages today issue a new call for men to renounce their evil ways and to live in simple harmony with their true natures and with the divine order that governs the universe—much as Christianity has preached repentance and deliverance from sin, and obedience to God.

Unheavenly City

This belief in the alienation of man from his true nature existed in the western tradition even before the advent of Christianity. For Plato, the undermining and corrupting power of greed and other economic influences—destroying the virtues of the citizenry—explained the decline of man. In the latter part of the ancient Roman empire, Augustine brought together the Platonic tradition and Christian theology. For Augustine, life on earth offered an existence of sin and depravity, characterized by "the love of self" and the pursuit of self-interest, as exemplified by the corruption and debauchery of ancient Rome.

In the history of western religion, Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation represent the next great statement of such a theology. Owing to the fall of man, reason is subverted; government, the law, and other institutional products of man's rational faculty will reflect the corrupted nature of man, exemplified for Luther by the Catholic Church. Reunion with man's true nature is not to be achieved in this world, but is possible only in a heavenly future. Luther also continued the Platonic and Augustinian tradition of seeing economic competition and the pursuit of self-interest as forces of darkness.

In some ways, Marxism is a secular variation of the tradition of Plato, Augustine, and Luther. Its fundamental thesis is the growing alienation through history of mankind from his true nature. In a new rendition of the fall of man, Marx argued that the forces of technological advance and economic growth created surplus production, causing the outbreak of class warfare to gain control over the resulting surpluses and thus yielding the alienation of man from himself. The Marxist concept of alienation was derived, as the political scientist Isaiah Berlin

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commented, from what "Rousseau and Luther and an earlier Christian tradition called the perpetual self-divorce of men from unity with nature, with each other, with God." Yet, Marx promised that there would soon be a day when the millennium arrives; the laws of economic history have predestined with ironclad certainty that the impending culmination of class struggle will open the way to a future in which earth becomes heaven.

Deep Ecology

The ideas of "deep ecology," which derive from this theological emphasis on the fall of man, are not widely known to the American public but are exercising a significant and growing (if often unacknowledged) influence even within the mainstream environmental movement. In their book *Deep Ecology*, Bill Devall and George Sessions offer a familiar portrayal of the fall of man—the story of history as one of decline from an earlier existence in true harmony with nature. In their version of the story, "technological society not only alienates humans from the rest of Nature but also alienates humans from themselves and from each other." Human pride and an excess of confidence in human reason, now exalted as scientific reason, have led to the fall of man. Devall and Sessions thus preach that deep ecology challenges "not only the growth addict and the chronic developer, but science itself."

As a secular faith, the tenets of deep ecology are closest to the Marxist analysis. Dave Foreman is the founder of Earth First, a self-described "radical environmental" organization that has received wide media attention in recent years for engaging in "monkey wrenching" (sabotaging heavy machinery and other acts of destroying instruments of development). If Marx once believed that the class struggle for surplus production had yielded the alienation of mankind from a truer nature, Foreman now contends that "human destruction of the wild" is the "keystone to understanding our alienation from Nature, which is the central problem of Civilization." Foreman follows Marx in locating the fall of man in history; in this case, it is the arrival of agriculture and an organized society. If advancing technological capacity for Marx first made surplus production possible, and thereby yielded the class struggle, Foreman now finds that it was the "nascency of agriculture" about 10,000 years ago that first left man "apart from the natural world" and yielded the evils of "city, bureaucracy, patriarchy, war, and empire."

Where Marx saw history as revealing an ever deeper corruption and degradation, Foreman now finds history to be the story of "an ever widening rift" that opened "between the wilderness that created us and the civilization created by us." In the gospel of Foreman, if it was the wilderness that created man, man has now rebelled against his primitive naturalness and fallen into sin. One can hardly fail to note the environmental retelling in secular form of the Genesis story—the creation in the Garden of Eden and the original sin of Adam and Eve (the pursuit of knowledge) causing mankind to be cast out into sin and iniquity.

In his recent, much-noted book, *The End of Nature*, William McKibben writes of a severe "crisis of belief" in the current era but asserts that "many people, including me, have overcome it to a greater or lesser degree by locating God in nature." When Europeans first arrived in North America, McKibben writes, they found a "wilderness" that was a "blooming, humming, fertile paradise," very much like the biblical version. But by destroying the wilderness, modern men are engaged in destroying God and are instead "making ourselves gods." If they succeed, if nature—or God—no longer exists, there would be no "hope for a living, eternal, meaningful world." In essence, "nature" becomes for McKibben a substitute for the Christian God; if Friedrich Nietzsche a century earlier warned of dire consequences of the death of God, the end of nature today for McKibben and for many others of environmental faith would have much the same meaning.

Because there is a long tradition in America of separating church and state, and for tactical and other reasons, spokesmen for the contending theological viewpoints often leave the religious elements implicit. As a society, we often mask basic value disagreements by dressing them up in the formal rhetoric of rational discourse. Yet, theological terms and a recognition of an underlying religious content have been creeping into policy discussions with growing frequency.

Although leaders of environmental groups are often guarded in their public statements, funding solicitations of these groups are often much more revealing of the fundamental values and convictions of their membership. A few selections from recent solicitation letters of leading environmental organizations are offered below to illustrate the prominent role that themes and images from our western religious heritage play in the appeals of these groups.

Natural Resources Defense Council:

> Imagine a spectacular bay [in Alaska] that is home to the greatest concentration of marine life in North America—with more fish, birds, whales, seals, and otters than inhabit any other single place. More wildlife refuges and critical habitat areas than any other region on the continent.
>
> Now picture that the world's oil giants—Shell, Mobil and others—propose drilling for oil and gas in this national environmental treasure—at the invitation of the United States government!!!
>
> Opening up Bristol Bay to oil and gas drilling is akin to opening up Yosemite and Yellowstone National Parks to oil giants.
>
> I believe we can save Bristol Bay if I can convince you to help us.

One meaning of "save" is to preserve, but another is to curb the influence of evil. Today, urgent new calls are being issued to save innocent environments and helpless wildlife from the ravages of human exploitation and sinfulness. In this case, nature must be saved from "oil giants," who provide an especially powerful symbol of the growing alienation from nature resulting from modern technology and the forces of economic development. It is the ability to tap oil, generate electricity, and utilize other energy supplies that has given mankind a

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new and enormous power to reduce nature to submission for human purposes. The oil companies use drilling equipment and other intrusive technologies that can be seen as almost literally raping the virgin earth. Oil companies are large and impersonal corporations, motivated by the pursuit of profit and indifferent to the assaults on nature that their own activities bring about. In short, if the power of greed has long tempted Christians to sin, and if in Marxism surplus production moved one class to enslave another, now in our own time the need for energy to maintain the luxuries of modern living compels man to still further depravity, the violation once again of the innocence of nature.

The Wilderness Society:

> We need to protect our wilderness areas from being bulldozed, stripmined, denuded, and drilled.
>
> *Destroy them and we destroy our spirit*...destroy them and we destroy our sense of values...destroy them and we deprive future generations of their greatest heritage...destroy them and we upset a critical balance of nature, an upset that will have long-range adverse effects on our health and quality of life.
>
> Wilderness and the environment have become today's scapegoat, *sacrificed on the altar of economic expediency.*

To preserve a wilderness is to maintain a place where humanity can experience nature in the absence of human intrusion—wilderness "cathedrals" some have called these places. A wilderness, like a church, is a small enclave where the alienation otherwise so pervasive in modern life has been challenged. If the church historically sought to teach and to minister the restoration of man's sinless nature, as it was once found in an earthly paradise in the Garden of Eden, an environmentalist's return to nature now seeks a physical environment where the signs of human misdeeds are missing—a place, as the Wilderness Act of 1964 states, that is "untrammeled by man." If reunion with nature for many in the current age has assumed the traditional meaning of reunion with God, a wilderness is a place for communing with and being at one with the divinity.

Sierra Club:

> The progressive loss of the *ozone shield* will result in millions of new cases of skin cancer. In addition, increases in ultraviolet (UV) light will cause massive losses in the productivity of the oceans because, as one scientist put it, "we simply fry the plankton in UV."
>
> An increase in *global temperatures* is resulting from the over-use of fossil fuels and from massive deforestation. Also, rainfall patterns will shift, resulting in devastation of the world's food crops. Finally, the sea may rise, flooding much of the world's coastal plain.
>
> Citizens are going to have to be fully *educated* about the threat to global climate and then *called to action.*

In the Bible, the wicked can expect to incur the wrath of God. Drought and pestilence will be the lot of those who disobey, as in the time of Noah a flood encompassed the entire earth. Now, as the Sierra Club warns, massive flooding again threatens. Global climate change raises the prospect of widespread "devastation" of agriculture. Other catastrophes and disasters loom as well, which may arrive at any moment. Yet, these punishments for human attacks on and indifference to nature can be avoided. Men must be "called" to a new crusade on which the very future of the earth may depend. They must be educated in the truths of the natural world in order that they may reform their wicked ways. Otherwise, if the separation of man from nature continues to widen, there will be an ultimate and unforgiving reckoning.

Environmental "Unitarians"

The environmentalism of these solicitations and of deep ecologists such as Dave Foreman is of a fire-and-brimstone sort, harking back to Calvin and other Protestant reformers who saw a depraved world filled with sinners bent on their own destruction. But environmentalism also has its optimists, who have greater faith in human reason and in the benevolent impulses of mankind. These "Unitarians" of the environmental movement envision a happier future for humanity. Indeed, a wide range of practical and theological considerations can be found among those who have enlisted in the environmental cause.

In a recent analysis of "the meaning of wilderness," the chairman of the Sierra Club, Michael McCloskey, identifies 24 reasons to support the creation of wilderness areas. The reasons were classified into four main categories: biocentric; anthropocentric but not utilitarian; anthropocentric and utilitarian; and, least valid, commercial. The utilitarian reasons included "watershed function," "education," "science and research," "therapy," and "recreation." Wilderness areas in the United States can be seen as a museum of the geological and biological past, especially important to a nation that otherwise lacks a lengthy history to record. But McCloskey concludes that the core justification for creating wilderness areas is that they provide "beacons of hope for all those whose lives are oppressed by lines of traffic, layers of smog, piles of trash, and the menace of toxics. At last, perhaps, we can understand what Thoreau meant when he said: 'In wildness is the preservation of the world.'"

Is Man Part of Nature?

Despite drawing heavily on the Judeo-Christian tradition, environmental theology also contains major new theological elements. In the western religious tradition, to return to an original state of nature has been to return to the sinless condition of mankind in the Garden of Eden—or, for many secular theologies of the modern age, to some primitive tribal existence. Current environmental theologians, however, now have available to them the fairly recent scientific knowledge that for all but a

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very limited recent span, nature did not include human beings. To return to the original nature of creation thus might now be interpreted to mean a return to a state of nature that preceded human influence.

This theological logic is today exhibited in the formal criteria for designation of wilderness areas, where it is precisely the absence of signs of human presence that must be documented. Following a similar logic, the National Park Service maintains a policy to avoid interfering with nature and to seek to return to original natural conditions preceding human influence (thus, manmade fires are fought but "natural" fires are allowed to burn). The government goes to great lengths to regulate very small quantities of manmade pesticides, but sees little problem in the widespread presence of dangerous pesticides that are created naturally by plants and vegetables. Global warming due to natural causes would be a cause for concern, but would no doubt stimulate much less public alarm than warming due to a buildup of gases caused by human activities. In each case the violation of nature is the basic concern, not the risk or other impact on human well-being.

"The AIDS of the Earth"

Environmental theology faces a dilemma that could prove insuperable: How can mankind find harmony with and return to an original state of nature when the very presence of man may now be seen as foreign to original nature? One theoretical answer would be the disappearance of mankind. Many environmental proponents seeking to limit the violation of nature support a sharply reduced human population on earth. A former leader of Greenpeace, Paul Watson, recently commented that "our species [is] the AIDS of the Earth: we are rapidly eroding the immune system of the Earth...destroying [her] ability to cleanse herself." If so, perhaps the proper fate of humanity might even be the same that medical research today seeks for AIDS.

Such theological logic was actually carried to this extreme by the author of a proposal—hopefully offered somewhat tongue-in-cheek—that appeared a while ago in a radical environmental publication: "Only a very few of human pathogens are shared by other partners on our planet. Biological warfare will have no impact on other creatures, big or small, if we design it carefully." Although few if any environmentalists would so advocate, in some fringe groups serious proposals are being made to exclude signs of human presence from as much as one-third of the land area of the earth.

Some environmentalists have avoided this theological difficulty by arguing that man should be seen not as foreign to but as an inherent part of nature—no different in any fundamental way from the plants, animals, and perhaps even inanimate objects of the natural world. A faith of an animistic or pantheistic character would result: worshipping nature and seeking a unification of man with the divine element to be found directly and literally in the natural world.

However, these environmentalists face a theological problem of equal severity. If the lion is not to be condemned morally for wanton acts of cruelty against other creatures, why, then, should mankind be judged harshly for making practical use of the natural world? This brand of environmental theology ends up in a virtual self-contradiction: men are to look to the current natural world for their values and spiritual sustenance, yet are instructed to behave and are to be judged by a standard found nowhere else in nature.

Law of Nature and of Nature's God

Lynn White's influential argument that only a new and nonwestern religion could protect the environment has diverted attention from a more promising theological direction for the environmental movement. Few would dispute that there are new threats to the world ecology; that there are growing numbers of people, creating increased demands on natural resources; and that quality of life becomes a greater concern as other basic human needs are met. These factors and others suggest the necessity of taking active steps to maintain and improve environmental quality. Yet, it does not follow that a brand-new theology is needed to justify such efforts. Indeed, perhaps reinterpreted a bit to take account of improved ecological knowledge and other changing circumstances, the messages of the Judeo-Christian tradition not only offer ample scope for environmentalism but firmer grounds for the development of an environmental ethic and a theology of environmental protection.

While deep ecology and other branches of environmental theology have borrowed from the ascetic tradition of Christianity, there are other theological outlooks

If the lion is not to be condemned morally for wanton acts of cruelty against other creatures, why should mankind be judged harshly for making practical use of the natural world?

of equal importance. Besides the tradition of "contempt of the world," John Courtney Murray labeled a second and much different central tradition of Christianity as one of "affirmation of the worldly." There is no need to reject the current social order and its values, but man should set about "building himself a world" through the historical processes already at work. Although this theological tradition recognizes man's sinful nature, it sees history as not the story of a fall into ever greater sin and evil, but potentially of the progressive realization of "the life of reason" with the help of God.

Such a worldly and rationalist outlook reached a high point in Christianity in the theology of Thomas Aquinas.

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If Martin Luther saw rational argument as often subversive of strong faith, for Aquinas a life of reason brought man closer to God. Much of Christian theology over the centuries has been grounded in a natural law tradition that finds in reason the means to discover the divine intent for this world.

Worldly Environmentalism

Murray argues that the natural law outlook could also be found at the core of "the American proposition," which was embedded in the Constitution and had been closely reflected in American institutions ever since. Americans saw the world in optimistic terms, believed in progress here on earth, saw reason as the means to progress, and regarded a life lived according to reason as a correct life. To the extent that American environmentalism seeks to deliver an opposing ascetic and antirational message, its probable fate will be rejection in America—much as the Marxist message of ever-deepening alienation was earlier rejected.

The worldly and rational tradition in western theology, moreover, offers a more promising route for actually achieving practical improvements in man's relationship to the environment. A deep concern for the environment is a logical part of the advancement of man's worldly condition. Rather than representing an alienating and subversive influence, science and other rational inquiry may be required to find a superior means of protecting the environment. Indeed, it is an other-worldly theology that is more likely to end up neglecting the environment, because results in this world count for so little. In short, those who see the realization of God's design taking place at least partly here on earth are most likely to regard environmental protection and improvement as an indispensable part of the divine plan for the world.

The Bettmann Archive

Adam and Eve were commanded to care for the earth. By stressing man's responsibility for God's creation, the Judeo-Christian tradition offers firm ground for an environmental ethic.

The role of man as steward of the earth is an important biblical theme. Although environmentalists have often found fault with the dominion themes of the first chapter of Genesis, the second chapter asserts that God has placed man in the Garden of Eden "to till it and care for it." While men are directed to use the earth for their own purposes they are not to do so in irresponsible or uncaring ways. As eloquently expressed in Psalms 8 and 24, man's dominion is clearly a delegated dominion, leaving him accountable to God, who maintains actual ownership of the earth. While God has created man "a little lower than the angels and...has made him to have dominion over the works of [His] hands" (Psalm 8:5,6), still, "The earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof; the world and they that dwell therein" (Psalm 24:1).

However, a return to the biblical model of stewardship may deprive environmentalism of some of the spiritual force that it currently derives from the conviction of having discovered new religious truths and a new faith. Yet, by often failing to acknowledge its original inspiration, environmentalism today is guilty of historical ignorance and is unable to draw upon theological lessons learned over many centuries—sometimes at great cost in human lives and effort. For example, history shows that to seek to guide technological and economic advances more successfully may be possible, but to seek to reverse them and to return to a state of nature of the distant past is another matter altogether. More and more, however, environmental theology today is preaching the latter—a goal of renouncing modern ways of living and seeking in actual practice to organize society on the basis of achieving a "natural" existence in which "artificial" signs of human presence would be minimized.

Although this goal would seem hopelessly impractical and impossible to realize, it would not be the first instance in which many people actually tried to follow such a theological message. The most important recent example is Marxism, which led whole societies to seek to abolish property rights and government and to create a heaven right here on earth—further suggesting that the task could be completed within the span of a few generations. If the wish for heaven is understandable, following the wrong theology, as Marxism has shown, can instead yield a hell on earth.

In lesser matters as well, those who seek an impossible and utopian goal tend to forfeit the opportunity to shape the future constructively. While winning many symbolic victories, contemporary environmentalism has often failed to win the larger wars. The impractical and unworldly side of environmentalism shows up, for example, in the strong resistance shown by many environmentalists to use of market methods and incentives to bring about environmental improvements. If environmental

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theology preaches a return to original nature and an elimination of signs of human presence, some policy successes may be achieved, such as creating wilderness areas, but there is likely to be little impact over broad areas of political and economic concern. If environmental moralists ultimately have much practical impact, it might be to sow economic and political disorganization. Well-intended but misconceived environmental policies could impose large costs on society without much corresponding real gain to the environment.

The Christian ascetic tradition has often been in conflict with the Christian concern for uplifting the poor. So, too, many of the actions supported by environmentalists would be detrimental to the less advantaged people of the world. One prominent environmentalist, Paul Ehrlich, has suggested that the poor in some nations may have to starve if world population is to be effectively controlled. At a local level, the effect of rigorous environmental controls on growth is frequently to drive up the cost of living, restricting the housing opportunities of the less advantaged. Policies that restrict pollution without attention to costs and benefits can needlessly take away job opportunities. In preaching that material possessions and the good life are unnatural and to this extent evil, environmental theology suggests that the poor should be content with their condition and are perhaps even better off for it—an outlook that could eventually shape government policies.

In the future, environmental theology will have to recognize that man and physical nature are distinct. According to the very framework of environmental thought, man has obligations in the world that no other animal, plant, or inanimate object in nature possesses. Such a message is not found in science, which regards man as another mere object subject to the same laws as found elsewhere in nature. It is instead a biblical message. The responsibility to be good stewards of the earth follows from the essence of the biblical creation message—that man alone among creatures was created in the image of God and that man therefore has unique responsibilities for the rest of the earth. Environmentalism and the Judeo-Christian heritage are not necessarily in conflict; indeed, modern environmentalism is in some respects another theological variation of this heritage, one that could benefit from a greater recognition of the original inspiration.

Current environmental theology suggests that the poor should be content with their condition and are perhaps even better off for it.

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

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Creature Comfort

The Revitalization of American Wildlife

Robert E. Gordon Jr. and George S. Dunlop

One of America's great untold stories is the remarkable comeback of many species of wildlife. Public attention focuses on the 259 species and subspecies of animals classified as endangered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. It is less often observed that hundreds of species—from moose in New Hampshire to black bear in Pennsylvania to mountain lions in California—are increasing in population, demonstrating the resiliency and dynamism of nature.

One of the most dramatic stories of recovery involves our national symbol, the bald eagle. A decade ago, it was on the verge of extinction. Thanks to substitutes for the pesticide DDT (which was damaging eagle eggs) and harsh penalties for poaching, the bird's population has tripled in 15 years, and it may soon be taken off the endangered species list. In northern California 16 adults and one juvenile eagle were recently counted in a single tree. In Montana the number of observed nesting pairs has risen from 12 to 96.

Temporary restrictions on hunting have similarly led to an explosion of the American alligator population. This reptile was on the first federal endangered species list when the Endangered Species Act passed in 1973, although it probably wouldn't have been included by current standards. Dennis David of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Commission estimates that there are now as many as one million alligators in his state alone, and alligators are not limited to Florida. The range of the species extends in an arc from North Carolina to Oklahoma. The creature has been downgraded from the endangered to the threatened species list, which allows a certain leeway in harvesting. The fees collected from egg collectors, hunters, and others virtually offset Florida's management costs.

Some species have recovered because their habitats have improved as the unintended consequence of human activity. The population of white-tailed deer, for instance, has risen nearly 30-fold from 500,000 in the 1920s to 14 million today, partially because of reforestation in the Northeast. (Because industry and farming have moved westward, there are now 26 million more acres of forest in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York than there were at the turn of the century.)

Similarly, the chestnut-sided warbler was sighted only once by Audubon in all his peregrinations across America. It is now a more common songbird because its habitats of forest edges, slashings, and brushy pastures have expanded in the past century—though there has recently been a slight decline.

But many of the most remarkable recoveries have occurred as the result of deliberate human efforts. Specially designed birdhouses have helped the Eastern bluebird make a comeback since it faced extinction in 1930 as a result of competition from the European starling. Setting aside land for state and national parks and forests, as well as private wildlife sanctuaries, has preserved valuable natural habitat for hundreds of species.

Sheepshape

Simply setting land aside for nature, however, is not always enough for species recovery; many of the comebacks in the animal world have required careful management of the habitat. It has become fashionable in much of the environmental movement to support a let-nature-take-its-course approach to the regulation of park and wilderness lands, a philosophy that led to the great Yellowstone fire of 1988. However, many of the success stories in wildlife recovery result from a contrary view, in which government agencies or private organizations take an active, managerial role in support of species that people care a great deal about.

A good example comes from the Whiskey Mountain area of Wyoming, where the size of the bighorn sheep herd has grown steadily from about 150 in 1930 to about 1,000 today, making it the largest wintering herd for the species in North America.

The majestic bighorn, easily recognized by its massive coiling horns, had dwindled in number in the Whiskey Mountain region primarily because of competition for grazing lands from cattle and horses. But in the 1950s,

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

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From alligators in Florida to wild turkey in Missouri to moose in New Hampshire, dozens of majestic species are enjoying a population explosion.

a joint effort was initiated by the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, the U.S. Forest Service, and the Bureau of Land Management to acquire land for elk range. Unexpectedly, the organizers discovered by 1969 that the bighorn herd on this land had grown. From then on, the sheep became the focus of attention, and that is when the success story really began.

The three agencies formed the Technical Committee of the Whiskey Mountain Bighorn Sheep Herd, which took an aggressive approach to managing the herd and its habitat. In the 1970s, the committee deliberately started controlled fires in the grazing land in order to increase the spread of Idaho fescue and blue bunch wheat grass, favorite foods of the bighorn. As the herd grew and began to tax the capacity of the land with its heavy grazing, wildlife officials noticed that climax grasslands were being taken over by matty vegetation like selaginella, a flowering forb (or herb) related to common garden flowers that was of no interest to the bighorn. The problem was solved by aerial spraying of an herbicide that kills broadleaf plants.

Wyoming wildlife officials also invented an ingenious contraption for capturing bighorn and transporting them to areas both in and out of the state where herds have been absent for as long as a hundred years. A 5,625-square foot net is held atop five 15-foot poles by helicopter hooks that can be released by remote control. A bait of second-cutting alfalfa and fermenting apple mash is used to attract the sheep. As a result of transplanting efforts, new bighorn herds have been established in Utah, New Mexico, Nevada, Idaho, and South Dakota, as well as various Wyoming mountain ranges and the Wind River Indian Reservation. Recipients are charged $150 per sheep plus another $150 for capturing operations, and must provide manpower to assist in the capture and transportation. The funds raised are returned to Wyoming's Game and Fish operating budget, which is augmented by some $260,000 in annual license fees collected from bighorn sheep trophy hunters.

Tom Ryder, chairman of the Whiskey Mountain committee, is worried, however, that reduced access by the herd to its summer range will put a heavier burden on its winter range than is sustainable. Lack of access to this range might put great stress on the bighorn and force them to split into two less healthy herds, making them more susceptible to outbreaks of lungworm, which causes pneumonia and death. The problem is that the summer range is in a federally designated wilderness area, where prescribed fires haven't been set, even though stands of subalpine fir and lodgepole and white bark pine increasingly present obstacles to the migrating herd. Although current wilderness policies were intended to benefit our natural resources by removing any trace of man, they may spell disaster for the bighorn.

The chestnut-sided warbler was sighted only once by Audubon in all his peregrinations across America. It is now a more common songbird.

Trout Maneuvers

In New Mexico's Gila National Forest the recoveries of the Gila trout and the healthy javelina (or peccary) population are further examples of successful manage-

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Today there are over 7,500 black bears in Pennsylvania alone. Wildlife biologists plant apple and crab apple trees to feed them.

ment by wildlife officials. One of these officials, biologist Bruce Anderson, expects that in three to six years the Gila trout will be downgraded from an endangered to a threatened species and returned to sport fishing in a decade.

The Gila trout is the only trout native to this part of New Mexico. Its numbers were depleted by the introduction of rainbow and brown trout into its waters. Game managers reintroduce the Gila trout in rivers and streams from which the brown and rainbow trout have been removed. The Gila trout, captured from streams where competitive trout species were never introduced, are immobilized by a low-amperage, high-voltage current. This electric current temporarily interferes with the fish's nerve endings, so that it cannot move its fins. The captured fish are then transferred by pack mule or helicopter to reintroduction sites.

Unfortunately, the recovery of the Gila was set back in 1989 by a 12,000-acre forest fire followed by a hailstorm. The fire and storm depleted the oxygen in some of the fish's waters by introducing heavy amounts of ash, which raised the alkalinity level. The alkalinity and fine ash particles suffocated the Gila trout and killed off the bottom invertebrates on which it feeds. Wildlife biologists worked hard to limit the damage by transporting over 500 trout from the most affected rivers before ash made them uninhabitable.

Anderson thinks that this disaster might have been avoided if the accumulation of deadwood and scrubby undergrowth in the forest had been prevented by prescribed fires. Wildlife managers are now working to prevent further deterioration of water quality by building small dikes to prevent erosion and ashy runoff from reaching the water.

Meanwhile, the number of javelina (a species of wild pig) in arid areas of the Gila Forest has risen from roughly 160 in 1970 to about 1,000 in 1984, although the earlier figure may represent some underreporting. The population is now stable, except for fluctuations stemming from changes in weather. Wildlife officials have been piping water to javelina watering holes, and have also been setting prescribed fires according to the historical frequency of natural fires as determined by analysis of tree rings. The tubers and forbs that grow after fires in the Gila Forest provide food for the javelina as well as cover for piglets. Sound management principles like these help ensure the javelina's place among America's wildlife.

The Moose That Roared

In the opposite corner of the country, another mammal has gone through a population explosion. In 1950, there were only about 50 moose in New Hampshire. Over-hunting and the state's increasing dedication of land to farming and raising livestock caused the once plentiful moose population to plummet.

Today, according to Kristine Klein, a wildlife biologist with the state's fish and game department, the number of moose has grown to approximately 4,000. Initial increases resulted from the gradual regeneration of forest, aided by a restriction on hunting until the moose population could reach a healthy and stable number. By the early 1980s, the population had grown to about 1,600.

Then came the spruce budworm, which infested broad stretches of forest owned by timber companies in the northern half of the state. The timber companies had to move quickly to harvest their trees before they became unmarketable. Large tracts of forest were clear-cut, whereupon millions of hardwood and softwood saplings, important elements of the moose diet, sprouted. The moose population more than doubled in less than a decade.

The New Hampshire Fish and Game Department is encouraging both private owners and the U.S. Forest Service to harvest timber in a manner that varies the age

The wild turkey population has risen to over two million, thanks to cooperative efforts by hunters, game commissioners, and private property owners.

of different tree stands. In this way, habitat for moose, white-tailed deer, and other species will be continually regenerated. Prescribed burning is also encouraged, both to eliminate accumulated deadwood and to produce successional growth rich in nutrition for the moose and deer.

Lion's Share

California wildlife officials have likewise been actively managing habitat to enlarge the state's deer population. Burning chaparral, a dense woody brush, allows deer greater access to habitat and enables saplings, which would otherwise be choked out, to grow and provide forage.

What is good for deer is also good for mountain lions.

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Terry Mansfield, a manager with California's Department of Fish and Game, says density levels of three to four lions per 100 square miles used to be cause for excitement. Now five to nine is the standard.

In the early '70s, California wildlife officials annually documented five to 10 incidents of damage to livestock or pets from mountain lions. Last year a new record was set—168 verifiable incidents. In some cases, these incidents are attributable to the encroachment of human settlement on lion habitat, but many take place in areas without much recent development.

Large carnivores such as the mountain lion can prosper only when there are many smaller animals for them to prey on. Their presence, therefore, is a good indication of positive wildlife trends. The same can be said for the omnivore *Ursus americanus*, the black bear, which has been growing steadily in number. Today there are more than 7,500 in Pennsylvania alone, with a healthy and productive population. Wildlife experts in Pennsylvania say the typical litter is three cubs per sow; four cubs are not uncommon, and there are reports of even five. The cubs' weight after one season ranges from 60 to over 100 pounds.

In the Allegheny National Forest, as in the rest of Pennsylvania, wildlife managers and biologists like Brad Nelson have been working to improve bear habitat. They plant apple and crab apple trees, and prune old apple trees to provide a healthy food source. In areas of the forest that are harvested, maple and cherry trees are cut while mature stands of oak and beech are left. The older oak and beech provide good habitat: bears often den in or under large-diameter fallen trees, and the deadwood is full of grubs for food.

Giant Goose Chase

Hunters, fishermen, and farmers have played an important role in the revival of many species. The Pittman-Robertson Act, enacted in the 1930s with the support of hunters, levies an excise tax on firearms and ammunition that provided $100 million in 1989 alone to state wildlife programs for restoration of habitat, restocking, and development of wildlife resources. A similar program, the Dingell-Johnson Act, does the same for game fish.

In Missouri, hunters help wildlife managers by collecting information about the population density of the wild turkey. There are now as many as 20,000 wild turkeys in the state's Mark Twain Forest. The hunters' cooperation pays off in another way: Officials from the Missouri Department of Conservation capture the bird with cannon nets, and then exchange one wild turkey for four ruffed grouse from Indiana. Now eight counties in Missouri have a grouse season they didn't have before.

The wild turkey had been reduced to a few southern states by the early 1900s, but today can be found throughout the continental United States. Its numbers have risen to between two million and three million, thanks to cooperative efforts by hunters and game commissions, as well as re-stocking by private property owners.

Farmers and hunters saved another big bird from extinction. The giant Canada goose is similar in appearance to other Canada geese, but much larger. While a typical male Canada goose might weigh nine pounds, a male giant could weigh 14 to 15 pounds.

Transported by pack mule, Gila trout are returning to New Mexico streams.

During the 1950s, giant Canada geese were believed to be extinct. However, in 1962, goose specialist Harold Hansen discovered some of the giants in Rochester, Minnesota, and afterwards at other locations. Farmers and hunters, among others, had been collecting giant Canada goose eggs and rearing goslings in captivity for food, and for farm or decoy flocks. The stock reared by these farmers and hunters, and their knowledge of how to care for the geese, greatly benefited subsequent restoration programs. Current estimates of the giant Canada goose population run as high as 150,000.

Profits of Game

Like farmers, hunters, and fishermen, ranchers can play a positive role in recovering wildlife. A good example is the Deseret Ranch in Woodruff, Utah. The 200,000-acre ranch is home to pronghorn antelope, buffalo, mule deer, moose, red fox, coyote, bobcat, mountain lion, and Rocky Mountain elk, as well as 7,000 to 8,000 head of cattle. Currently the ranch is working to establish healthy populations of Bear Lake cutthroat trout. It is conducting a study for reintroduction of an upland game bird, the sharp-tailed grouse, and it is participating in an experimental antelope harvest strategy with the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources.

Hunters are willing to pay higher fees for Deseret trophies, because the ranch's managers work hard to enhance the health and quality of wildlife on the property. A case in point is the elk herd, which has grown from around 350 in 1979 to between 1,200 and 1,400 today. Nationally, the elk population has grown five-fold since the 1920s—from approximately 100,000 to about half a million today. Deseret elk are exceptionally healthy. Their calving rate is high—about 65 calves to 100 cows, and about 90 percent of the calves are a result of the first heat. First-heat calves are more mature and have a higher survival rate during the winter than calves born after the second or third heat, as is more common on state and federal lands near the ranch.

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Wyoming Game & Fish Dept. Photograph

Bighorn sheep herds have been reestablished in much of the West with the aid of helicopters and herbicides. Two officials with Wyoming Fish and Game Department transport a ewe.

In accounting for the excellent health of Deseret's elk, general manager Gregg Simonds stresses the quality of grazing lands. Cattle grazing is strictly monitored to insure ample high quality graze and forage for other species. Deseret's wildlife biologist Shane Davis stresses the minimal disturbance to elk herds during the rutting season and a high ratio of healthy mature elk bulls to cows for breeding.

Nature's Resiliency

There are several lessons from these stories of species recovery. One is that humans can care for and expand wildlife populations not just through negative means—such as bans on pesticides or restrictions on hunting until the population stabilizes—but through sound management techniques such as prescribed fires, improvement of food and water sources, and other enhancements of habitat. Most of these management techniques are site and situation specific, not conducive to administration by a central state or federal bureaucracy. They involve trial-and-error experiments tailored to conditions in local ecosystems. Wildlife biologists can easily tell whether their techniques actually benefit the species they are trying to help. If not, they try something else.

A second lesson is that ranchers, farmers, outdoor sportsmen, and others from the private sector play an important role in effective wildlife policies, sometimes on their own, sometimes in association with government wildlife authorities. Sportsmen naturally have an incentive to care for and expand the species they like to hunt and fish. Increasingly, property owners are discovering the attractions of enhancing habitat on their lands, either for their own enjoyment or for the hunting income offered by rich and diverse animal populations.

Perhaps the most important lesson is that nature itself is dynamic and resilient. Natural forces, of course, are the cause of the majority of extinctions. Other species have been devastated by human action, such as encroachments on habitat and over-hunting; the passenger pigeon and the Carolina parakeet are among the most prominent man-caused extinctions on the American continent. But one of the glories of nature is how strong and renewable it is. Many of our threatened species can regain their numbers. Through careful management of their habitat, man can help. ☎

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Hail to the Chiefs

The Untold History of Reagan's SDI Decision

Donald R. Baucom

One of the most dramatic episodes of the nuclear age occurred in June 1967 during the Glassboro summit between President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin. Johnson's goal was to convince the Soviets that the deployment of their Galosh anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, which was then under way, would do nothing to improve Soviet security and would merely intensify the nuclear arms race. Johnson was having some difficulty getting this point across to his Soviet counterpart, so he turned to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and said: "Bob, for God's sake, you tell Kosygin what's wrong with their plan." McNamara then laid out the logic of assured destruction for the Soviet premier: "If you proceed with the anti-ballistic missile deployment, our response will not, should not be, to deploy a similar system....[O]ur response will be to expand our offensive weapons." McNamara then told Kosygin that the only way out of this trap was to negotiate restrictions on defensive systems. At this point, Kosygin became red in the face, pounded the table, and declared: "Defense is moral, offense is immoral!"

Nevertheless, McNamara's logic prevailed, and the first round of SALT agreements two years later stifled ABM developments while leaving offensive technology essentially unconstrained. This institutionalized the strategic doctrine that is loosely referred to today as mutual assured destruction, or MAD. In consonance with this doctrine, at the beginning of 1976 the United States closed the one operational ABM facility it was allowed, the Safeguard missile defense facility near Grand Forks, North Dakota. At the same time, Congress ordered the Department of Defense to reorient its ABM program from one designed to produce a successor system to Safeguard, to a limited research program to insure against a surprise Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty.

Seven years later, President Ronald Reagan went before the American public with a nationally televised speech in which he announced his decision to order the Department of Defense to expand its research and development efforts to see if ABM technology had advanced to where the deployment of an effective strategic defense might be possible at some point in the future. To a number of his critics, Reagan's decision seemed to be a hasty, ill-advised reversal of past national policy. However, a closer examination indicates that Reagan's decision came in response to a strategic crisis (the increasing vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs to a Soviet first strike) and was taken on the advice of the nation's top military advisors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council. Furthermore, the decision aimed to capitalize on a number of important advances in ABM technology that had been produced by a lengthy research and development effort.

Forty Years of ABM Research

In 1983, America's involvement with ballistic missile defenses stretched back almost 40 years to efforts of the Allies to find a defense against German V-2 missiles, which first struck England in September 1944. Concern over ballistic missiles intensified within the U.S. defense establishment when German plans to strike New York City with ICBMs were uncovered after the war. Within a year of the war's end, the Army Air Forces (soon to become the Air Force) commissioned two technical studies to examine the feasibility of an anti-missile system that could destroy incoming missiles at altitudes up to 500,000 feet and at ranges of up to 500 miles. Even before the Air Force had started its studies, the Army had initiated the Nike anti-aircraft program. In the mid-1950s, the Army began to place more emphasis on the ABM mission in response to early intelligence reports of a developing Soviet ICBM capability.

As the Army began to pay more attention to the ABM mission, the first major milestone in the U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile program was achieved. As late as the mid-1950s, a number of scientists doubted that it was possible to intercept ballistic missiles because of their extremely high velocity, which meant that intercepting a missile would be like hitting a bullet with a bullet. However, in a 1955 study sponsored by the Army and Air Force, Bell Laboratories completed 50,000 computer simulations of missile intercepts, which indicated that it was theoreti-

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Official Department of Defense photograph by R. D. Ward

On February 11, 1983, the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommended a shift to a long-term strategy based on strategic defense.

cally possible to hit a missile with another missile.

In 1958, the Army and Air Force ABM programs were merged and the Army given responsibility for ABM developments. At this time, the principal candidate for an ABM system was the Army's Nike-Zeus—a three-stage, nuclear-tipped missile. In 1962, Zeus demonstrated sufficient accuracy to destroy an ICBM reentry vehicle (RV). Nevertheless, problems with the Zeus system, among them its inability to distinguish warheads from booster debris, led to the addition of a second missile to the system. The Sprint missile was to complement Zeus by intercepting warheads at low altitudes, after atmospheric friction had stripped away booster debris. Together, these two missiles constituted a layered defense, with Zeus attacking warheads at altitudes of 70 to 100 miles and Sprint attacking at altitudes of 20 to 30 miles. Another important change was the development of phased-array radar. The new radar had a much greater capacity for handling targets because its search beam was electronically pointed and could be moved much more rapidly than the beam of a conventional radar, which aims its search beam by moving its entire antenna dish.

The Nth Country Threat

By this time, the secretary of defense was Robert McNamara, who opposed the deployment of an ABM system because he believed the Soviets could easily overcome it by adding decoys and warheads. As a result, he felt that an ABM system would not increase security, but would merely intensify the nuclear arms race. Nevertheless, he was forced to change his policy when the Soviets began deploying the Galosh system around Moscow, thereby creating political pressure for the United States to field its own ABM system. At first, McNamara hoped to head off a U.S. deployment by persuading the Soviets to abandon their Galosh system. When he and Johnson could not dissuade Kosygin at the Glassboro summit in June 1967 and the Republicans indicated they would make ABM an issue in the 1968 election, McNamara yielded to the pressure for an ABM deployment.

On September 18, 1967, at the end of a speech describing all the reasons against deploying an ABM system, McNamara announced the United States would field a thin ABM system to defend against the so-called Nth country threat, an unsophisticated ICBM attack from a country such as China, which was developing ballistic missiles at the time. McNamara hoped that the capabilities of Sentinel, as this system was to be called, would be limited enough not to trigger an expansion of Soviet offensive forces, thereby heating up the arms race.

Soon after taking office in 1969, President Richard Nixon reoriented Sentinel from population defense against the Nth country threat to defense of ICBMs. This reorientation eliminated the major political problems caused by the necessity of locating Sentinel sites with their nuclear warheads near population centers.

Also, continuing the deployment of an ABM system would give the Nixon administration a position of some strength from which to bargain with the Soviets in arms talks that would soon begin. The ABM system, now re-designated Safeguard, called for the deployment of defensive missiles at up to 12 locations with construction to begin immediately at only two sites: Malmstrom, Montana, and Grand Forks, North Dakota.

The use of Safeguard as a bargaining chip was the principal U.S. strategy in the 30 months of SALT talks that culminated in May 1972 with the signing of the ABM Treaty. The treaty allowed each side to deploy up to two ABM sites, each having 100 interceptor missiles. One site was to defend the national command authorities at each nation's capital city; the other was to defend an ICBM field. A 1974 protocol further restricted deployments to only one site.

These agreements effectively sounded the death knell of Safeguard. Under constant attack by liberal congressmen who considered the program too costly and technically flawed and saw Safeguard as a symbol for a military establishment that had gotten out of control in

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Vietnam, Safeguard limped along until 1976 when the only completed site was closed within a month of being declared operational.

Advances in Computing Power

When Congress ordered Safeguard closed, it also directed the Army to reorient its ABM efforts. Until that time, the Site Defense program, the core of America's missile defense research and development effort, had aimed to develop a successor system to Safeguard. Now the Army's ABM program was to become essentially a research-only program to keep the United States abreast of the latest developments as a hedge against a possible technological breakthrough by the Soviets. After 1976, Army research efforts focused on eliminating the technical limitations that had plagued Safeguard; and by 1983, significant advances had been made in a number of critical areas.

One especially fruitful research area was the field of computer science, where speed and computing power increased considerably. The original Safeguard computer could complete only 10 million instructions per second (MIPS). For its Site Defense program the Army had planned to use a commercial Control Data Corporation 7700 computer with an operating capability of 20 MIPS. Soon after this, parallel processing was used to increase the speed of computers to 800 MIPS. At the same time, the Army was developing small, powerful computers that could be used in the guidance systems of kinetic kill vehicles that destroy their targets by physically colliding with them. These computers were to operate at a rate of 100 MIPS, weigh about 80 pounds, be about a foot long, and have a diameter of 14 inches. The Army also made progress in the development of infrared sensors that could be used to detect and track reentry vehicles beyond the range of ground-based radar systems.

These and other advances in technology laid the groundwork for a fundamental shift in the concept for intercepting ICBMs. Prior to these advances, ABM interceptors such as Zeus were so inaccurate that they had to rely upon nuclear warheads to insure destruction of reentry vehicles. Furthermore, limitations in sensors and guidance systems dictated that these nuclear-tipped missiles be guided from the ground. The requirements for nuclear warheads and ground-based control greatly limited the Safeguard system. But small and powerful computers and improved seekers made it possible to develop a new generation of ABM interceptors that were self-contained and so accurate that they could destroy incoming RVs by actually crashing into them, as was confirmed by the fourth Homing Overlay Experiment completed on June 10, 1984.

Strategic Crisis

The SALT agreements of 1972 set the stage for a strategic crisis at the end of the decade. While the ABM Treaty led to the conversion of the U.S. ABM program into a largely research-only program, the interim accord on offensive systems produced no comparable restraints on offensive weapons and technologies. Indeed, one of the major shortcomings of SALT I from the American perspective was its failure to place adequate restrictions on the Soviet heavy-ICBM force. As a result, these missiles gave Soviet strategic forces a tremendous advantage in throw weight. Furthermore, the SALT I accord left MIRV (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle) technology unconstrained. The significance of this situation was fully recognized by Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson, Democrat of Washington, who warned during ratification procedures in the Senate that the Soviets could gain a first-strike capability within five years by MIRVing their huge SS-9 missiles.

In the second half of the 1970s, Jackson's fears began to be realized. The Soviets MIRVed their new SS-18s, which had a throw weight that was 30 percent higher than the 12,000 to 15,000 pounds of the SS-9s they replaced. By the time the SALT II agreement was ready for approval, the SS-18 had been tested with 10 warheads and had shown an accuracy of .1 nautical mile. This meant that by the early 1980s the Soviets could hold the American ICBM fleet at risk. Furthermore, the limits negotiated on Soviet offensive forces under SALT II did nothing to reduce the threat posed by the Soviet heavy ICBMs, for the Soviets refused to accept a U.S. proposal that would have reduced their SS-18 fleet by 50 percent. Each side was to be allowed 2,250 strategic launchers, 1,200 of which could be MIRVed. Thus, even if the SALT II process had not collapsed in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. ICBMs would still have been threatened by 308 Soviet SS-18s.

The failure of SALT II to restrain the heavy ICBMs of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the SALT process, and steady improvements in the Soviet ICBM force created a strategic crisis. Some answer had to be found to the vulnerability of the U.S. Minuteman force.

Ridicule for Dense Pack

Two solutions to the crisis were seriously considered in the late 1970s: 1) defending Minuteman missiles with an updated ABM system, and 2) fielding a new missile, the MX, in some form of basing mode that would make it invulnerable to a first strike. While the idea of defending ICBMs was never out of the collective consciousness of the American strategic community, the first possibility was generally ruled out because of the restrictions imposed by the ABM Treaty of 1972 and the protocol of 1974.

More attention was given to the second option. The U.S. had been trying to field a new ICBM since the late 1960s, when the so-called Strat-X study described possible basing modes for a successor to the Minuteman. By the time Reagan had become president, developments had proceeded to the point where the Carter administration had decided to field the MX in a multiple protective-shelter basing mode in the southwestern United States. Because this decision was extremely unpopular in the Southwest, Reagan cancelled it soon after he took office in 1981. Yet, two years later his administration had still not found an acceptable basing mode of it own, and its efforts now were being complicated by the nuclear freeze movement, which was reaching the peak of its popularity. This search for an appropriate basing mode reached a critical point in December 1982, when

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Reagan's dense-pack basing mode proposal met with widespread ridicule.

The rejection of dense pack meant that the American government was deadlocked in its efforts to respond to growing Soviet strategic capabilities. As 1982 was ending, Republican Senator William Cohen summarized the political and strategic situation in these words:

> ...conservative Republican presidents (moderates or liberals need not apply) may be able to open doors to China and secure support for arms control treaties yet be unable to sustain a significant or even stable growth in military spending.
>
> By contrast, liberal or moderate Democratic presidents may be able to secure support for strategic and conventional modernization (few questioned the need for the MX, Stealth aircraft, Trident submarine, or a Rapid Deployment Force under Jimmy Carter) but will be less able to obtain ratification of arms control treaties.

Yet, if the U.S. did not respond in some way to the growing threat to its ICBMs, it risked sending a signal to the Soviets that America would acquiesce to an apparent Soviet drive for strategic dominance.

A President Favorably Disposed

The president who faced this strategic crisis at the end of 1982 found the doctrine of offensive nuclear deterrence distasteful. Daniel O. Graham, a retired three-star Army general who had served as a campaign advisor to Reagan in 1976 and 1980, recalled that Reagan was already displeased with MAD during his unsuccessful run for the Republican nomination in 1976. According to Graham, Reagan had compared MAD to a situation in which two men trained loaded and cocked pistols on each other's head. If either man sneezed they would kill each other.

Reagan was concerned that despite America's mastery of high technology, the nation was unable to defend itself against Soviet nuclear weapons. This had become painfully obvious to him during a July 1979 visit to the Cheyenne Mountain underground command center in Colorado, where he witnessed a demonstration of the tracking and display capabilities of the center. Few who watch the demonstration are unmoved as the simulated tracks of reentry vehicles appear at the top of the display screen and progress rapidly toward theoretical targets in the United States. Reagan asked General James E. Hill, the NORAD commander, if there wasn't something the U.S. could do to stop the progress of these warheads. No, replied General Hill. Furthermore, the general continued, even the Cheyenne Mountain underground was not likely to survive an attack, for it had been built to withstand the effects only of 5-megaton warheads; Soviet SS-18s could deliver warheads of 25 megatons, which could "blow away" the command center. Reagan was sobered by the implications of what he saw and heard. All the way back to California on the plane that evening, he and aide Martin Anderson talked about the terrible vulnerability of the United States.

Reagan carried into the White House his discomfort with nuclear deterrence based on mutual assured destruction. After taking office, he expressed concern about the "nakedness" of deterrence without defense to presidential science advisor George Keyworth. Yet when he called upon the bureaucracy for some kind of response to his concerns, none was offered. The president's closest advisors were more responsive.

Between 1979 and early 1983, President Reagan received recommendations and information on America's strategic situation from a variety of sources. To a large measure, these men shared Reagan's dissatisfaction with MAD. Furthermore, they believed that the United States and the Soviet Union were in a head-to-head strategic competition that the U.S. was losing and would continue to lose until the ground of the competition was shifted to the high technology realm that was America's strong suit. The initiation of a strategic defense program, especially one focused on space-based defenses, would move the competition into the high technology arena. Finally, from the perspective of grand strategy, an expanded space-based defense effort made sense, because the economic exploitation of space was man's next great frontier. The thrust of this advice was that the pursuit of offensive nuclear weapons was no longer adequate to insure deterrence; it was time to launch a major new strategic defense program.

If the U.S. did not respond in some way to the growing threat to its ICBMs, it risked sending a signal to the Soviets that America would acquiesce to an apparent Soviet drive for strategic dominance.

A Wallop from Wyoming

One of the men who presented these views to the president was Malcolm Wallop. When he came from Wyoming to the Senate in 1977, Wallop was amazed to find the people charged with the defense of the nation calmly accepting America's vulnerability to a devastating nuclear attack. As a member of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, he had learned firsthand what could be done with modern optics and pointing and tracking technology. Since these technologies are important in the development of laser weapons, it is not surprising that Wallop was impressed when he learned of a proposal to defend the United States against a Soviet ICBM attack with a system of space-based, laser-armed battle stations. The author of this plan was a senior aerospace engineer named Maxwell Hunter, whose ideas had been made

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public in an October 1978 article in *Aviation Week*. Wallop met Hunter through the senator's close aide Angelo Codevilla, a strong supporter of strategic defense.

In addition to advising Wallop, Hunter set up the so-called Gang of Four briefing that described key ABM technologies and how they would fit together in a coherent ABM system. Under the sponsorship of Wallop, the "gang" gave the briefing to a number of senators in the fall of 1979. Included in this group were William Cohen (R-Maine), Jake Garn (R-Utah), Ernest Hollings (D-South Carolina), Henry Jackson (D-Washington), Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa), Daniel Moynihan (D-New York), Harrison Schmitt (R-New Mexico), John Tower (R-Texas), and John Warner (R-Virginia).

By the summer of 1979, Malcolm Wallop was confident that defensive technologies had matured to the point where an ABM system could be deployed more cheaply than could the countermeasures required to overcome it. He expressed these views in an article that appeared in the Fall 1979 edition of *Strategic Review*. Before the article was published, he sent a copy of the manuscript to Ronald Reagan, who was campaigning for the presidency. According to one of Wallop's aides, Reagan responded with supportive remarks. Shortly thereafter, in August 1979, just after Reagan had been to Cheyenne Mountain, Wallop met Reagan during a camping trip in the Sierra Madre Mountains and discussed missile defense with him.

High Frontier

Six months later, during a campaign trip in New Hampshire, Reagan received another recommendation in favor of strategic defense, this time from his campaign advisor Daniel Graham, who would later expand his ideas on space developments and strategic defense into what became known as the High Frontier concept. Graham saw space as the next economic frontier, and believed that the nation that first took advantage of the economic opportunities offered by space would become the dominant world power. In Graham's view, the Soviets understood this and were driving to achieve dominance in this sphere. Just as warships had been necessary to protect commerce on the high seas during the age of European expansion, military space systems had to be available to protect the high-value assets that would be involved in the full economic development of space. A spin-off from these space forces would be the ability to defend against ballistic missiles.

In addition to direct approaches to members of the Reagan government, Graham formed a partnership with an influential Republican supporter named Karl Bendetsen in an effort to persuade the president to make missile defense a top national priority. Bendetsen recruited a private panel to advise Graham as he and his staff developed the *High Frontier* study, which Graham later independently published under the aegis of The Heritage Foundation. To insure access to the White House, Bendetsen made sure that his panel included a number of personal friends and confidants of the president: Joseph Coors, William Wilson, Jacqueline Hume, and Edward Teller. The principal White House contact for Bendetsen and his panel was Edwin Meese, then counselor to the president. Additionally, George Keyworth, President Reagan's science advisor, served as an unofficial observer with the High Frontier panel.

After several meetings in the fall of 1981, during which panel members reviewed the strategic situation of the United States *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union and explored the technical aspects of missile defense, this group presented a briefing and a position paper to President Reagan on January 8, 1982. Following a warning of apparent Soviet efforts to achieve space dominance, the panel, speaking through Bendetsen, advised the president to select a commission of experts to identify technologies that could be used to develop strategic defenses, and then to establish an organization on the model of the Manhattan Project (which developed the atom bomb) to rush development of an effective missile defense system. In the opinion of panel members, it was especially important to establish a comparable office to keep the Washington bureaucracy from strangling the new strategic initiative in its cradle.

GAO Endorses Lasers

The High Frontier panel was not alone in finding that ABM-related technology had matured to where it was reasonable to reconsider deployment of a strategic defense system. In response to the interest of Congress, the Defense Department, and the news media in space-based lasers, the General Accounting Office completed a study on the potential of lasers in a missile defense mode. The results of this study were published on February 26, 1982. One conclusion in the study stated:

> The emergence of SBL [space-based laser] weapon technology, if successfully developed for military applications, could affect strategic policy and help bring about a long-term transition from offense-based nuclear deterrence toward defensive dominance. Over the long haul, such a transition could help increase U.S. national security greatly by providing a physical survival against nuclear threats rather than a psychological deterrence as now exists. Realistically, early generations of SBL weapons will not provide the important military capabilities needed to achieve defensive dominance, but would represent important steps toward developing such a system.

Within a year of the appearance of this GAO report, two major centers of support for a new strategic defense program developed within the administration itself. These were the National Security Council, where Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant National Security Advisor, was the principal figure, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where Admiral James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, was the central actor.

The Bishops' Checkmate

McFarlane had been Special Assistant for National Security to President Ford when the United States was planning to have the MX missile operational by 1983 as a response to the expected vulnerability of land-based ICBMs. It was now 1982, the Minuteman was becoming

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vulnerable, and still the U.S. could not make a decision on the MX basing mode. In McFarlane's words, "The United States faced a military crisis; our deterrent force was badly out of balance with the Soviet force, and we needed to compensate for that militarily." Moreover, the nuclear freeze movement seemed to be gaining momentum and the Catholic bishops were starting to work on their pastoral letter, *The Challenge of Peace.* The sentiments these developments seemed to reflect threatened to cut off the modernization of strategic forces pursued by Reagan's administration.

A shift from offense- to defense-based deterrence seemed to offer a solution to these problems. For one thing, it would give the Reagan administration the moral high ground and thus undercut the freeze movement. Moreover, McFarlane believed, a new ABM program would give America an edge by moving the strategic competition into the realm of high technology.

For these reasons, McFarlane advised the president in the fall of 1982 that he was working on a concept that might solve the administration's strategic problems. McFarlane worked closely with a small group within the NSC staff, including Admiral John Poindexter.

Watkins' "Valley of Death"

While McFarlane and the NSC staff were developing a concept for strategic defense, Admiral Watkins was heavily involved in the JCS search for an appropriate recommendation on the MX basing mode. In the six-month period between the summer of 1982 and early 1983, the chiefs met over 40 times to consider the issues raised by the MX basing problem. As a result of his participation in these activities, Watkins concluded that the search for an invulnerable ICBM basing mode was taking the United States into what he called a "strategic valley of death," because he believed the U.S. could not match the Soviet Union in the development of ICBMs. Any attempt to solve the crisis of ICBM vulnerability by deploying the MX missile was tantamount to competing with the Soviets where they were strongest. Like McFarlane, Watkins believed America should look for answers to this vulnerability crisis in her technical superiority.

The difficulty the United States was having in finding a solution to the vulnerability of its ICBMs was complicated in some quarters by the moral implications of deterrence based on nuclear retaliation. Although Watkins had no personal qualms about the morality of nuclear deterrence, as a devout Catholic he was concerned about the effects on naval personnel of the pastoral letter on nuclear deterrence the American bishops were then preparing. Indeed, in the late summer of 1982, Watkins was disturbed to learn from the chief of Navy chaplains that Catholic officers and enlisted men were beginning to leave the Navy in response to the work of the bishops. Not only did Watkins speak out in support of the morality of nuclear deterrence, but he also began to think that it would be wise for the nation to seek a defensive alternative to MAD.

On January 10, 1983, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were advised by William Clark, Reagan's national security advisor, that their next meeting with the president would take place on February 11. At that time, each chief would be expected to present his position on the MX and its associated basing modes.

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A shift from offense- to defense-based deterrence undercut the freeze movement, and thus had political as well as strategic implications.

Teller "Pops-up"

The chiefs were now under pressure to draw some conclusions from their six-month-long review of strategic issues. This set the stage in Watkins' mind for some revolutionary thinking. In a few weeks he would have to present his recommendations on the U.S. strategic force structure to the president. His participation in the JCS review of strategic issues had convinced him that the search for a secure basing mode for the MX was bankrupt and at the same time had exposed him to information on the Defense Department's anti-ballistic missile and anti-satellite programs. Furthermore, he suspected that the American commitment to offensive nuclear deterrence was on the wane. Yet he had no concrete suggestions for revising the force structure, nor could he suggest a replacement for the prevailing concept of nuclear deterrence. Then, on January 20, Watkins had lunch with a group of high-level advisors that included Edward Teller. During the luncheon, Teller talked about the possibilities for missile defense that were offered by new technical developments. Specifically, he discussed using the Excalibur X-ray laser in a "pop-up" mode, in which it would be launched into space from a submarine to defend against a Soviet ICBM attack.

Teller's remarks made a deep impression on the admiral because of his reputation and because of Watkins' faith in American technology. Moreover, what Teller said more or less confirmed what Watkins had been hearing in JCS briefings on strategic technologies and in discussions with his own R&D advisors.

Watkins pressed Teller for more information on ABM technology. Could a power source for a terrestrial laser be made small enough to fit in this room? Yes, responded Teller, although it would perhaps be a bit longer. Then lasers could be installed aboard ballistic missile submarines, Watkins realized, and stationed under the Arctic ice off the coast of the Eurasian landmass. In case

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The National Security Council was an important center of support for strategic defense, with Robert C. McFarlane, then Assistant National Security Advisor, its principal proponent.

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of an attack, the submarines could "pop-up" and attack Soviet ICBMs, using space-based mirrors to direct the laser beams onto the missiles. Watkins then asked if the national laboratories could produce the technologies that would make ballistic missile defense feasible within 20 years. Unquestionably, responded Teller. Watkins then asked specifically if the U.S. could accomplish detection, boost-phase intercept, and battle management capabilities within that 20-year period. The answer was yes.

Weinberger's Opposition

Now Watkins knew what he would recommend to the president in February. He directed his staff "to develop, on a 'close-hold' basis, a very brief presentation that would offer a vision of strategic defense as a way out of the MX debate." There followed a series of meetings in the "sea cabin" (the Pentagon office of the Chief of Naval Operations) in which Captain Linton Brooks and Admiral W. J. Holland (head of OP-65, the Navy staff's Theater and Strategic Nuclear Warfare Division) presented various "drafts" of the five-minute briefing for Watkins' approval. During the week of January 24, after many rewrites, Brooks and Holland finally found the proper balance and wording. The briefing's main points were that the United States should quit looking for a complex basing mode for the MX missile, deploy a small number of MXs in Minuteman silos, and start developing a strategic defense that would provide the basis for a shift "to a long-term strategy based on strategic defense." Such a change in strategy "is both militarily and morally sound."

With a week now remaining before the chiefs were scheduled to meet with the president, Watkins advised General John Vessey, chairman of the JCS, that he had a position paper he thought should be presented to the president. Vessey arranged for a February 5 meeting of the chiefs at which Watkins presented his views. After hearing Watkins' briefing, the chiefs agreed that this should be the position the JCS presented to the president and that General Vessey would present the briefing.

When the chiefs approached Secretary Caspar Weinberger with their position, they found that he was opposed to the idea of strategic defense. However, as was his practice in matters such as this, he believed that the president should hear the views of the chiefs, and he agreed that General Vessey would present the JCS position to the president on February 11.

While these events were occurring, Watkins informally apprised McFarlane and Poindexter of his actions, advising McFarlane that he favored some role for missile defense in America's strategic policies. McFarlane encouraged Watkins to develop a consensus among the chiefs on this issue, for he believed a unanimous recommendation from the chiefs would be required if the president were to make the desired decision.

"Don't Lose Those Words"

On February 11, 1983, Washington was in the grips of one of its worst snow storms. Road conditions were so bad that the chiefs had to use four-wheel-drive vehicles to make it to the White House for their meeting with the president. The hour-and-a-half meeting started with Secretary Weinberger presenting his recommendations on the MX basing mode. He then advised the president that the chiefs had a different view, which he believed the president should hear.

General Vessey then delivered a broad 30-minute briefing that was based on the views presented by Admiral Watkins and included some of the phrases Watkins had used in briefing the Joint Chiefs. After this, each chief was given an opportunity to speak, and Watkins strongly supported the position Vessey had presented. Because McFarlane had a good idea what the chiefs would recommend, he was prepared to exploit this opportunity to push the president toward a decision to develop a ballistic missile defense capability. When Watkins finished, McFarlane interjected:

> Mr. President, this is very, very important. For 37 years we have relied on offensive deterrence based on the threat of nuclear counterattack with surviving forces because there has been no alternative. But now for the first time in history what we are hearing here is that there might be another way which would enable you to defeat an attack by defending against it and over time relying less on nuclear weapons.

The president indicated that he understood the significance of the JCS position. To be sure that the position was unanimous, he asked each chief in turn if he agreed. Each confirmed that he believed it was time to explore the possibilities offered by ballistic missile defense (BMD). The president then informed the chiefs that he was very interested in what they had recommended and asked them to work diligently to develop a missile defense proposal and report the results of their work as soon as possible. Moreover, with his sensitivity to politically effective rhetoric, he took special note of one particular expression used by General Vessey, an expression Vessey himself had picked up from the briefing Watkins had presented earlier to the chiefs: "Wouldn't it be better to protect the American people rather than avenge them?" Reagan liked this phrase very much and remarked: "Don't lose those words."

As the meeting was breaking up at about 1:30 P.M., McFarlane sought to insure that the chiefs understood that they had "really struck a responsive chord" with the president. He told each of them that he expected them

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to develop a thorough report advising the president of an appropriate approach to take in developing a missile defense capability.

The chiefs and McFarlane thought they would have about six months to refine their thinking on the matter of strategic defense. Specifically, at the earliest, McFarlane believed the president would not expect a report until sometime in April, after the Scowcroft commission completed its review of the strategic issues surrounding the U.S. search for a solution to the vulnerability of its Minuteman missiles. However, a month after his meeting with the chiefs, Reagan began to prod McFarlane and National Security Advisor William Clark to speed up their work.

In the middle of March, the president again indicated his desire to have the strategic defense proposal completed quickly. Congress was about to begin its work on authorizations for the Defense Department, and Reagan was worried about the state of his defense program. He wanted to give a major speech on defense issues in which he could "break something new." Specifically, he wanted to provide the nation with something reassuring that might stem the progress of the freeze movement. McFarlane passed this message to the chiefs and at the same time put speech writers to work on the main body of a speech dealing with general defense matters. The writers were instructed to leave space in the speech for a five-minute insert on the president's strategic defense program that McFarlane would personally write and coordinate with top administration officials such as Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.

"Impotent and Obsolete"

On the evening of March 23, 1983, President Reagan gave his nationally televised defense speech in which he announced the beginning of a major research and development program to see if a missile defense could be deployed at some time in the future. The president couched his speech in the most general terms, avoiding any specific references to such things as protecting populations and defending missile silos. Reagan believed that defensive technologies had advanced to where the U.S. could hope to prevent nuclear aggression by developing a defensive system that would "save lives" rather than "avenge them." He realized that this would be a "formidable technical task"; it could "take years, even decades, of effort on many fronts" to produce a new ABM system. Nevertheless, it was clearly time to begin the effort, so the president called upon the American "scientific community who gave us nuclear weapons to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace; to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." The effort Reagan envisioned was to be consistent with U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty and would involve close consultation with American allies. It was to begin immediately with the establishment of "a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program" in support of the "ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles."

Seen against its background of a strategic crisis and almost 40 years of developments in ABM technology, Reagan's 1983 decision to expand and intensify the U.S. anti-ballistic missile program seems prudent. Moreover, technical progress has continued apace since 1983, so that today the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) is a mature research and development program in which the key issues no longer concern the basic technical feasibility of ballistic missile defenses.

As currently envisioned, the central subsystem of the first strategic defense system the U.S. might deploy in the future would be Brilliant Pebbles, a constellation of small homing rockets, each having the capability to find and attack its own target. The lineage of Brilliant Pebbles can be traced back through a decade and a half of missile defense work completed by the Army. Furthermore, the future continues to be bright for the directed-energy technology that did so much to excite renewed interest in missile defenses as the '70s ended. While this technology has not matured as rapidly as kinetic-energy kill systems, important roles are still envisioned for directed-energy weapons in later phases of any strategic defense system the United States might field.

Today, in spite of budget limitations, the SDI program remains on schedule in pursuit of its principal goal: within the next three years to provide the information the president needs to make an informed decision about the deployment of a missile defense system. Current evidence indicates that if the nation so chooses, before the century is out, the United States can begin to field an effective missile defense system built around Brilliant Pebbles for about $55 billion.

Such a system would have the capability to blunt any major nuclear attack against the United States and would therefore deprive hostile planners of any hope of bringing off an effective first strike against U.S. ICBMs. Furthermore, the capabilities of this first system would be enhanced by the addition of new defensive systems developed through SDIO's advanced technologies program. Such an enhanced defensive system, in conjunction with arms control agreements, could move the world substantially closer to the situation envisioned by President Reagan in which nuclear weapons are "impotent and obsolete."

President Reagan took special note of an expression heard in his meeting with the Chiefs: "Wouldn't it be better to protect the American people rather than avenge them?"

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Castro's Last Stand

Can Cuba Be Freed Without a Bloodbath?

Luis E. Aguilar

Time is working against Fidel Castro. His 31-year dictatorship is besieged by mounting external and internal problems. The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, the ailing Soviet regime, and the democratization of Latin America have left the dictator politically and ideologically isolated, with dwindling economic resources.

A new generation of Cubans, indifferent to the myths of Che Guevara and Castro, is demanding its place in the sun. Housing, clothing, and food are becoming scarce. A bloated army has nowhere to march. And the aging "Maximo Líder" promises only more sacrifices and an isolationist stand against the whole world.

Signs of weakness are omnipresent: the militarization of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Stalinist-inspired neighborhood watch groups), the arrest of all dissenters, and recent friction with the Catholic Church.

The last schism is significant. The church, never strong in Cuba, has been unable to overcome the revolution's Communist restrictions on worship. In spite of that apparent weakness, Castro is beginning to see the church as a threat to his regime. In April 1990, he suddenly abandoned plans for rapprochement with the church, branding it as imperialist and an "enemy of the revolution." Permission for a papal visit this Christmas became mired in "confusion," forcing the Pope to postpone his trip indefinitely.

Castro's criticism and the diplomatic reversal were prompted by an unexpected demonstration of mass devotion for the Virgin of the Caridad del Cobre, patroness of Cuba, that swelled a procession from her Santiago shrine to Havana. The vast hymn-singing crowds shocked Castro and blew the lid off 30 years of strictly supervised socialist education. Castro considered intolerable a papal visit that could attract even larger crowds, and he appears increasingly afraid of popular manifestations—any gathering not organized by the government—whether they be religious or political in nature.

Euphoria over Castro's woes is spreading among Cuban exiles, spurred by widespread international media predictions of the dictator's coming fall. In Miami, Castro's perceived lease on power has been reduced to months, as hopes rapidly mount that Cuba will soon go the way of Eastern Europe. However, the exile community may need to become reacquainted with the realities of Castro's hold over modern-day Cuba.

The People's Hitler

No European Communist leader—no reigning leader in the world in fact—has Castro's record and characteristics. He reached power with heroic status and without foreign help, and gained enormous worldwide influence with his revolutionary fervor and declarations of autonomy. At the height of his prestige he had troops in Angola, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Vietnam. The Soviet Union and the United States treated him as a power to be reckoned with.

These historic achievements dazzled the Cuban people from the start and must still be taken into account. Castro is old and gray, his victories faded memories, his failures all too visible—yet his regard by the Cuban people is difficult to assess. No one claims he is hated by the majority. Some make fun of him; the young consider him a crazy old man. Collective despair is growing, but there lingers awe at what Castro was able to achieve and a vague Hitlerian faith that he can overcome any crisis.

The Hitler comparison is not farfetched. Castro also rose to power after a failed military coup, then claimed, like Hitler, that "history will absolve me." He practices the same repetitive oratory to mesmerize the masses, keeps a similarly disorganized work schedule, and demands unconditional loyalty on the premise that he represents the destiny of his people. Like Hitler, Castro has a streak of nihilism. It first surfaced during the missile crisis and has become a leitmotif in his recent speeches, wherein he repeatedly asserts that "the island will sink into the ocean," or become "ashes and stones" if the enemy tries to conquer it; and that "all Cubans, old and

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

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Castro (right) is no Ortega. He will not relinquish power without a Cuban *Götterdämmerung*.

young, will die" before surrendering. He changed the old war cry of the Cubans who fought for independence, "*Patria y Libertad*" ("Fatherland and Liberty"), to "*Patria o Muerte*" ("Fatherland or Death"), and, more lately, to "Socialism or Death."

The implications of Castro's behavior for the United States are unsettling. Castro is no Noriega or Ortega. He will not relinquish power without a bloodbath, and he may be prepared to provoke a Cuban *Götterdämmerung* by attacking the United States if he feels cornered.

Fear of Anarchy

Beyond the mystique of Castro as hero, two social fears sustain his power: fear of repression and fear of change. All Cubans know the terrible price of dissension. Extensive documentation of Cuba's continuous violations of human rights has been compiled by Americas Watch, Amnesty International, and the United Nations Human Rights Commission. The secretary general of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, is preparing a report on Cuba to be published this October.

After three decades of a totalitarian regime that forces every citizen to participate in state policies and provides a certain job security, most Cubans (like Spaniards in the 1970s under Franco) want change but fear it would plunge Cuba into anarchy. Unlike Franco, Castro has allowed no alternatives to his dictatorship, nor has he proclaimed a successor. Brother Raúl is only a cheap copy of Castro, with all of the defects and none of the charisma.

Today, Castro is more entrenched and isolated than at the start of his rule, when Camilo Cienfuegos, Che Guevara, and other revolutionaries shared popular appeal. Last year's execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa, "hero of the revolution" and decorated veteran of Angola, eliminated a potential rival. In Cuba there can be no hero besides Castro.

If Castro hasn't changed much in three decades, Cuba's racial balance has. When Castro took power in 1959 Cuba's black population stood at 30 percent. Blacks suffered no overt racial discrimination but enjoyed no real social equality. Between '59 and '62 one million Cubans, mostly whites, left the island. The blacks who stayed have had a higher birth rate than have the whites, and today blacks make up about 50 percent of the population.

The significance of this change goes beyond numbers. Castro's African military campaigns, his invitation to thousands of African students, and welcome to African ambassadors have given black Cubans a new sense of dignity, even though blacks are still denied positions of power. This population presents a challenge to a democratic Cuba, and particularly to the exile community, with which it has only loose ties. Unless there is clear indication that Castro's downfall would bring about racial equality, black Cubans will not likely oppose his regime.

Coming Economic Crisis

Cuba's economic situation is bad and getting worse. The system's basic inefficiency has been further hampered by Castro's erratic policies, the continuous decline of trade with Eastern Europe, and intra-Soviet strife. These have combined to create an atmosphere of doom. Despite a jump in the price of sugar (from 7 cents a pound in 1987 to 15 cents in 1989), shortages of raw materials and spare parts have forced the government

As in the case of Nicaragua, simultaneous pressure by Washington and Moscow ought to bring changes in Cuba.

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to reduce national production and to announce drastic cuts in its programs.

Cuba's debt to western nations has doubled since '84, and most are reluctant to give further credit to Castro's regime. Havana's attempt to expand commercial treaties with other Latin American states has been hindered both by Cuba's lack of hard currency and their own economic problems. Castro will not get relief in this area.

The key to Cuba's economic survival is Moscow. Gorbachev has announced his intention of continuing aid to Cuba, and the recently signed protocol between Moscow and Havana maintains the present level of trade for the next two years. But sustaining the same level of economic assistance to a growing population means a *de facto* reduction in aid. Cuba tried hard to get a five-year commitment, but Moscow conceded only two. Moreover, the Soviet Union's internal problems make even these terms uncertain.

Unless there is clear indication that Castro's downfall would bring about racial equality, black Cubans—now about 50 percent of the population—will not likely oppose his regime.

What will happen if the Soviet Union is forced to further reduce economic aid? How far will the people follow Castro? How passively will the armed forces accept a situation with no hope of improvement?

The possibility of worse times to come explains Castro's latest "wartime" speeches exhorting his people to be ready to follow the Cambodian example and "abandon the cities" in order to save the revolution: "We are alone, we'll fight alone, and if necessary, we will die alone."

For now, the situation in Cuba is less critical than it was, say, in Poland or Romania. Unlike their European comrades, Cuban workers do not face the hardship of snow and winter, and the black market has so far provided an escape from hunger. The time of truth will be 1991. That year, most of the 40,000 troops will have returned from Angola. Also, the impact of Soviet efforts to join international markets, demanding efficiency and hard currency (both scarce in Cuba) from its trade partners, will impose a new burden on the Castro regime. If there is no economic turnaround by then, the belt will get tighter and tighter. Then the armed forces will be forced to act, one way or another.

The Military, Only Source of Change

Pampered and privileged, 100,000 strong, and proud of their apolitical professionalism (now vanishing), the military is the only possible source of change inside Cuba. The international battlefields—Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua—that bestowed glory and promotion have dwindled, and despite increasing budget cuts, Castro is involving the military in one internal matter after another: the execution of General Ochoa and company, thinly veiled as punishment for drug dealing, the arrest of hundreds of officers of the Ministry of Interior, and the militarization of the neighborhood-watch Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. In April 1990, the armed forces were once more placed on alert to ward off an "imminent imperialist attack." When the U.S. Marines failed to show, soldiers had to return to their stark daily routine, which may now, after the militarization of all security forces, include repressive actions against the people.

Many experts think that these incidents have spawned division in the ranks and mistrust of the "politicians." But the armed forces still appears disciplined. As do Cuba's civilians, the officers see no alternative to Castro.

A military move against Castro could only occur after a combination of three circumstances: the economic situation leads to unrest and popular protest, the armed forces refuse to increase mass repression, and they feel reasonably secure that Castro's removal will not mean their own.

Even then, the possibilities of a Romania-style bloodbath remain high. With Castro gone, the scramble among factions for power or safety could lead to violent confrontation between elements of the military and the Communist Party. One of the top priorities of U.S. intelligence should be to learn about internal tensions and potential leaders within the Cuban military. In the event of an uprising, the U.S. should try to head off the military involvement of independent fringe groups within the large, powerful Cuban refugee community in the United States, which could add dangerous complications to a revolution.

The Role of Exiles

More than any other group of exiles, Miami's Cuban community has duplicated the society it left behind. Industrious and successful, Cuban exiles read Spanish-language newspapers, listen to Cuban radio, eat Cuban food, and play in Cuban clubs. They have organized "municipal councils" according to regions of origin and are staunch anti-Communists. It has been said that Miami is the only U.S. city where the mayor must have a clearly stated foreign policy.

The energetic efforts of Cuban exiles around the world have foiled Castro's every attempt to improve his image and position. When he tried to cajole them by allowing some to visit Cuba, his plan backfired. The sight of well-dressed exiles bringing presents and "luxuries" to the island disproved years of government propaganda, prompting another mass exodus through the Cuban port city of Mariel in 1980. This northbound wave by the "children of the revolution" (the average age of the *Marielitos* was 25) prompted an angry Castro to sever

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contacts with the Cuban community in Miami.

Despite their Castro-bashing success, most of the exiles remain narrowly focused on a Cuba of the past. Castro's situation has increased anticipation of their "impending return," and discussions about possible forms of government and how best to retrieve their lost properties can be overheard everywhere. Some of this talk has created divisions among the exiles and undermines the best course of action for them and Washington: to calm the fear of change in Cuba and reassure those who can bring it about. For example, the United States should assure the Cuban people that it has no intention of using military or any other force against Castro; but that should he fall, it is prepared to provide credit and assistance to a new Cuban government moving toward a democratic regime.

It may also be time to consider whether the embargo on Cuba could be lifted without helping Castro preserve his rule. The embargo has until now served a useful purpose in raising the cost to Castro of international adventurism. And it could continue to be used as leverage to press for democratic reforms. On the other hand, the Cuban economy is now so devastated by three decades of mismanagement that Castro has no hard currency to buy anything in the American market. Lifting the embargo could deal a severe psychological blow to Castro, indicating to Cuba that the U.S. no longer regards him as a power to be reckoned with. It will also deprive him of his last excuse to explain Cuba's dire economic situation.

Washington should create an office to serve as a permanent liaison with the Cuban exile community to explain U.S. policy, discuss plans of mutual interest, and

Lifting the embargo could deal a devastating blow to Castro, indicating to Cuba that the U.S. no longer regards him as a power to be reckoned with.

encourage studies on how refugees can assist the future reconstruction of Cuba. The office should also make clear why, in the event of violence in Cuba, the United States cannot allow armed exiles to go there.

Foreign Pressure

The key to the immediate future is Moscow. President Bush must convince Gorbachev, whose *perestroika* has

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The U.S. should try to head off the military involvement of independent groups of Cuban refugees.

been banned from news coverage in Cuba, that it is in neither the American nor the Soviet interest to provide weapons to an old, outmoded dictator ready to plunge Cuba into bloody chaos. The presence of Soviet troops on the island does nothing but add fuel to an explosive situation. Soviet aid should be conditioned on democratic reforms in Cuba, and all possible encouragement should be given to those struggling in Cuba for an opening in the rigid Cuban system. As in the case of Nicaragua, simultaneous pressure by Washington and Moscow ought to bring changes in Cuba.

International pressure is important, especially from other Latin American countries. Castro is the longest-surviving dictator in the Western Hemisphere. Pinochet, Stroessner, and the Sandinistas are gone. He has few friends left on the continent. In May, during the last meeting of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean, the United States proposed the inclusion of Puerto Rico in ECLAC. The Cuban delegation objected, but found no supporters in any Latin American delegation and had to accept a compromise.

Even Mexico's leading actors and film directors joined an international list of artists such as Federico Fellini, Paloma Picasso, and Jack Nicholson in calling for Castro to hold a Pinochet-style plebiscite. Reportedly, statesmen such as Felipe González of Spain, Carlos Andrés Perez of Venezuela, and Oscar Arias of Costa Rica have made similar suggestions.

Castro keeps reiterating that there is no alternative to himself besides catastrophe. But most Cubans and Latin Americans know that Castro himself is the catastrophe and that his exit can only bring a better future.

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High Noon in Alexandria

How We Ran the Crack Dealers out of Public Housing

James P. Moran Jr.

My motivation for entering politics 10 years ago had much to do with my commitment to civil liberties and government programs designed to help the less fortunate. Today, as mayor of Alexandria, Virginia, I still carry that commitment. But on March 22, 1989, something happened that profoundly changed my traditional liberal approach to crime and public policy.

March 22, 1989, was the day Corporal Charles Hill was killed in a public housing project known as "The Berg" at 316 Hopkins Court in Alexandria. I happened to know Charlie Hill. He was an outstanding police officer who was very much involved in making his racially and economically integrated community a better place to live for everyone. The best marksman on the force, he had just passed his sergeant's exam and had received his 23rd letter of commendation. But it was clear to those who knew him that it was his wife and kids who made this man so proud and disciplined. On the day of the shooting he had come home early to play ball with his sons Charlie, age seven, and Robbie, age three.

The experience of seeing his wife look up from her grief in the hospital that night and ask me "How do I tell Robbie and Charlie that their father will never come home again?" is one I will never come to grips with. It was the kind of experience that burns in your soul a resolve that it never be repeated.

Down the Drain

The story of Charlie Hill's death begins in a crack house that the housing authority was powerless to shut down. A young man in the housing project at 316 Hopkins Court, 16-year-old Eddie Jackson, was the principal crack supplier to the local junior high. Over half a million dosage units had been distributed from his residence in the previous year. On March 16, while the police were trying to make a bust, Eddie flushed down the toilet $1,100 worth of cocaine that he was supposed to distribute. He wasn't arrested, because police have to knock on the door and announce who they are before executing their search warrant. Often, this delay provides enough time for the dealer to flush drugs down the toilet or wash them down the sink. You can't get a conviction on the basis of drugs being found around the rim of the toilet bowl or the sink drain unless someone admits to owning them.

Although Eddie wasn't taken into custody, he now couldn't get the money to pay his suppliers. At 3 P.M. on March 22, Eddie's two New York suppliers walked into his housing project and demanded payment for the crack that Jackson had been given. When he didn't have the cash, they left to pick up their enforcer. Within half an hour, a newly released felon from the District of Columbia, Jamie Wise, showed up with a sawed-off shotgun.

A Dangerous Felon Goes Free

Before I go further about what happened on that day in March, let me tell you a little bit about Jamie Wise. District of Columbia corrections officials actually had him listed as Jamie Black for the 20 years during which he had spent most of his time in their custody. He gave the name Black when he was first arrested as a juvenile. It was only after his death that his real name was discovered.

As an adolescent, Wise was committed to Cedar Knoll juvenile facility, which allows frequent home visitations. He committed increasingly serious robberies and burglaries during these "visitations." His punishment for these crimes was more time at Cedar Knoll.

He also developed an addiction to heroin by the age of 14, which evolved into cocaine addiction. After spending most of his adolescence in reform school, he emerged as a hard-core adult criminal who, when he wasn't incarcerated, was constantly involved in violent, drug-related rape, armed robbery, and assault.

In 1980, while on parole, Wise broke into a home, robbing and terrorizing the family. He was again paroled for four years to a halfway house in the District, from which he promptly escaped. His last sentence by a District of Columbia judge, for possession of drugs and weapons, was for one year, of which 90 days were to be spent in a halfway house.

So Wise, then 34, with over 30 felony convictions on his record, was released on February 16, 1989, to a

James P. Moran Jr., *a Democrat, is the mayor of Alexandria, Virginia.*

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halfway house in the District. Officials there say they were never informed of his previous escapes and parole violations; the judge in Wise's case refuses any comment. Upon his arrival, Wise took advantage of the fact that the residents were free to come and go—and went.

He went directly to the apartment of Darlene Williams, his common-law wife and mother of three of his six children, in the 800 block of Chesapeake Street, S.E. The first thing Wise did was to acquire a shotgun. He used the shotgun to commit two armed robberies, which in turn fed his cocaine habit.

The halfway house officials waited three weeks to notify the police of Wise's escape, even though Wise's address was well known to authorities. D.C. Councilman H. R. Crawford, who owned the apartment building on Chesapeake Street, told me that he had tried at least twice to get the police to arrest Wise for threatening residents with his shotgun while demanding crack cocaine. Attempting to apprehend Wise, the D.C. police knocked on his girlfriend's door; when nobody answered, they left.

At 10 A.M. on Saturday, March 18, the police were given a description over the phone of a shotgun-toting, halfway-house escapee known as Jamie living on Chesapeake Street. The woman on the phone said she would wait for the police to arrive and then point him out. The police never responded. At 3 P.M. on March 21, the same woman called again to request police assistance because "Jamie" was threatening people with his shotgun. The D.C. police never arrived.

A Hail of Bullets

The next day, March 22, Wise arrived at 316 Hopkins Court. The two suppliers had paid him $200 to make a hit on Eddie Jackson. Jackson's mother, her younger son, and two other street dealers were at home. Jackson's mother, Charlotte Durham, had been a public housing tenant all her life, paying $99 a month for her three-bedroom unit. She also had a $70-a-day cocaine habit, which she was feeding with her son's drug sales. Her other son, 13-year-old James, was a spotter and drug runner for his brother.

Instead of making a hit on the young dealer, Wise became distracted by his search for cocaine. He became so desperate for crack that he started eating paint chips off the floor. He sent the 13-year-old into the neighborhood to find some cocaine. The kid told an adult, who called the police at 4:04 P.M. "There's a man with a shotgun that busted into 316 Hopkins Court. He's demanding drugs or he's going to kill them," said the caller.

Charlie Hill's SWAT team beeper sounded as he was playing ball with his sons. He rushed to the phone and heard the same message.

At 4:11 P.M. the Alexandria police arrived and confirmed that it was a hostage situation. They surrounded the public housing unit. Eventually the police got everybody out but the 16-year-old and Jamie Wise. Wise came out with a gun to Jackson's head.

Charlie Hill and his fellow officer Andy Chelchowski were stationed on both sides of the door. They put down their guns, asking Wise to put his gun down and let the hostage go. When Wise didn't drop his gun, it was radioed back to the control point that the two officers were now also hostages. The commanding officer gave the green light to a police sniper who had Wise in range.

The police sharpshooter shot Wise in the spine. He had so much cocaine in his system, however, that he was able to discharge his gun, shooting Chelchowski in the legs and Charlie Hill fatally in the face. Then Wise went down in a hail of bullets.

Two Years to Evict

I asked the housing authority how we could possibly have maintained a known crack house in our city's public housing. The answer I got was that you could not evict anyone from public housing unless she didn't pay her rent, committed fraud on her application, or admitted her income was above the eligibility level. (Not many tenants were going to admit the latter if their major source of income was drug dealing.) It *was* possible to evict someone after she had been convicted of a felony. But the courts have made it very difficult to secure sufficient proof to get a conviction for possession or distribution of drugs from a crack house. It's necessary to go in and find fingerprints in the cocaine, find it on the dealer's person, or get him to admit that the cocaine or other hard drugs is his. That seldom happens. The police told me that they have often found cocaine still around the edge of the drain in the kitchen sink, around the edge of the toilet, or in bureau drawers. But that is not enough evidence to get a conviction.

Even if a conviction were obtained, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) required you to go through an administrative grievance procedure that was costly, frustrating, and seemingly interminable. First, the housing authority had to put together a panel of three people to review the case. One person was appointed by the housing authority, and presumably would take a prosecutorial attitude. Another person was appointed by the tenant. The third person had to be acceptable to both groups. If the tenant didn't accept the third party, then you continued to negotiate until a third person who was acceptable was found. Our housing authority manager told me that this process generally took three to six months. Often it was used as a delay tactic by the tenant.

HUD gave us the first waiver in the country to evict drug dealers without going through the administrative grievance procedure.

Once the panel was assembled, you went through a grievance procedure that was time-consuming and

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tedious. The housing authority had to present its evidence. The tenant had to see the evidence and have legal representation. The legal costs alone almost made it a prohibitively expensive process. According to HUD, throughout the country this grievance procedure took about nine months to a year. That was about what it took in Alexandria.

If you managed to prevail in the administrative grievance procedure, you went into the court system. And the normal court procedure could be appealed. Overall, it could take one to two years to get somebody evicted from public housing, even when she was openly running her unit as a crack house.

Essentially, our housing authority had given up. It just wasn't worth the effort. Better to wait and hope that the drug dealers missed their rent payments, because at least they could be evicted immediately for that.

Kemp's Fast Response

I wanted to make sure that our housing authority didn't give up, that it would be worth its effort to try to get known drug dealers thrown out of our projects.

I asked for a meeting right away with HUD Secretary Jack Kemp. I got that meeting the following Monday. At HUD we presented as strong a case as we could that the Virginia constitution guaranteed due process through its judicial system. If HUD would allow us to bypass the administrative grievance procedure, we would pay for the evicted tenant's attorney and any appellate costs, and we would provide an adequate evidentiary proceeding.

I have spent six years in the federal government, and then several years on the staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and I have never seen quicker action than we got from Secretary Kemp and Frank Keating, the general counsel for HUD. Frank Keating had been a prosecutor in Oklahoma and he really understood the problem. HUD had tried to get regulations changed the previous year, before Kemp's tenure, to enable them to evict drug dealers, but tenants' rights organizations had defeated them.

HUD gave us the first waiver in the country to evict drug dealers without going through the administrative grievance procedure. As of April 1, 1989, we were allowed to evict public housing tenants if there was a "preponderance of evidence of criminal activity." HUD has since waived the eviction grievance procedure in 39 states and the District of Columbia (although few areas are actually taking advantage of the waiver). At my request, the Alexandria housing authority also withdrew its requirement that we get a felony conviction before evicting anyone.

100 Households Evicted

Let me explain how we determine the existence of a crack house, so that you understand how careful we are to protect the innocent. First, we make a controlled drug buy. Often we send in someone who has been involved in the drug trade in the neighborhood, and who wants to get off light, or for one reason or another is cooperating with us. He goes into the house with marked money and nothing else. He comes out with drugs and no money. To make sure that this is not a one-time thing—that you can regularly buy drugs in that housing unit—we make such buys on more than one occasion, usually separated by two or three weeks.

After we have made more than one successful controlled drug buy, we go to the magistrate to get a search warrant. Only if we find drugs and drug paraphernalia in the possession of the tenant, or have reason to believe that the tenant is aware of the drugs found in her home, do we go through the eviction procedure.

Using this procedure, over 100 families involved in the drug trade have been evicted from public and private housing in the city. We have been legally challenged three times. The eviction has been upheld each time.

We have applied the same aggressive attitude toward private housing that we have toward public housing. With the help of the apartment owners' association, we have put clear, specific language in every lease making the tenant subject to immediate eviction if "a preponderance of evidence of criminal activity" is presented by the police to our prosecutor, who then notifies the landlord. We then put an asterisk next to the evicted tenant's name in a computer base maintained by the landlords' association so as to deny them housing elsewhere in the city.

Holding the Family Accountable

Once we have enough evidence for an eviction, our policy is that the whole family goes. That's another controversial issue that has had a lot of political ramifications. ACLU lawyers, Legal Aid, and Congress feel strongly that the whole family should not be evicted, and have even brought suits or passed legislation that would prevent family evictions. They're wrong for several reasons.

If a house is being used as a distribution center, the whole family is nearly always aware of it and therefore is complicit in, if not supportive of, the crime. One of the most effective deterrents to criminal activity is family control—even if it is coerced. If you threaten to evict only a son or a daughter who is dealing drugs, the parent has limited incentive to stop her child's drug dealing, especially since she generally shares in the profits.

In many cases the parent is the offender. But cities are not going to evict the parent and leave the kids in the housing unit alone. If the parent is incarcerated or is so addicted that she can't be a responsible parent, we take the children and put them in foster care. If the parent subsequently proves to the family court and the social worker that she is neither addicted to nor selling drugs, the children are returned.

Many of the evictions have been caused by the drug activities of male visitors who supply the tenant's family with drugs and money in return for the use of the apartment. Without the threat of eviction, there is little incentive for the female head of household to keep these dealers out.

Our ultimate purpose is not to convict or even to evict drug dealers. It is to deter the devastation that open drug-trafficking wreaks on a neighborhood, by letting everyone know that there is a very real punishment associated with drug dealing in Alexandria—a punishment far more severe than the few months generally served by multiple-offense drug dealers. We have found

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that evicting an entire family with a "preponderance of evidence of criminal activity" is the most extreme penalty we can assess.

Eddie Jackson, the young dealer involved in the murder of Charlie Hill, has been sentenced for distribution. His mother, Charlotte Durham, has been prohibited from setting foot on public housing property, and her children have been placed with her mother, who lives next door. Mrs. Durham, who is still addicted to crack, is again pregnant and has appealed to the city's Human Rights Commission to negate her separation from her children. The city of Alexandria has refused to rescind the separation order. We are considering charging her for the child abuse of her fetus.

After we had started our evictions of drug dealers and had won our first appeal, Congress put language in the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1989 that said that you cannot evict someone if any member of their family would suffer an adverse consequence as a result of that eviction. We continued in a *sub rosa* fashion, and fortunately, HUD got the language reversed last November. But that was an example of what local governments that want to rid their public housing units of known drug dealers have to deal with. This kind of legislation is irrational and irresponsible.

A related question deals with the placement of people into public housing. There is a federal regulation that requires that the first people placed in permanent housing come from homeless shelters. Another well-meaning regulation. Everybody, on the face of it, would say, "Oh, that's a real good idea. If you don't have any shelter, you should be the first to be placed in public housing." Wrong. We found that of the first 14 people from our homeless shelters placed into permanent public housing, eight were addicted to drugs and/or dealing drugs.

The other tenants in the neighborhood said, "What are you doing to us? You are destroying our neighborhoods by putting these people into our communities and we have no say in it." I would like to require that tenants be tested for drugs before they are placed into permanent public housing.

Seizing Buyers' BMWs

One of the biggest problems in our housing projects has been the growth of open-air drug markets. Drug sales in the United States generate about $150 billion in gross income a year. That kind of money doesn't come just from low-income ghetto neighborhoods. It comes from more affluent suburbs as well. And many buyers from these suburbs come to buy at open-air markets in the projects. In fact, if you watch any of our worst neighborhoods, you will see automobiles from the suburbs pulling up to make their drug transactions. To fight this problem in our public housing projects we have obtained state authority to seize the automobiles of these buyers.

Recent court decisions have nullified arrests of known drug dealers, searches of whom have uncovered significant amounts of illegal drugs, because the arresting officer didn't actually see the small rock of crack being exchanged between buyer and seller. Street dealers now openly transfer drugs in a clenched-fist fashion, even if the police are standing nearby. This past May, Alexandria passed a very restrictive definition of loitering that will help police counter these "criminals' rights" court decisions. Loitering is now defined as remaining in an identified drug area for longer than 15 minutes and making hand contacts with two or more individuals on separate occasions lasting less than two minutes each, so as to pass small objects in a covert way.

Of all the public benefits we can provide people in low-income areas, none is more beneficial than a safe neighborhood.

The ACLU, the NAACP, and Alexandria's Human Rights Commission are suing the city over this ordinance as this article goes to print.

Safety as Civil Liberty

It is phenomenal to think that we have evicted over 100 drug-dealing households in our city. And that's just in one year. It should have been done a long time ago. I have gotten very positive responses from community leaders on the evictions. There is an improvement, a dramatic improvement, in some of the five neighborhoods that were under the control of drug dealers. We have reclaimed all but one and a half of these areas today. You can now walk your dog at night and sit on your porch in three of these previously drug-infested neighborhoods.

Fighting the devastation of drugs at the individual, family, and neighborhood levels is an objective worthy of our best efforts. It should motivate us as a society to come together, to act logically, and to work diligently to save our family members, friends, and neighbors from addiction to hard drugs and easy money. Unfortunately, these efforts are made much more difficult by those who, in their well-meaning desire to defend their ideas about civil liberties, trample the rights of the majority of individuals in drug-infested neighborhoods. Of all the public benefits we can provide people in low-income areas, none is more beneficial than a safe neighborhood. Law-abiding citizens have no civil liberties when our laws protect the rights of drug dealers to poison children, to offer more money than an honest job can ever pay, and to terrorize households into criminal complicity.

It is true that our civil liberties are at stake. It is also true that unless we exercise common sense and judicial responsibility now, they may be lost forever to the citizens who need them the most.

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LETTERS

J. Laurence Kulp, Mary Beth Adams, Alan W. Katzenstein, Marjorie G. Winkler, S. Fred Singer, Andrew T. Ringgold, Ivan Th. Rosenqvist, Lawrence R. Benson, Thomas M. Kearney, Timothy J. Walsh, David C. Isby, R. W. Robinson, W. Edward Chynoweth, James E. Mack, Representative Bill Frenzel, Herbert Stein, Gary E. Rubin, Antony T. Sullivan, Robert Hawkins, Park Chamberlain, Romas A. Shatas, Elizabeth Richman, James L. Robson

No Acid Rain Crisis

Dear Sir:

I agree with Edward C. Krug's thesis in "Fish Story: The Great Acid Rain Flimflam" (Spring 1990) that damage to the environment from acid rain has been greatly exaggerated. A decade of scientific investigation has shown that the effects of acid rain at current concentrations, even in the most affected areas of the northeastern United States, are negligible to minor. Numerous controlled experiments on all important agricultural crops and tree seedlings of dominant species show no growth impairment even at 5 to 10 times the ambient acidity.

No damage to forests from acid rain has been demonstrated in North America. In fact, there has probably been a positive fertilization effect. The corrosion of building materials is only slightly increased by current levels of acidity in rain; other pollutants and natural weathering agents are more harmful. Significant human health effects have been identified for acidic aerosols only at levels far above ambient. The presence of fine sulfate particles generated in the atmosphere from sulfur dioxide emissions does degrade visibility, but the liability is difficult to quantify.

The effect of acid rain given the most attention is the acidification of some lakes and streams, to the detriment of fish populations. Comprehensive sampling of surface waters in sensitive regions across the United States has shown that fish loss from acidification is restricted to the Northeast and represents much less than 1 percent of lake area. Furthermore, as Mr. Krug has described, much of this acidification is due to natural processes and land use changes.

No Effects for 100 Years

It has also been established that at present levels of acid rain, there will be no significant increase in any of the observed effects for perhaps a century. Therefore, there is no crisis. In the long term, however, it would be desirable to eliminate its effects completely.

Recent advances in control technology make it possible to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions (the primary source of acid rain) to 10 percent of that required by the current New Source Performance Standard for coal-fired boilers. The costs of new plants using the advanced control technologies are estimated to be comparable to those now being constructed.

Unfortunately, all of the above appears to have been ignored in the Clean Air bill passed by the Senate in April. The bill requires a crash program to retrofit old uncontrolled boilers with scrubbers (as if there were no new technologies) at a very high cost (perhaps $100 billion over 20 years), which will still remove only about half of the sulfur dioxide emissions. This legislative plan would also reduce the thermal efficiency of the plants (thus requiring more to be built), would increase carbon dioxide emissions (thereby accelerating the greenhouse effect), and produce large quantities of sludge (a solid waste problem).

Cheaper Alternative

An alternate proposal would be to tighten the New Source Performance Standard for coal-fired boilers by a factor of 10, and to put an age limit (greater than the depreciation life) on the old uncontrolled plants. On reaching this age, the uncontrolled plants would have to be shut down or modified with new technologies to meet at least the present standard. The ultimate result of such a policy would be to: 1) reduce the sulfur dioxide emissions to less than one million tons per year (the Senate bill leaves at least six million); 2) substantially increase the average thermal efficiency of our electrical generating stations; 3) reduce the carbon dioxide emissions per ton of coal burned; and 4) permit the use of high-sulfur coal (thereby solving the employment problems of miners in the high-sulfur-coal areas). Most important, this could all be achieved at no net cost, as new plants will have to be built anyway to meet our increasing demand for electricity, and the advanced technologies carry similar costs to the present pulverized-coal-scrubber plants.

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Although under this alternative policy it would take about one decade longer than it would under the Senate policy to achieve a reduction of the first 10 million tons of emission per year, the net cost to the economy would be negligible, instead of the $100 billion now mandated by Congress.

J. Laurence Kulp
Former Director of Research
National Acid Precipitation
Assessment Program (NAPAP)
Federal Way, WA

Edward C. Krug uses his evidence to instill complacency about acid deposition and proposes a "solution" that would destroy naturally acidic systems and cause further damage in industrially acidified lakes.

—Marjorie G. Winkler

Can't See the Forest for the Trees

Dear Sir:

Although Mr. Krug's article emphasizes surface water acidification, I will restrict my comments to the author's remarks on high elevation spruce-fir ecosystems. The Spruce-Fir Research Cooperative, which is part of the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program's Forest Response Program, has been conducting research on spruce-fir ecosystems in the northeastern and southeastern U.S. for the past five years. A great deal of information has been gained from this research, some of which refutes Mr. Krug's statements.



In particular, the large numbers of dead trees on Mt. Mitchell, North Carolina, are not red spruce, but Fraser fir, which have been killed by the balsam woolly adelgid. The mortality is *not* believed to be related to acid deposition. Also, above-normal red spruce mortality has been observed only on mountains in the northeastern United States, with more dead trees in the Adirondack and Green Mountains than in the White Mountains.

Mr. Krug also states that northeastern forests appear to be the most robust in the country. I am not sure on which Forest Service statistics he bases this "fact." Most tree species in the northeastern U.S. are growing well; however, red spruce and balsam fir have experienced decreases over the past 20 years. Although high-elevation spruce-fir forests make up only a small portion of the forests in the eastern United States, their importance as aesthetic and recreational resources should not be underestimated simply because of their small geographical representation.

High Cost of Fertilization

Finally, Mr. Krug suggests that the overall health of red spruce may be improved by fertilization with neutral salt mixtures. This is probably not true. One of the major conclusions of the Spruce-Fir Research Cooperative is that in the high elevation northeastern spruce-fir forests, the observed symptoms are the result of winter injury, not of magnesium or calcium deficiency. The mechanism of winter injury is not clearly understood, but it is believed to be exacerbated by high amounts of cloudwater deposition, particularly sulfate, to the foliage. It is unlikely that adding neutral salts to these forests would significantly alter their susceptibility to winter injury.

Mr. Krug implies that such fertilizer applications are common in Europe. In West Germany, these prescriptions are made on a site-by-site basis, not as broad-scale applications. Furthermore, such fertilization is not inexpensive. It is affordable to German landowners because the government heavily subsidizes the program.

Mary Beth Adams
Spruce-Fir Research Cooperative
Forest Service
Department of Agriculture
Radnor, PA

Further "Flimflam" Evidence

Dear Sir:

Mr. Krug's "Fish Story: The Great Acid Rain Flimflam" provides a long-overdue explanation of the realities of fishlessness in lakes that so many people have attributed to acid rain. His explanation of the terrestrial factors that determine lakewater acidity should be widely disseminated, particularly among those who press for legislation to reduce emissions, ostensibly to aid fish and forest resources.

A practical demonstration of the mechanisms Krug discussed was the Integrated Lake-Watershed Acidification Study (ILWAS), which determined the physical and chemical characteristics of precipitation, soils, and surface waters in three Adirondack watersheds roughly 10 miles apart. The watersheds received substantially similar precipitation, but Woods Lake was significantly acidic and fishless, as Mr. Krug noted; Panther Lake was in the low-acid range and had good fish populations; Sagamore Lake was intermediate in acidity and in fish population. The ILWAS data confirmed that it is the physical and chemical nature of the watershed soil layers that determine the

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I agree with Edward C. Krug that damage to the environment from acid rain has been greatly exaggerated.
—J. Laurence Kulp

markedly different acidities of the respective lakes.

Unfortunately, Mr. Krug perpetuated the popular weakness in the "acid rain" issue by using the term without defining it. For more than a dozen years, nearly all parties have similarly used the term without specifying the concentration of acidity that defines acid rain. Defining it as precipitation that is more acidic than normal is meaningless; there is no *normal* acid level for rain or snow. Acidity varies from place to place; sometimes there are major differences in locations less than 100 miles apart. For any given location, the acidity will vary over time—from year to year, from season to season, from day to day, and even from minute to minute as a storm develops.

There is good reason to question the suggestion that combustion of fossil fuels in the Midwest is the source of acid rain in the Northeast. Environmental Protection Agency data show that when sulfate emissions were reduced in EPA Regions 1 (New England) and 2 (New York-New Jersey), sulfate levels in precipitation fell, but precipitation acidity was not significantly changed. Other data have shown that the acidity of rain and of surface waters is not directly linked to either sulfate or nitrate concentrations but rather to the alkaline substances in the air that serve as acid neutralizers.

Useless Exercise

Mr. Krug showed why proposed changes to the Clean Air Act can have no perceptible influence on the quality of surface waters or, in turn, on fish populations of lakes in the Northeast or the trees in Northeast forests. An amended Clean Air Act cannot significantly alter the chemistry of rain or snow. Research on atmospheric and terrestrial processes show the proposed acid rain legislation to be a useless exercise destined to provide no meaningful environmental benefits. Mr. Krug made a good case for liming as the faster and cheaper alternative if fish and forests are the resources to be "protected." The case is further strengthened when the realities of atmospheric factors are also considered.

Alan W. Katzenstein
Larchmont, NY

Hold the Lime

Dear Sir:

Although some of Mr. Krug's statements about the presence of naturally acidic lakes and the contribution of acid soil (formed by heath and conifer forest vegetation) to decreased lakewater pH are correct, he takes a very simplistic view of the complex problem of acid and toxic atmospheric deposition. In addition, he uses his evidence to instill complacency about acid deposition and proposes a "solution" that would destroy naturally acidic systems and cause further damage in industrially acidified lakes.

There is abundant evidence that surface waters and vegetation have recently (during the past century) been impacted by both air-borne and water-borne acid deposition. The most notable cases in North America are the landscape and lake changes surrounding the nickel smelting area of Sudbury, Ontario, the chemical and steel-refining region near Gary, Indiana, the copper smelting area in Tennessee, and the mine-tailing leachate contamination region in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. In all these places toxic and acid air and water from industrial processes have contributed to acidic waters and denuded the natural vegetation—both forests and grasslands. Acid precipitation has also led worldwide to the weakening and destruction of metal structures, highways and bridges, stone buildings, monuments, and statues; to health problems, sometimes of epidemic proportions; and possibly to the disappearance of a whole phylum of organisms, the amphibians.

As Lime Goes By

Liming of lakes is not a solution to the above problems, some of which, like the decimation of amphibian populations worldwide, have just begun to be recognized. Liming brings its own set of problems to biotic systems. Studies show that liming:

1) increases concentrations of toxic elements (such as aluminum, zinc, copper, and cadmium) in lake water, lake sediments, and soils;

2) stabilizes concentrations of toxic industrial organic compounds such as trichloroethylene in lake sediments and soils;

3) stresses and kills biota that have evolved in naturally acidic waters;

4) causes eutrophication of relatively clean waters (as evidenced by subsequent blooms of dinoflagellates and algae);

5) greatly increases lake sedimentation rates; and

6) causes gill abnormalities in fish, which may explain why fish in limed lakes grow so poorly.

On the other hand, when smokestack emissions decline, reversal of acid- and toxic-rain impacts on organic systems has been rapid.

Marjorie G. Winkler
Associate Scientist
Center for Climactic Studies
Institute for Environmental Studies
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI

Clean Air Hype

Dear Sir:

Mr. Krug's article amply confirms that the current acid rain legislation represents a billion-dollar solution to a million-dollar problem. The pioneering research by Mr. Krug, by geologist A. Gordon Everett (formerly of the EPA), and by others, has now been confirmed by the 10-year, $600-million study about to be released by the federal National Acid Precipitation Assess-

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ment Program. There is little scientific doubt that the benefits of acid rain control are nowhere near commensurate with the enormous costs about to be placed on the American consumer—a hidden tax that wastes resources and does little good.

First, this is *not* "the first acid rain bill," as was so proudly claimed by the leader of the U.S. Senate. What hype! Previous Clean Air Acts have already removed eight million tons of sulfur dioxide since 1973 (without these laws today's levels would be about 20 million tons higher). The present bill would simply remove another 10 million tons, but at a staggering cost.

Senator Mitchell fails to tell us—while he and others continue to ignore the scientific evidence of the NAPAP report—that the removal of the eight million tons so far hasn't had a noticeable effect on the acidity of rain. After the failure of this grand experiment, how can we then be sure that the additional 10 million tons will make a difference?

Current acid rain legislation represents a billion-dollar solution to a million-dollar problem.

—S. Fred Singer

And why 10 million tons? Why not remove 5, or 15, or the whole 22 million tons of sulfur dioxide? There is really no rational answer, because there is no cost-benefit analysis to turn to. The 10 million ton figure could, of course, be related to the number of fingers, but the likely origin may be a 1983 acid rain report by the National Academy of Sciences, which argued that acidity is directly proportional to sulfur dioxide emission and recommended a 50 percent removal. Wrong science *and* wrong economics—all in one report. After its release, Congressman John Dingell was quite blunt in his assessment: "They issued a report that was...slovenly, incompetent, and unscientific."

Pollution Permits

George Keyworth, President Reagan's first science advisor, commissioned a critical review of a set of joint U.S.-Canadian acid rain studies from a panel of scientists chaired by geophysicist William Nierenberg. The panel's 1984 report contained a conceptual cost-benefit analysis that showed control costs rising slowly at first, and then quite sharply, as one attempts to remove more and more sulfur dioxide.

The Nierenberg panel made the radical proposal, now generally accepted, that free trading of emission permits would create a least-cost solution for the nation—since the atmosphere doesn't care which smokestack emits. It also noted that no data were then available on the dollar value of benefits, and therefore recommended that sulfur dioxide removal not go beyond about two to five million tons—the approximate position of the "knee" of the "least-cost" cost curve—by extending controls to non-electric-utility sources and encouraging the phase-out of older, coal-fired powerplants.

This recommendation still stands today.

S. Fred Singer
Professor of Environmental Sciences
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA

Unscientific Oversimplification

Dear Sir:

Mr. Krug suggests some intriguing relationships between naturally acidic environments, historic land use, and the chemistry of surface waters in the Northeast. However, he unfortunately goes on to use these arguments to oversimplify the acid rain dilemma and its solution. In particular, his conclusion that liming all naturally acidic water bodies is a cheap alternative to controls on emissions neglects the full range of acidification effects and the ecological consequences of liming naturally acidic aquatic systems.

Mr. Krug is correct in pointing out the fallacy of assuming that most acidic lakes have been acidified by industrial era pollution; however, his contention that acid lake management consists of a choice between sphagnum moss and fish ignores all other ecosystem components that are dependent on, in this case, acidic conditions. In no way should this be considered a scientific perspective.

Moreover, lake and pond management is greatly influenced by many factors, including specific agency mandates, historical and present day pond environments, land ownership and recreation patterns, amount and nature of adjacent development, degree of past human manipulation, and ecological sensitivity of the resource. Specific management objectives for a given pond or lake will thus certainly vary and not be restricted to the simple sphagnum moss/fish dichotomy.

Lime Disease

In fulfilling its mandate to preserve native ecosystems within lands and waters within its jurisdiction, the National Park Service looks to science, first, to describe these "native ecosystems"; and second, to prescribe management for preservation or, in some cases, restoration. The first step in the case of the acid kettle ponds of Cape Cod National

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Seashore has included examination of both past (through sediment analyses) and present pond environments. What we have found is a diversity of aquatic habitants, albeit of a generally acidic nature, replete with sphagnum, amphibians, *and* acid-tolerant native fish. The application of lime to any of these ponds profoundly alters native conditions, with deleterious effects to water quality and native organisms, including fish.

Contrary to statements made by Mr. Krug, Cape Cod National Seashore has not "deliberately underdeveloped" public access to the



kettle ponds it manages in order to protect them from recreational overuse. Swimming is allowed in all ponds, and walking trails lead to most. While the emphasis on recreation at each pond may vary (because protecting ecological values may be more important), visitor use of the ponds is not prohibited. Our management approach in balancing recreation with resource protection is through intensive water quality monitoring, restoration (including stabilization of shoreline erosion), promoting septic system upgrades, and public education.

It is extremely unfortunate that Mr. Krug, a respected chemist, has chosen to end the article as he does, advocating the "quick fix" of liming over emissions controls. This attitude is especially troubling if it diminishes public concern for the full range of air pollution effects to human and environmental health.

Andrew T. Ringgold
Superintendent
National Park Service
Cape Cod National Seashore
South Wellfleet, MA

More Fish Stories

Dear Sir:

Mr. Krug is one of the few scientists who have dared to put a scientific question mark to the politically popular modern dogma that industrial air pollution is *the reason* for fish decline in some lakes and streams.

Mr. Krug refers to the fact that many Norwegian lakes that lost their fish population after 1940 also had barren periods in earlier periods. He states that "Viking legend is filled with stories of fishing lakes and streams that went barren as a result of 'sinful behavior.'"

I have conferred with Mr. Olaz Bo, professor of Scandinavian folklore at Oslo University. He confirms that the legends mentioned by Mr. Krug are somewhat younger than the pagan Viking age (800-1000 A.D.). The sinners were not pagan Viking chieftains, but late medieval Christian knights and commoners, although in many of the stories the fishing was stopped by wood nymphs. These stories probably date to the 15th century, as the crimes were committed by bow and arrow, not by firearms.

Ivan Th. Rosenqvist
Professor
Institute for Geology
Oslo, Norway

Edward C. Krug replies:

The majority of the respondents addressed the message of "Fish Story," which is, in the words of Professor Singer, "The current acid rain legislation represents a billion-dollar solution to a million-dollar problem." The remaining respondents address peripheral issues, distracting from the fact that they, too, confirm the core theme of "Fish Story": What little acid water we have is largely naturally acidic. We have yet to clearly identify acid rain as a forestry problem in spite of over a hundred million dollars of research spent to do just that.

Given that the core facts of "Fish Story" are not in dispute, why has the public remained misinformed about acid rain? The answer is illustrated by the contentious respondents. The "scientific" peer-review process is peculiarly selective in its opposition to scientists employing the scientific method (improve our knowledge by finding out what is wrong with the standing paradigm) and in its rewarding of those who perpetuate the myths upon which such "problem-oriented" research programs are based.

Consider the hurricane that NAPAP's ex-director Kulp went through when NAPAP publicly released the EPA lake survey data in 1987. Letting the cards fall where they might, Kulp reported that there are only hundreds of acid-dead lakes, not thousands, as we had repeatedly been told. Kulp reported what many "experts" were *then* telling him—what few acid lakes we have are essentially the result of acid rain. Nevertheless, reaction to NAPAP's report was one of fury.

Ms. Winkler attempts to discredit my views on acid rain as "very simplistic," but popular acidification theory ignores land-use change, natural acidity produced by acid soils and plants, and the peer-reviewed scientific literature showing the prevalence of acid lakes and streams in areas not having acid rain.

The reverse of Ms. Winkler's assertion is true: acid actually dissolves toxic metals into water, whereas liming removes them. The simple truth is that liming works. Through liming, Scandinavians have successfully restored fisheries to more acid lakes than exist in the entire United States.

Killing Trees with Kindness

Concerning the acid-rain-induced winter injury hypothesis, the red spruce problem on Mt. Mitchell was noted at a critical phase of acid-rain-related forestry research. The red spruce decline from Maine to North Carolina, which began in the 1960s, extended geographically beyond the Northeast drought. Accordingly, Professor Art Johnson of

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the University of Pennsylvania developed the hypothesis that nitrogen in nitric acid produced by cars (not sulfate from Midwest power plants) directly fertilizes the spruce needles (as opposed to root uptake from the soil), so that they grow late into the fall and do not harden properly for winter. In the words of Johnson, direct nitrogen fertilization of leaves may be "killing trees with kindness."

This hypothesis remains unproven because, in the words of Johnson and others (National Academy of Science, *Acid Deposition: Long-Term Trends,* 1986) such unexplainable forest diebacks also occur in areas not subject to air pollution and dieback of red spruce also occurred between 1871 and 1890 prior to the advent of acid rain, widespread air pollution, and the use of the automobile.

To call a remediation policy of soil fertilization for spruce-fir forests that will relieve all kinds of stress "expensive" and not to criticize a remediation policy that costs billions of dollars and that will *not* address causes of stress is peculiar.

Role of USAF *Is* Unique

Dear Sir:

Jeffrey Record's provocative but flawed article "Into the Wild Blue Yonder: Should We Abolish the Air Force?" (Spring 1990) should meet its apparent goal of generating a response within the Air Force. Some of his criticisms of doctrine and force structure are valid. His basic premise, however, is even more illogical than the argument that the end of the Warsaw Pact means we should abolish the U.S. Army and give what's left of its mission to the Marines.

The author seems to think that the U.S. Air Force, merely to justify its existence, must be the world's dominant military entity. This attitude reveals an unrealistic utopianism comparable to that of early airpower theorists, some of whose ideas he sets up as straw men to knock over. It also reflects an inside-the-beltway parochialism typical of many of our professional defense intellectuals.

Jeffrey Record reveals an unrealistic utopianism comparable to that of early airpower theorists, some of whose ideas he sets up as straw men to knock over.
—Lawrence R. Benson

If land-based airpower is truly so marginal, why have most of the world's militarily significant countries, both large and small, seen fit to establish their own separate air forces? Was this, as Record claims, merely bureaucratic empire-building by the flyboys? Surely there must be valid historical and organizational reasons to have air forces, even when some are only a fraction of the size of the USAF.

Space Cadets?

Although gloating over the dwindling number of the Air Force's manned bombers, Mr. Record never even mentions its growing role in space. Perhaps he thinks the Army, Navy, and Marines would be anxious to take over that arena, too. Or maybe we should set up a separate service of "space cadets" to go along with the new service of "nukes" that he seems to recommend.

In trying to make his case, the author attacks the Air Force's lack of commitment to close air support (CAS). This overblown issue has probably kept enough consultants employed churning out studies to pay for a wing of F-16s. But, as explained by the noted aerospace historian Richard Hallion in the Spring 1990 issue of *Airpower Journal,* pure CAS has never proved very successful. What has worked better is battlefield air interdiction performed by capable fighters, not single-mission attack aircraft.

While Mr. Record criticizes longer-range interdiction, such as that conducted in Korea, the article fails to mention the now well-known lesson that interdiction campaigns can be successful if accompanied by an active ground offensive that makes the enemy expend supplies.

Gulf Conflict

Echoing the Navy's traditional argument about the dependence of the Air Force on overseas bases, Mr. Record makes at least one error of omission and somewhat of an overstatement. He states incorrectly that "the Air Force played no role in U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf in 1987-88" while claiming "sea based air power...was employed extensively and successfully."

For his information, the Air Force operated an element of E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and KC-135 tankers at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, from October 1980 until April 1989. In an impressive example of sustained air operations, these Sentries flew more than 86,000 hours to provide 24-hour-a-day AWACS coverage of the Persian Gulf during the entire Iran-Iraq War. Perhaps the U.S. naval forces in the area found this to be helpful.

Was sea-based air power really that effective in the recent Gulf conflict? The *Vincennes* tragedy partly resulted from having to rely on surface combatants to perform an air control mission. Even though the Iranian Air Force had ceased to be much of a threat by 1987, the Navy continued its long-standing practice of never sending one of its aircraft carriers into the enclosed waters of the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the most successful employment of sea-based airpower in the Gulf appeared to have been the super-secret U.S. Army special operations helicopters.

As it was, the presence of an Air Force KC-10 tanker as an airborne refueling station above the Strait of Hormuz helped allow the carrier *Enterprise*'s air wing to operate from the Gulf of Oman. And, while we're on the subject of Air Force support, I'm sure the Navy also benefitted from dependable deliveries of key supplies and personnel by the Military Airlift Command (MAC).

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The Air Force has suffered from the Congress and the electorate reinforcing its tendencies to focus on weapons—especially aircraft—rather than on broader concepts. We must remember that there are no "conservative" or "liberal" aircraft.

—David C. Isby

Advantage of Speed

Carrier task forces steaming at 30 knots will never be able to respond as quickly to a sudden crisis as a squadron or two of F-15s accompanied by KC-10s, especially if the crisis does not occur conveniently near a coastline. In cases such as Panama, MAC can get numerous Army battalions to the action much sooner than a Marine amphibious force. As evidenced by the worries over the future of Subic Bay, distant naval forces are not entirely immune from the need for forward bases.

Rather than trying to fan the old flames of interservice rivalry, Mr. Record and other knowledgeable critics should clearly acknowledge that all services still have important roles to play—even in the downsized American military of the future. Constructive ideas, without sensationalism and cheap shots, are what's needed in this challenging era of defense cutbacks.

Lawrence R. Benson
Director of Research Services
Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center
Kirtland Air Force Base
Albuquerque, NM

(Note: The views expressed above are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the USAF.)

Political, Military Success Differ

Dear Sir:

The central question of Mr. Record's article appears to be "Should We Abolish the Air Force?" However, in its final paragraph, the reader learns the title is simply a rhetorical device for examining Air Force deficiencies—some real and some perceived.

One set of opinions clusters around what the Air Force founders called strategic bombardment. Mr. Record questions its efficacy in Europe during World War II. His interpretation is at odds with the *U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey* and, more recently, Albert Speer's autobiography. Speer admits that as Hitler's Minister of Armaments and Munitions, he fought a losing day-to-day battle against the effects of Allied air.

In the Pacific theater, air power's success is credited to "two years of bloody amphibious and surface naval actions." Unfortunately, Mr. Record omits reference to General Kenney's brilliant land-based air campaign, which included such successful engagements as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. It, too, was crucial to General LeMay's ultimate success with his strategic air campaign.

The Politics of Vietnam

Mr. Record depicts air power as having been unsuccessful in Vietnam. Linebacker II is described as having forced the enemy to concede to our demands, but Mr. Record then portrays the campaign as less than a victory. This perception of his is perhaps the most difficult to understand. Whereas the wisdom of the desired political ends can be debated, one would be hard pressed to argue against the effectiveness of the means.

The various services are instruments used to impose military force. Like all instruments, they produce their best results when they are in the hands of experts trained in their use. However, this training must include a thorough understanding of the need for combined arms support, and of each service's limitations.

In Vietnam, the basic failure of the services to articulate clearly their inability to achieve certain desired political outcomes and their reluctance to define the parameters of operations they required for military success set the stage for a prolonged, indecisive conflict. However, once these obstacles were overcome, as they were in December 1972, properly employed air power accomplished in just 11 days what 11 years of conflict had failed to achieve. Had larger or more lasting political concessions been desired, there was nothing that would have prevented our continued strategic air attack until such concessions were granted or became moot.

As Mr. Record states, some air power advocates have claimed that the same options were available in

1965. However, most would agree that a different political situation existed then, and that it required a different approach. Perhaps Lansdale's approach of nation-building was more appropriate, but further speculation or revisionist history will not solve the Vietnam dilemma. What remains is the generally held belief that all forms of U.S. military power were misapplied during that conflict. As regrettable as this may be, one need not call for the abolition of U.S. military power simply because it could not handle a situation for which it was not designed.

The final area of Mr. Record's

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SACRED COWS

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—George F. Will

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—Robert H. Bork

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—Hugh Sidey

ETHICS, POLITICS

and the

INDEPENDENT

COUNSEL

Executive Power
Executive Vice
1789–1989

by

TERRY EASTLAND

Terry Eastland, journalist and author, is the Presswatch Columnist for the *American Spectator.*

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The orange marketing system is certainly not perfect, but even so, it has allowed the California-Arizona area to achieve the highest rate of fruit utilization of any citrus-producing area in the world, which could hardly be called "squandering."

—W. Edward Chynoweth

concerns revolve around basing options and vulnerabilities. It is likely that in this changing world, the U.S. military will find itself with far fewer overseas bases. It is also true that the vulnerability of our forward bases will increase as the sophistication of the threats increases.

At this point in history, where the world looks upon us as the leading aerospace nation, it is essential that we maintain the visionary perspective of a true global power. We must also maintain our commitment to global peace. In those instances where our strategic interests can only be secured through military force, it is likely that we will face an enemy whose centers of gravity are extremely vulnerable to strategic applications of conventional air power. Conversely, if our interests run contrary to those of a preindustrial, Third World nation lacking vulnerable centers of gravity, it is difficult to imagine the validity of applying *any* military force against it. Far more would be gained through nation-building efforts.

In the end, Mr. Record answers his own rhetorical question. An independent Air Force is in the best interests of this aerospace nation. More important, however, he has effectively surfaced issues that will indeed become deficiencies if ignored or addressed from a misguided perspective.

Lt. Col. Thomas M. Kearney (USAF)
Springfield, VA

(Note: The views expressed above are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the USAF.)

Time for Reevaluation

Dear Sir:

As we know, the world has changed a great deal since World War II. After the war, senior military leaders met in Key West to redefine the roles and missions of our

nation's armed forces. When the bitter debate had ended, it was hoped that the settlement would decide once and for all the responsibilities of the various military services.

Mr. Record's article clearly shows that, because of developments that were unforeseen in 1947, the time is ripe for another evaluation of roles and missions. It correctly points out that the Air Force's original intellectual and bureaucratic claims for independence are no longer valid. In addition, the evolving nature of modern land warfare, questions about the availability of overseas bases, and doubts about the effectiveness of strategic bombing raise serious concerns regarding the future role of the Air Force in our nation's military experience.

While "Into the Wild Blue Yonder" makes a number of compelling points, I am not sanguine about the prospects for change. The article itself highlights the central obstacle in stating that the Air Force has "come to be a politically powerful institution," and any attempt to change its mission would encounter monumental opposition. Given the political clout wielded by the Air Force, the tacit agreement among the branches of the military not to attack each other's budgets and programs, and the dim prospect for self-induced reform in the military, I am left to wonder whether "Into the Wild Blue Yonder" will remain little more than words on paper.

Timothy J. Walsh
Fellow in National Security Studies
American Defense Institute
Washington, DC

Too Many Cooks

Dear Sir:

The Air Force, like the Navy and unlike the Army, has articulated its own service-specific strategy. While the USAF is no longer run by bomber barons, its strategic belief in independent war-fighting remains. Similarly, as the Navy's maritime strategy had its underpinnings with Mahan, so the USAF began with Douhet, Mitchell, and the Air Corps Tactical School thinkers of the 1920s and '30s to get where it is today. Indeed, the USAF, like many of its blue-suit brethren throughout the world, is very good at flying airplanes, but less adept at understanding modern war.

Williamson Murray, a historian (and USAF officer), has cogently analyzed where the USAF's thinking has been and where it is today: at the intersection of its background, rapidly evolving technology, decreasing funding, non-responsive policies, and an uncertain national decisionmaking process. That this is not satisfactory is only partially the fault of the USAF, as Mr. Record recognizes. Rather, what he has detailed is a service-specific version of the many weaknesses inherent in today's U.S. military, many of which,

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in turn, are inherent in how we have decided to govern ourselves.

Outside Actors

These fundamental weaknesses include the fact that our armed forces fight together, but are administered, equipped, and funded as specific services. These problems have not been solved by Goldwater-Nichols. Nor would they be solved by disbanding the USAF nor purging every bomber baron, nor, I fear, even creating a true General Staff. The ability of either the USAF or the Navy to prevail—independently—in any probable conflict is not likely to emerge. The problems with the USAF, however, are not so much in the existence of an independent strategy—U.S. defense policy, like foreign policy, is likely to stress pluralism above efficiency—but in the need for outside actors (that is, the Congress, Department of Defense, press, and public) to ensure that USAF priorities and goals are dictated not by its internal bureaucratic procedures but by the needs of national defense.

The USAF has suffered from the Congress and the electorate reinforcing its tendencies to focus on weapons—especially aircraft—rather than on broader concepts. Despite the procurement-driven nature of much of the U.S. security debate, we must remember that there are no "liberal" or "conservative" aircraft, and that the future of the USAF is much more than the sum total of system-related decisions, such as ATFs vs. F-16s or C-17s versus re-sparred C-141s. Outside support is needed if the USAF is to look to nontraditional systems, but in times of financial stringency, an institution tends to look to its preferred menu of items and issues, rather than to innovation.

If the Air Force is to become more responsive to the real-world requirements of U.S. national interests, rather than its own bureaucratic concerns, it will require these interests to be clearly defined; hard choices must be made by both the executive and the Congress. To fault the USAF for playing the bureaucratic game is less useful than changing the rules.

David C. Isby
Alexandria, VA

Not Cowed by Armey

Dear Sir:

In his article "Moscow on the Mississippi: America's Soviet-Style Farm Policy" (Winter 1990), Representative Dick Armey is more of a propagandist than a reporter on the farm fiasco, especially regarding dairying.

Mr. Armey asserts that his proposals won't cause us to lose any farmers, and he further contends



that the ones we now have don't adapt to modern technology; both claims are dubious. Both farm income and the total number of farmers have been in steady decline for over 50 years. A few years have been flat, but the overall trend is steadily downward. Finding the good old boys who still milk by hand takes extensive searching. The average dairy herd of 150 cows is not so handled.

Of the farms producing milk in 1950, 90 percent are not producing it today. In the early '50s we got a federal milk order in the Puget Sound area. In a few years, the government was penalizing the producers who sold directly to the market, and subsidizing those who sold to government storage facilities, which soon filled up.

More recently, the Dairy Termination Program was substantially financed by a levy on existing producers. It was a time-limited project, not an ongoing one. The move against bovine somatotropin was due to: 1) no need for greater production; and 2) the bad publicity sure to rise against shots and chemicals, regardless of merit, as demonstrated by the Alar scare.

Suppose the author increased his credibility and told the truth about all of these programs. Is there, somewhere in the wings, a program to disengage the federal government from mandating high costs to farmers? This issue is much like recycling—very important in its place, which is *after* the minimum wage law, OSHA, union labor contracts, withholding taxes on all employees, inspections, environmental impact statements, etc. If these burdens are not removed, you will have all the elements of a hanging. The noose of mandated expense is still around the farmer's neck, and the trapdoor of support under his feet will be dropped.

The ever-declining number of farmers have not been able to vote themselves a pay hike, so they use political coalitions. If I were as horrified about this as Representative Armey, I would resign from Congress, rather than be so used.

R. W. Robinson
Sequim, WA

Rotten Arguments, Not Oranges

Dear Sir:

In his otherwise sensible article on our misguided farm policy, Representative Dick Armey's misinformation seems to have led him to paint a distorted picture of the California-Arizona Orange Marketing Order. Contrary to his assertions, neither Sunkist nor "a few large growers" dictate to the industry when to pick fruit; the order is not run like a "cartel"; and growers can give leftover fruit to charity, if they so desire and follow the appropriate procedures.

As both a small grower of 22 years and an advocate of non-centrist free enterprise, I must admit that I have long felt challenged by and at times been dubious of marketing orders. The system is certainly not perfect, but even so, year in and year out, it has allowed the California-Arizona area to achieve the highest rate of fruit utilization of any citrus-producing area in the world, which could hardly be called "squandering."

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A fully private system of refugee assistance would allow rich communities to "buy" refugees admission into the U.S., while denying opportunities for rescue to those from poor communities or groups that have not yet established a presence in this country.

—Gary E. Rubin

Contrary to Mr. Armey's implication, the Orange Marketing Order is not financed nor subsidized by the taxpayer. It is entirely industry-financed. Large growers cannot set the price for their fruits "at a high level," because prices are, in fact, determined by the marketplace. In fact, even in the best years, my share of the gross returns has never exceeded 50 percent, and in most years has been closer to 30 percent.

Marketing Orders Benefit All

Mr. Armey's comparison of orange marketing orders with OPEC is inept. Any thinking person would realize that oil and oranges can serve, at most, as a silly, grammar-school-level analogy. A somewhat better analogy might be that of auto drivers "forced" to comply with traffic laws for the benefit and safety of all people on the road, including their own.

As a practical matter, even if there were no marketing orders, some sort of phasing plan would probably emerge on a voluntary basis, due to what I will call the "fire-in-the-theater" syndrome. For example, at the start of a navel season in November, when the price is attractive and fruit is selling, many small growers, if not all, will try to sell their whole crop so as to reap the rewards as well as to avoid the later winter freezes. Obviously, if every grower did that, the result would be disaster. Flooding the market beyond its capacity would deflate prices to below a profitable level.

While market chains and possibly consumers might benefit from depressed prices temporarily, the growers themselves cannot long survive such depressed profit-loss conditions. No one would benefit from groves failing, except perhaps the Chilean citrus industry, at the expense of our own—sort of a reverse trade barrier.

Oranges enjoy a tree life of as long as six months. Unlike deciduous tree fruit, oranges don't have to be picked in a matter of days and, thus, growers and packers have an added dimension of time in the marketing process. Growers should not be criticized for using this advantage—both for their own protection (and profit) as well as for the protection of the industry and the benefit of the consumer.

In view of the above, Mr. Armey's assertion that we are "forced" to watch our "fruit rot" seems wide of the mark. The only fruit that rots is either fruit that won't sell because of inferior size or quality or fruit left unintentionally by the picker. The latter are called "shiners," and growers are free to use them or let neighbors and churches glean them.

Perhaps, instead of spouting hyperbole about our "semi-feudal" system, perhaps Representative Armey could come up with a better alternative, and we could all gain from his wisdom. Personally, I would be delighted to discover a way to allow orderly phasing without marketing orders, but, as of now, I would be surprised if anyone who studies the industry would reach the same conclusion as Representative Armey does: "Repeal all marketing orders." We growers (vassals?) aren't quite that trigger-happy.

W. Edward Chynoweth
Sanger, CA

Nutty Quotas

Dear Sir:

Representative Dick Armey's article is excellent. I have heard that several members of Congress, who are trying to protect unsound, illogical, and consumer- and taxpayer-abusive commodity programs, were offended by the article's comparison of these programs to the failed but similar agricultural programs of Eastern Europe. In my view, the reason they are offended is that the truth hurts. The comparison of Eastern Europe's failed programs to the United States' commodity programs is striking. In Eastern Europe, the result was severe shortages. In the United States, the result has been staggering costs to the taxpayer and/or to the consumer, with outrageous benefits to a selected few who can profiteer from these programs.

The peanut program, which in recent years has not been tremendously expensive to the taxpayer, has been terribly abusive to the United States consumer. Our estimate is that for 1989 the peanut program has required United States consumers of peanut products to pay $533.6 million more for these products than they would have been required to pay without this program.

James E. Mack
Managing Director and
General Counsel
Peanut Butter and
Nut Processors Association
Potomac, MD

Representative Dick Armey replies:

Significantly, Mr. R. W. Robinson ignores my point that almost half of U.S. farmers grow crops that receive no federal subsidy. In many cases, the only real difference between the crops that are subsidized and the crops that are not is the power of their respective lobbies in Washington. If a huge number of Mr. Robinson's fellow farmers can prosper in a free market, I suspect that he could also.

It is true that the Dairy Termination Program has not been repeated since 1986, but that is irrelevant. Killing a million cows to drive up the

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price of milk so that mothers can pay more to feed their children—the sort of absurdity that the government can only get away with once in a while. The Agriculture Committees must now wait a decent interval before doing it again.

I completely agree, however, with Mr. Robinson about the burden that certain labor laws place on farmers (and other businessmen). Perhaps if the farm lobby would stop supporting organized labor's agenda in return for labor's support of farm subsidies, we might make progress in this area as well.

Edward Chynoweth, in his zeal to defend California's orange growers cartel, simply distorts what I wrote and ignores my argument. For example, he objects to my alleged assertion (which I never made) that marketing orders allow Sunkist to dictate when California growers can pick their fruit.

He is right. Marketing orders do not dictate when growers can *pick* their fruit; they dictate when growers can *sell* their fruit. By keeping a large amount of the crop off the market, these marketing orders create an artificial scarcity and drive consumer prices upwards. This is a form of price fixing.

In the 1989-90 crop year, for example, California's navel orange committee (controlled by Sunkist) proposed a quota of 49.5 million cartons of oranges out of a total tree crop of 85.5 million. In effect, with the collusion of the Food and Drug Administration, Sunkist was able to order 36 million cartons of oranges off the market.

Mr. Chynoweth objects to my describing this system as a "miniature OPEC for oranges." Perhaps a different analogy would be more appropriate. After all, if the leaders of other industries tried to do this sort of thing, they would wind up in Leavenworth.

Don't Ease Gramm-Rudman Targets

Dear Sir:

Because of the editorial abuse the Gramm-Rudman law has been taking recently, it is good to see Daniel Mitchell's article, "The Grim Truth About Gramm-Rudman: The Deficit Law Is Working" (Spring 1990), which shows that Gramm-Rudman may be the only fiscal discipline we have. Gramm-Rudman has turned around the parade of increasing deficits and has kept the deficit shrinking as a percentage of GNP.

Complaints about the effectiveness of Gramm-Rudman almost invariably are a prelude to suggestions for slipping the budget targets or weakening fiscal discipline.

—Representative Bill Frenzel

The congressional urge to spend has not abated. However, the specter of Gramm-Rudman sequestration has changed congressional attitudes about spending. New or expanded spending proposals are no longer taken seriously unless they are accompanied by spending or revenue offsets. I hope this restraint on new programs will be a legacy that survives long after Gramm-Rudman has run its course.

Just because Congress has been forced to accept some fiscal discipline doesn't mean it likes it. The author is exactly right when he observes that those who want to repeal Gramm-Rudman would do so not because the law has failed; advocates of repeal are merely tired of being constrained by it.

Those who want to replace Gramm-Rudman with something tougher should have no objection to keeping Gramm-Rudman around in case the new mechanism does not meet expectations. Complaints about the effectiveness of Gramm-Rudman almost invariably are a prelude to suggestions for slipping the budget targets or weakening fiscal discipline.

On the question of reducing the payroll tax, Mr. Mitchell unfortunately falls into the trap of the spenders who are trying to get rid of Gramm-Rudman. If, as Mr. Mitchell suggests, we were to ease the Gramm-Rudman deficit targets to accommodate a large payroll tax cut, the target adjustments or baseline changes would be likely, as in the 1987 changes, to punch a gaping hole in Gramm-Rudman.

If we believe that Gramm-Rudman works, we ought to let it work us down to a zero deficit before we change it. Defenders of Gramm-Rudman's effectiveness have to resist the temptation to make changes every time we see a proposal we like.

Representative Bill Frenzel
Ranking Republican Member
House Committee on the Budget
Washington, DC

Domestic Spending Escapes Axe

Dear Sir:

Mr. Mitchell shows in "The Grim Truth About Gramm-Rudman" that in the five fiscal years before Gramm-Rudman, 1980-85, real federal expenditures rose by 4 percent per annum, whereas in the subsequent five years after Gramm-Rudman went into effect, the increase was only 1.4 percent. (He uses the FY 1991 budget as an indication of 1990 expenditures, as do I in what follows.) Some of your readers may find the following breakdown of this expenditure change relevant to assessing the effectiveness and wisdom of Gramm-Rudman.

Annual Percent Change in Real Federal Expenditures

	Total	Defense	Interest	Other
1980-85	4.0	7.0	13.0	1.3
1985-90	1.4	0.9	2.8	1.3

It appears that the parts of the budget most needing restraint—domestic programs—escaped the Gramm-Rudman axe.

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Herbert Stein
Senior Fellow
American Enterprise Institute
Washington, DC

Political Distinction Must Be Maintained

Dear Sir:

Stephen Moore's "Flee Market: More Refugees at Lower Cost" (Spring 1990) offers many fresh and important insights. His calls for a more generous policy toward refugees and for a positive response to migrants from newly freed nations of Eastern Europe will find strong support from across the political spectrum. Two of his points, however, need to be challenged because they would detract from the positive refugee policy he aims to further.

First, it is a serious mistake to collapse the distinction between economic and political refugees or to apply current methods for admitting political refugees to the regular immigration stream, including economic immigrants.

The protection of political refugees is one of the few international human rights standards upheld by a broad spectrum of nations. Such protection does not imply that people facing political persecution are somehow more deserving of aid than those facing starvation. It does, however, proclaim that migration and reception are especially apt solutions for this group.

At a time when human rights violations continue at depressingly high levels, despite encouraging moves by several countries toward democracy, we would be ill-advised to weaken this widely supported standard, which offers prospects of hope and rescue for the millions who qualify for it.

LBOs for Immigrants?

Second, while we might well investigate alternative funding mechanisms for refugees, we should not contemplate shifting the entire financial burden to the private sector. A fully private system would allow rich communities to "buy" refugees admission into the U.S., while denying opportunities for rescue to those from poor communities or groups that have not yet established a presence in this country. Instead, I believe conservatives and liberals should join to develop mechanisms that promote public-private partnerships for funding refugees, especially in ways that use federal support to leverage new private monies. That would result in a system of which we could all be proud—one that simultaneously promotes freedom, generosity, and opportunity.

Gary E. Rubin
Director of National Affairs
American Jewish Committee
New York, NY

Islam, A Tolerant Faith

Dear Sir:

Douglas Streusand's article on Islam entitled "Abraham's Other Children: Is Islam An Enemy of the West?" (Fall 1989) provides a healthy corrective to the increasingly prevalent view in some quarters that Islam is joining (or replacing) Marxism-Leninism as the most important enemy of the West.

Mr. Streusand is on target in emphasizing the similarities among Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. He also correctly argues that Islam incorporates much of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Christendom and Islam are indeed "sister civilizations," as Bernard Lewis has observed, whose "essential kinship" sets them apart from the civilizations of India and China. Islam as a self-conscious inheritor of the two prior Abrahamic monotheisms is most clearly revealed in the Koran itself.

Respect for "Children of Israel"

"Truly God chose Adam and Noah and the house of Abraham in one line of descent," the Koran states. It admonishes adherents to "Let your word be: 'We believe in God and what has been revealed to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the tribes, and to Moses, to Jesus, and the prophets, from their Lord.'" The Koran counsels discussion with "people of the Book" (Jews and Christians) only in "courteous terms," and urges Moslems to inform such interlocutors that "We believe in what has been sent down to us and sent down to you. Our God and your God are One." Special emphasis is placed on Jesus, "Mary's son, the messenger of God, eminent in this world and in the age to come." The Koran recognizes attachment of the "children of Israel" to Palestine, quoting Moses urging his people to "enter the holy land which God has decreed for you."

As Mr. Streusand maintains, Moslem tradition highlights the charity of God, whom the Koran describes as "ever forgiving and merciful." Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam insists on each individual's moral responsibility to his fellow man, especially through the giving of alms, and its ethical vision encompasses the Ten Commandments. Islam is certainly not a religion incorrigibly opposed to the West, but rather an adaptation and extension of many of the deepest convictions that have traditionally informed western monotheism. What are noteworthy are the commonalities in morality and values that link the three Abrahamic revelations, not differences in dogma and practice.

Judge Leaders by Their Actions

Mr. Streusand might best have eschewed use of the emotive word "fundamentalism," which imposes a western category of analysis in a fashion that is more confusing than enlightening. Nevertheless, he correctly argues that politically activist Islam dates from the religion's first century but has never achieved dominance over large areas for ex-

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tended periods. Kharijites, Qarmatians, Ismailis, and Wahabis have all appeared in Moslem history, but always have been contained or domesticated. Currently, revolutionary Islamic utopianism emanating from Iran is on the wane, and moderate and/or secular tendencies are showing new signs of vitality in important parts of the Moslem world. Progress toward resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may help to vitiate Islamic extremism.

Mr. Streusand suggests that Khomeini, Assad, and Qadhafi have been dangerous because of their sponsorship of terrorism, *not* because of their profession of Islam. His point is well taken. Middle Eastern leaders (like leaders everywhere) should be judged by their actions, not by their religion. Imagine the outrage that would ensue from any suggestion that Judaism or Christianity are inherently perverse creeds because a handful of their prominent believers have abetted violence or terrorism! Islam deserves similar consideration, especially given the fact that it has arguably demonstrated greater toleration of religious diversity and social pluralism over the entire course of its history than have either of its two sister faiths.

Antony T. Sullivan
Center for Near Eastern and
North African Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI



Islam is certainly not a religion incorrigibly opposed to the West, but rather an adaptation and extension of many of the deepest convictions that have traditionally informed western monotheism.

—Antony T. Sullivan

Stop Gerrymandering

Dear Sir:

I thought at least one of the participants in "The Vision Thing: Conservatives Take Aim at the '90s" (Spring 1990) would come out loud and strong for an end to the 200-year-old gerrymander system of electing our "representatives."

Then I had hopes that Representative Vin Weber would tell us why the ratio of total votes cast for Republican versus Democratic candidates in no way compares with the Republican/Democrat ratio of elected representatives in the House. The ratios compare in the Senate but not where "district drawing contests" are run by and for politicians.

Worse than the fact that the House is not representative of the voters is the fact that the House is given the exclusive right (in Section 7 of the Constitution) to author "revenue bills," yet the blame or credit for the budget is always given to the president, not the speaker of the House.

Geography may have been a valid basis for selecting representatives when we all knew our neighbors for miles around, but when most of us don't know who lives on our street, representatives should run at large, as do senators. Today, more than half the citizens have contrarious representatives. Under the at-large system, each of us could have someone to represent at least one of our views.

Robert Hawkins
Chairman of the Board
University of Santa Barbara
Santa Barbara, CA

Black-Robed Bandits

Dear Sir:

I am utterly fascinated by the statements of 39 "conservative leaders" detailing what should be the 10 "most important foreign and domestic policy priorities" for the conservative movement in the 1990s. However, my fascination lies less with the areas covered than with those ignored by the overwhelming majority of the respondents: namely, the unscrupulous seizure and exercise by the federal judiciary of legislative power, and the horrible increase of crime nationwide, in part the result of such a shift of power.

It is astounding that of the 39 conservatives included, no less than 35 seem never to have heard of the creeping *coup d'etat* accomplished by these non-elected and non-responsible but power-hungry black-robed men and women who, in only a couple of decades, have lawlessly wrested from the people and their legislatures their hitherto established rights to the control of prisons, schools, welfare institutions, and even of the very structure of state governments. Judges have even found Supreme Court blessing for the exercise of the power of taxation—a blessing abrogating our gloriously won right to taxation with representation!

Relative to this sleazy triumph, it seems odd that neither Adam Meyerson nor Grover Norquist, who correctly oppose more taxes, saw fit to explain how we the people are to resist the tax-levies of such non-elected and life-tenured officials.

It is equally astounding that no less than 33 of the respondents fail

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to regard as a problem the violent crime that year after year relentlessly and increasingly violates our inalienable rights. Of the lonely six who did list crime as a problem, only Daniel Popeo of the Washington Legal Foundation has the honor of emphasizing both crime and judicial activism.

Park Chamberlain
Woodside, CA

Siding with Dictators

Dear Sir:

In "The Vision Thing" Pete du Pont succinctly states, "We should delay rejoicing until we can join the people of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the other oppressed states in celebration." I agree with him.

For the first time in the past 50 years, free elections were held in February in Lithuania and later in the other two Baltic states. The parliaments were chosen by democratic balloting, sanitized of the "stuffed ballot box" syndrome of Stalin (who occupied the Baltic states in June 1940) and his successors.

The Lithuanian state has existed formally since 1251, when, in accordance with the diplomatic practice of that time, Pope Innocent IV conferred the royal crown upon the reigning monarch of Lithuania, King Mindaugas I.

Estonia and Latvia are following the Baltic independence lead of Lithuania. The three Baltic republics are about to form an economic entity that is more than self-sufficient, provided they can disentangle themselves from Moscow's clutches.

Those who firmly believe in the lasting value of the principles promulgated by America's Declaration of Independence should take a dim view of anybody who claims that a very sensitive issue may necessitate supporting demands made by a dictator, Mikhail Gorbachev, who was deposed by a massive landslide in a formal election, certified by independent observers as genuine.

However, President Bush seems to be more fascinated by dictators such as Deng Xiaoping of the Tiananmen Square massacre fame, or counterparts further west, of the Tbilisi massacre fame, who are euphemistically called "presidents" by their hand-picked-majority "parliaments."

Romas A. Shatas
Americans for Baltic Independence
Sunny Hill, FL

Geography may have been a valid basis for selecting representatives when we all knew our neighbors for miles around, but when most of us don't know who lives on our street, representatives should run at large, as do senators.
—Robert Hawkins

Undue Process

Dear Sir:

I'm glad I didn't obey my initial impulse to skip "The Vision Thing." It most certainly was not ho-hum. I'm rereading it, finding many proposals to ponder, proposals that you don't encounter elsewhere.

Gary Bauer's first agenda item, "Protect the rights of parents," is an example. He says, "The doors of the home must be a barrier against public authority." We're all against child abuse, but under the guise of combatting child abuse the states have set up bureaucratic dictatorships that arrogate to themselves unconstitutional powers. Homes are entered without warrants on the basis of unconfirmed and often anonymous reports; children are taken from schools and baby-sitters; punishments such as taking the child and placing him with strangers are inflicted without proof of guilt.

Bauer does well to speak of "due-process guarantees." In this area they don't exist. Guilt is judged under laws so vague that anything can be child abuse. For example, one directive to Oregon social workers includes as neglect, "Failure, whether intentional or otherwise, to provide...guidance." And abuse includes "expressions of an intention to inflict...punishment." Unless you've given birth to an angel, you're bound to have done one or the other.

The process is counterproductive, partly because the system is so clogged with complaints generated by the agency's actions. Mandatory reporting laws for professionals working with children frustrate the efforts of those professionals, who are generally much more knowledgeable than those to whom they must report. There is also a traumatic effect on the conscientious family that is "visited," and a chilling effect on other families that know about it. It is not just the parents who suffer; it is also, often more grievously, the children.

Elizabeth Richman
Alsea, OR

Avoid Quicksand

Dear Sir:

It was a great idea to gather many of the best conservative thinkers in "The Vision Thing" to express their opinions of the most pressing problems nationally and their thoughts for solutions. Thomas J. Bray hits a most important nail on the head when he writes, "Forget about banning abortion." Republicans should avoid this issue. The high moral ground may be quicksand.

James L. Robson
LaBelle, FL

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

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Just as freedom is too important to be left exclusively to the libertarians, the family is too important to be left exclusively to the pro-family groups.

Adam Meyerson
The Vision Thing, Continued
A Conservative Research Agenda for the '90s

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